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HISTORY IS HELL: Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman and His Biographers

By Rodney Earl Walton

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Rodney Earl Walton served in the U.S. Army from 1969 to 1973, including a year as an intelligence officer in Vietnam. In 1976 he earned a law degree from Cornell and worked as a civil litigation attorney in South Florida for more than twenty years. In 2009, he earned a Ph.D in history from Florida International University, where he has taught as an adjunct since 2001. His first book was entitled Big Guns, Brave Men: Mobile Artillery Observers and the Battle for Okinawa (2013). He wishes to thank Professor Darden Asbury Pyron and graduate student Jason Chohonis for their assistance.

This article traces the biographical interpretation of William Tecumseh Sherman over the past 150 years. Sherman (1820-1891) is famous not only for his exploits as a Civil War general (the capture of Atlanta and the “March to the Sea”) but also for one of the most well-known phrases in the American lexicon: “War is hell!” Sherman’s exploits are not confined to America but have been a source of international examination as well. The General continues to fascinate readers despite the current academic trend away from a focus on great historical figures and toward a focus on social and cultural issues. Since 1991, over 20 biographies of Sherman have been published, with more planned in the coming years.

This article asserts that the biographical treatment of Sherman has been anything but consistent. We trace the evolution of his depiction from a well-adjusted, popular, sociable, and affable individual to that of a tormented, dark, and unstable individual. Civil War students can accordingly be forgiven for posing the question: “Will the real William Tecumseh Sherman please stand up?”

The historical interpretation of Sherman did not take place in a vacuum. Sherman’s biographers, whether academic historians or not,
were frequently under the influence of the various schools of Civil War interpretation in vogue at the time their biography was being written. This article will briefly summarize six significant interpretive theories of the Civil War and examine how the biographical treatment of Sherman meshed with historical paradigm in force at the time.

This does not examine Sherman’s autobiography, specialized biographies (which focus on a single aspect of Sherman’s life), campaign studies (which focus on a single Sherman military operation), biographies written primarily for a juvenile or adolescent audience, or biographies published after 2001.

In the years following the Civil War up through the early 1890s, there were two competing schools of historical interpretation concerning the Civil War. Both were rooted in justifying the political and military actions taken during the conflict. One of these two is now called the “Southern School” but is alternatively referred to as the “Lost Cause” or “Rebel School.” The Southern School held that the South was a separate nation whose legitimate goal of independence had been unjustly crushed by the North. This view relied heavily on legal arguments based on the compromise which had by inference legitimized slavery in the Constitutional Compromise of 1787. The North was depicted as an imperialistic aggressor imposing its will on the Southern states in complete disregard of Constitutional law.

The Yankee or Northern School was directly opposed to the view of the Southern School. Yankee School theorists argued that slavery was incompatible with America’s national spirit, as embodied in the Declaration of Independence. Consequently, the Northern had no sympathy for the southern cause. Fortunately for Sherman, his biographers immediately after the war were all proponents of the Yankee School.

It was in the interest of the Yankee School historians to make Sherman as heroic a figure as possible. If the Northern leader who had caused the greatest amount of damage to the deep South (and in particular, to South Carolina) was noble and heroic, then the North was more than just an evil imperialistic aggressor. If Sherman was virtuous and idealistic, then the Northern cause could likewise be seen to be virtuous and idealistic. This would not be the last time that historians would interpret Sherman’s life as one that fit neatly within the confines of the historical paradigm in vogue at the time.

The first four biographies of Sherman appeared in 1864 and 1865 (the last two years of the Civil War). The first, an 1864 work by publisher Thomas Robinson Dawley (1832-1904), set the Yankee school tone. It made no critical analysis of Sherman but praised him as a “great general,” “great genius,” and “hero of the Southwest.” In marked contrast with post-1990 biographers (such as Marszalek, Fellman, and Kennett), Dawley portrayed Sherman as living “very happily” with his wife.

Around February 1865 clergyman Phineas Camp Headley (1819-1903) produced a work which portrayed Sherman as a faultless hero. “General Sherman’s character from childhood has been above reproof,” wrote Headley, “and his honor unsullied.” In marked contrast with post-1990 biographers (such as Marszalek, Fellman, and Kennett), Dawley portrayed Sherman as living “very happily” with his wife. Around February 1865 clergyman Phineas Camp Headley (1819-1903) produced a work which portrayed Sherman as a faultless hero. “General Sherman’s character from childhood has been above reproach,” wrote Headley, “and his honor unsullied.”

The next 1865 biography is an important piece of primary source material. Sherman and His Campaigns: A Military Biography was written by two military officers: Col. S. M. Bowman and Lt.-Col. R. B. Irwin. Bowman was Sherman’s California lawyer, served as a colonel in Sherman’s army, and “became a student of his career.” Sherman had personally assisted Bowman in the collection of biographical data which contained pro-Sherman propaganda typical of the Yankee School. Sherman must have been impressed with the work of Bowman. In 1875, when Sherman’s own Memoirs came under historical attack from some quarters, Sherman hired Bowman to coordinate all activity related to the defense of the Memoirs.
Walton

Faunt Le Roy Senour (1824-1910), a clergyman who had personally observed General Sherman during his campaigns, wrote the third and final 1865 biography of Sherman. Senour distinguished himself by being the most worshipful of all of Sherman’s biographers (past and future). Generals Sherman, Grant, Sheridan, and Thomas were divine answers in response to the people who “prayed that God would raise up men who would lead our brave armies on to victory and glory.” On the other hand, the city of Richmond, for example, was a “nest of traitors and treason.”

Following the initial burst of enthusiasm for Sherman biographies in 1864 and 1865, no adult-level biographies of Sherman were published for 25 years. Such “dry spells” are not unusual in the historiography of General Sherman. Several years can go by with no biographical interpretation of Sherman being written. Then a flurry of Sherman biographies will appear in a very short period of years. It is interesting to note that both the 1890s and the 1990s saw such a flurry of interest in Sherman. It is also interesting to note that two of the finest biographies of Sherman appeared in very close proximity to each other (around 1930).

General Sherman died of pneumonia on 14 February 1891. He was fondly remembered by a whole rash of writers and “his death called forth a perfect flood of reminiscences.” The result was an outpouring of what will be referred to here as “eulogy” biographies. This deluge of writing artificially resuscitated the vitality of the Yankee School of interpretation—at least as far as the interpretation of Sherman was concerned.

Among these eulogy biographies were those of Civil War veteran Edward Chase, Henry Davenport Northrup (1836-1901), and writer Willis Fletcher Johnson (1857-1931). In light of the later attacks on Sherman as a racist, Johnson’s work was noteworthy since it contained the favorable endorsement of Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard. Since Howard was the founder of Howard University (an African-American institution) and a staunch friend of the black “Freedman” both in his public and private capacities, it was clear that he was no racist. General Howard, a long-time Sherman associate, also wrote his own reminiscences as part of an 1891 volume called Life and Reminiscences of General Wm. T. Sherman. The authors included an ex-president (Hayes), four generals, two senators, an admiral, and a former Secretary of the Interior (Carl Schurz).

Another 1891 eulogy biography, authored by writer James Penny Boyd (1836-1910), gave the reader a small glimmer of changes that would come to fruition late in the 20th Century. Although the tone of Boyd’s work is overwhelmingly complimentary to Sherman in traditional Yankee School style, it gave the first inkling of a theme of Sherman’s psychological unhappiness. Boyd described Sherman as a “dissatisfied, unrooted man” until the war broke out.

The last Sherman biography of the 19th Century was written in 1899 by bvt. Maj. Gen. Manning Ferguson Force (1824-1899). Although the heyday of the Nationalist school of interpretation was well under way by 1899 (see the discussion in the next section), Force’s General Sherman still belonged to the by then largely out-of-favor Yankee school of interpretation. Sherman was described by Force as being “the most picturesque figure of the civil war” and as having a character that “was absolutely pure and spotless.” In contrast to the dark portrayals of Sherman that would appear in the 1990s, Force’s Sherman had a “cheerful disposition” and was a “delightful companion.”

The biographies of Sherman written during the Yankee School tradition are important historical documents. While they may lack the historical rigor and documentation of later biographies, they capture the passion of the times in a way that cannot be replicated by more impartial biographers. Since several of the biographers actually knew Sherman or had first hand access to informants who knew Sherman, large parts of these biographies are primary source material.

In the period from approximately 1890 to approximately 1920, the reigning interpreters of the Civil War came from a group of historians
The year 1905 marked the appearance of the first and only Sherman biography to be written using the Nationalist School interpretation. *William T. Sherman* by Edward Robins (1862-1943) was intended to present a new objective view of Sherman. In keeping with the perspective of the Nationalist School, this book was not written by a compatriot, hero-worshipper or eulogist. Robins was a “great admirer of General Sherman” but nonetheless took him to task for his threatening letters to Confederate General Hardee at Savannah. What is most striking to the modern reader is Robins’ attitude toward Sherman’s racism. Although Robins was a Northerner, not only did he decline to criticize Sherman for his racist views, but also he went so far as to support Sherman on this point.

The favorable timing of the release of intimate historical data concerning Sherman was very fortunate for his legacy. The last decade of the 19th Century and the first decade of the 20th Century were significant in the biographical interpretation of Sherman, because it was during those two decades that two important sets of Sherman’s letters were published. These letters contained excerpts which were not only anti-Black but also anti-Jewish. Had these materials been released in the mid-1860s, they might have been quite detrimental to Sherman’s reputation during the Yankee School period.

The historians of the Nationalist School, however, found little to condemn in these writings of Sherman. After all, they saw Negroes as the catalyst which set off the war between the heroic North and the heroic South. Furthermore, Sherman’s post-war conduct had exemplified the spirit of national unity endorsed by the Nationalist School. Sherman had rendered assistance to several ex-Confederate Generals after the war. Thus Sherman’s life was found to be compatible with two seemingly contradictory schools of Civil War interpretation.

The massive casualties of World War I (1914-1918) led to a widespread disillusionment and re-evaluation of war. In an age of industrialized warfare, the Nationalist School view of a heroic war no longer seemed appropriate. For historians of the inter-war period (1918-1939), war was to be avoided if at all possible. Since the Civil War had not been avoided, someone must have made a mistake. This attitude gave rise the school of historical interpretation now called the “Blundering Generation” School. This school, which was highly influential from roughly 1920 to 1948, held that the Civil War was a great catastrophe. Professor J.G. Randall was a leading proponent of

now called the “Nationalist School.” In the view of this school, the Civil War was a healthy and necessary event for the rise of a new national spirit. Both the North and South were seen as heroic. The leading proponent of this interpretive school was a businessman turned historian named James Ford Rhodes (1848-1927), who asserted that “all the right is never on one side and all the wrong on the other.”

If both the North and South were virtuous, there must be some other villain in the drama. The catalyst for the conflict, in the Nationalist School interpretation, was the Negro. Rhodes not only opposed Negro suffrage but declared in 1905 that blacks were about a million years behind whites. In addition to portraying battles as “heroic struggles between brave men in blue and gray”, Rhodes and his followers popularized the use of the term “Civil War” rather than the previously used pro-Northern designation of “the Rebellion.” This name change was only one of several efforts by the Nationalist School to inject a less partisan view into the interpretation of the Civil War.

Although he was not an academic historian, for years James Ford Rhodes dominated American historical thinking about the Civil War “to a degree unmatched by any historian before or since.” In 1898, Rhodes even became president of the American Historical Association (AHA), the most prestigious historical association in the United States. It is thus not surprising that the only article concerning Sherman to ever appear in the *American Historical Review* was written by Rhodes himself in 1901.

The massive casualties of World War I (1914-1918) led to a widespread disillusionment and re-evaluation of war. In an age of industrialized warfare, the Nationalist School view of a heroic war no longer seemed appropriate. For historians of the inter-war period (1918-1939), war was to be avoided if at all possible. Since the Civil War had not been avoided, someone must have made a mistake. This attitude gave rise the school of historical interpretation now called the “Blundering Generation” School. This school, which was highly influential from roughly 1920 to 1948, held that the Civil War was a great catastrophe. Professor J.G. Randall was a leading proponent of
the “blundering generation” theory. He was supported by “Professor
A. O. Craven’s thesis of ‘the repressible conflict,’ and George Fort
Milton’s presentation of ‘the needless war.’”

Once again Sherman was fortunate in having led a life which
conformed to the ever-changing demands of the historical profession.
He did this despite the fact that there had been a complete reversal of
views on the issue of whether the war was heroic or not. Sherman fit
the paradigm of the Blundering Generation School very well, since he
had argued both in the 1860s and 1880s that the Civil War was “one of
the most causeless, foolish wars ever devised by the brain of man.”

This school de-emphasized the heroics of the war—a stance which
might have hurt Sherman’s historical reputation, since he was one of
the heroes of the war. Sherman, however, survived with his reputation
intact. Sherman gained some immunity from attack because he had
scrupulously avoided participation in political activities.

Another “dry spell” in Sherman historiography took place in the
24 years between the biography of Robins (1905) and the biography
of Liddell Hart (1929). When that dry spell ended, however, the
quality of the output was extraordinary. The era of the Great Depres-
sion gave birth to two of the finest biographies ever written about
General Sherman. Indeed, these two biographies appeared within
just three years of each other. By the early 1930s, Sherman had been
dead for 40 years as were virtually all of his contemporaries. First-
hand accounts had thus been largely exhausted and sufficient time
had elapsed to shift through not only a significant portion of Sher-
man’s correspondence but also through the observations of his con-
temporaries. This allowed for the presentation of a balanced picture
of Sherman at a time when his living memory was still present.

The first of these two outstanding biographies was written by the
widely-published English military correspondent and tactician Sir

Princeton professor James
McPherson, who in 1988 published a best-selling single volume his-
tory of the Civil War, asserted that Liddell Hart’s book was “the best
place to start” for “important insights on Sherman.”

Liddell Hart was greatly influenced by the horror of the static trench warfare
of World War I. From 1914 to 1918, Liddell Hart had served with
the King’s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry rising to the wartime rank
of captain.

Liddell Hart was an advocate of mobile warfare and praised Sher-
man for adopting it. Consistent with his World War I experience,
Liddell Hart argued that frontal attack had become “an almost
hopeless venture.” He greatly admired Sherman’s tendency to make
indirect approaches towards the enemy rather than head-on assaults. He interpreted Sherman’s return to Washington, D.C., in May 1865 (after having left there in 1861) as a “great circular march ... The greatest strategic circle in military history.” As if to anticipate and rebut the future Fellman (1995), Hirshson (1997), Marszalek (1993), and Kennett (2001) biographies, Liddell Hart maintained that only “superficial observers” regarded Sherman as “an erratic genius, brilliant but unstable.”

_Sherman: the Fighting Prophet_ by journalist Lloyd Lewis (1891-1949) is, in the opinion of this author and several other Sherman biographers, the single most significant biography on Sherman. For example, Earl Schenck Miers, who wrote his own biography of Sherman in 1951, asserted in the _Encyclopaedia Britannica_ that Lewis had written “The definitive biography of Sherman.” In 1969, John Y. Simon called it “the best of the biographies.” Even at the cusp of the 21st century (1993), English professor and Sherman scholar Mark Coburn described Lewis’s work as the “best now available.” This same opinion has been expressed even by those like Walters (1948 and 1973) whose view of Sherman was very unfavorable. As the title of the book suggests, Lewis was impressed with Sherman’s ability to forecast events—a gift of logic rather than mysticism.

In contrast to the unstable and philandering Sherman of the 1990s psycho-biographies, Lewis depicted a Sherman whose “reputation for ‘steadiness’ ... had been so universal that “no objection was ever made by ladies of Charleston to permitting their daughters to attend parties at which Lieut. Sherman would be present.” Lewis was less interested in tactics and strategy than Liddell Hart (1929) and more interested in “how Sherman learned about war and the nature of military leadership from men such as Grant.” In Lewis’s view, Sherman, “Grant, and the Westerners had triumphed largely because they had approached the war with a psychology diametrically opposed to the feudal traditions of chivalry.” In an oft-repeated phrase, Lewis saw Sherman as a general who “had never clearly won a battle, nor ever failed to win a campaign.”

In a message likely to please both a general public reacting against the massive casualties of World War I and the Blundering Generation theorists of academia, Lewis pointed out that Sherman’s foster father found Sherman “most worthy of commendation” for the “care you have taken to preserve your men.” Despite the virtuoso skill which Lewis displayed in portraying Sherman, the Lewis biography may nonetheless be gradually edged aside as the “definitive biography” in years to come. Although Lewis provided a short bibliographic essay for each chapter, his work fails to meet current academic standards for documentation, since he had no footnotes.

For nineteen years following the Lewis biography, there were no further significant biographies on Sherman. By the early 1950s, the Blundering Generation School of thought was largely out of vogue in academia. In the field of Sherman historiography, however, that school of thought received a brief stay of execution from a non-academician. The impact of the view which Earl Schenck Miers (1910-1972) had on the interpretation of Sherman extends beyond that of his 1951 book. Miers’s real influence is perhaps more likely to be felt through his authorship of the _Encyclopedia Britannica_ article concerning Sherman, which was viewed by more people than any one book.

Miers was a prolific author of both adult and juvenile literature, who held undergraduate and master’s degrees from Rutgers, despite having been unable to control a pencil (due to cerebral palsy). Miers’s study was described by one leading Blundering Generation School theorist as “a most competent piece of research, characterization, and a bill of indictment of a great general who, as the author says in his title, “marched to Hell.” Miers himself described this book as focusing on “Sherman’s temperament and fighting style.”

The Sherman he described was suffering from “essential insecurity,” was full of violent dislikes and passions, was impatient, spoke with a quick nervous voice, and was full of quirks and prejudices. Miers’s work thus began to anticipate the pseudo-psychoanalytical biographies of Sherman that would be done in the 1990s.

Although Miers was not an academician, he represented the transition between two academic theories of Civil War interpretation. His work met the specifications of the Blundering Generation theorists, but he himself was very concerned with the issue of what it meant to be an American. This last issue would be of paramount importance to the next generation of Civil War interpreters.

The American Studies School (or Consensus School) interpretation of the Civil War was in vogue in academic circles from approximately 1948 to 1968. This school advocated the proposition of “American exceptionalism”—the assertion that the United States is quite distinct from the rest of the world because there has been so little class conflict in America. Using this interpretation, the Civil War posed a problem to the historians of this school. The War Between the States was not consistent with the national unity they saw as so central to American tradition. These historians thus interpreted the Civil War as a national aberration caused by a great gap between the nature of the 19th century South and the rest of America. The 1950s and 1960s also brought forth some fine narrowly-focused specialization to the study...
of Sherman. Biographers like Robert G. Atkinnon and Dwight L. Clarke focused on a single aspect of Sherman’s life, often unrelated to his Civil War exploits.87

The only American School Sherman biography fitting the criteria for this study was produced by James M. Merrill in 1971.88 Merrill was the recipient of three battle stars for service as a naval officer in the Pacific Theater during World War II.89 In those chaotic days of the Kent State killings, race riots, an increasing crime rate, and the Vietnam War controversy, Merrill saw in Sherman a man who still had something to teach the modern generation.

Today there is a need for an understanding of Sherman’s sense of human values, his devotion to law and order, his ability to rise above partisanship, his concept of the soldier’s task in its relation to society and to peace in the world.90

In contrast to the disturbed and philandering Sherman that would appear in the biographies of the 1990s, Merrill’s Sherman “was, above all, deeply devoted to his family.”91 Instead of the image prevalent in textbooks “of Sherman as the fiercest of all battle captains,” Merrill’s Sherman was a “warm man” with a “vital personality.”92 This view would be vehemently attacked during the next interpretive period.

A new school of Civil War interpretation came into vogue during the late 1960s and early 1970s. In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, this school was anti-establishment and leftist in its political orientation. Although this interpretation is too current to have a generally agreed upon name, it will be referred to as the “Social History School” because of its focus on issues of race, gender, and class (RGC).93 This New Left school remains dominant well into the second decade of the new millennium.94

During this period, the interest of academic historians in the military and political history of the Civil War was greatly diminished with a refocus on slavery and ethnicity. A contemporary professor lecturing on July 1863 might highlight the New York City draft riots rather than the Battle of Gettysburg. Even America’s premier battlefield interpreter—the National Park Service—seemed to hop on the Social History bandwagon. For the 150th anniversary of the opening shots of the Civil War, Park Service living history demonstrations focused on the role of blacks and women. A Fort Sumter Park Service spokesman announced “We’re very clear that we don’t see this as a celebration but rather as a somber time.” Thus, in an apparent contrast to the enthusiasm shown for the study of the conflict during the Civil War centennial (1961-1965), for the National Park Service, the sesquicentennial (2011-2015) would be a time for commemoration but not celebration.95

As in the Yankee School (1861-1890), for the Social History School the South was the fatally flawed villain in the drama that we call the Civil War. Unlike the Yankee School, however, the Union was also viewed with substantial suspicion by these social theorists because of the North’s intensely capitalist structure. The new school took a cynical view of ideas and idealism while emphasizing motives of self-interest and ambition.

The 1970s not only saw an American disenchantment with the war in Vietnam and its “search and destroy” missions, but also a disenchantment with the psychological makeup of the personalities then believed to be primarily responsible for the U.S. involvement in Vietnam. It was in this environment that John Bennett Walters took a fling at the Sherman as a “bad guy” thesis. Walters (1912-1979) was a history and political science professor at Montevallo College in Alabama. The perspective of his 1973 book (and an earlier 1948 article on Sherman) was from the point of a view of a circle of historians who saw the North as “evil” and the South as “good.”96

In Walters’ 1973 Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War Sherman begins to take on personality traits of Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon in that he is portrayed as having “almost overbearing egotism and an overdeveloped sense of dignity ... emphasis on self, with attendant braggadocio,. . . sense of inadequacy ... self-pity ... great mental anguish, [and] periods of gloom and despair.”97 These deficiencies of personality were presumably the reason for Sherman’s alleged violation of “the laws of civilized war.”98 Walters made specific reference to the World War II war crimes trials as well as to the trials arising out of the My Lai incident in Vietnam.99 In one critic’s view, Walters portrayed Sherman as “a barbarian who threw open the doors to the madness of warfare and all its cruelties; thus he is responsible for the horrors of modern warfare.”100

Richard Wheeler’s We Knew William Tecumseh Sherman, which appeared in 1977, was aimed much more at a popular audience than Walter’s very academic book.101 Wheeler, a non-academic writer and Marine Corps veteran, did not list Walters’ book in his extensive bibliography. Nonetheless Wheeler’s book could be interpreted as a popular reply to Walters’ war crime accusations. Wheeler let others do much of the talking for him since most of his book was made up of direct quotations from people who had known Sherman or at least had made personal observations about him. Wheeler himself leaped to the defense of Sherman’s strategy of destructive warfare.102
A renewed interest in the Civil War was sparked by “Ken Burns’ blockbuster ‘The Civil War,’ a PBS documentary that in September 1990 captivated American television audiences on five successive nights.” This documentary included photos from Sherman’s campaigns and interpreted Sherman’s capture of Atlanta as playing a significant role in the re-election of Lincoln in 1864. The years that followed saw a substantial interest in the life of Sherman. Indeed, one Sherman biographer referred to the 1990s as “Cump’s Decade.”

The now mainstream Social History School historians saw men like Sherman as mere “dead white males on horseback” and thus unworthy of further attention. For the thoroughbred New Left historian, biographies of generals was something “one doesn’t do.” The reaction against the detailed study of individuals was vehement. In 2009, professor and academic historian David Nasaw observed that “[c]ollege and university libraries, including my own, adhere to collection protocols that discourage the purchase of biographies.” Nasaw went on to explain that many leading journals, including the prestigious American Historical Review in which he was writing, not only avoided publishing biographical articles but also generally declined to even publish book reviews of biographies. Thus, throughout the dominance of the Social History School, the elite American university history departments elected to ignore Central American figures like Sherman.

In 1990, academic military historians began a trend of combining Social History School ideas in their works. Marsha Landreth’s William T. Sherman was a relatively short book aimed at a popular audience with excellent maps, illustrations, and photos focusing on the military aspects of Sherman’s career. Consistent with the Social History School, Landreth carefully mentioned issues of gender and issues of race.

Charles Royster (1944 - ), a professor at LSU and former Air Force officer had previously edited a re-publication of Sherman’s Memoirs (1990). Royster apparently sought to make military history more palatable to the culturally-focused academic mainstream by asserting that the history of American warfare was in fact “a branch of the history of American thought and culture.” Royster’s 1991 book was about the progress to a more ruthless type of warfare that “shattered certain ethical restraints, which have not been restored in America’s subsequent wars.” Royster responded to Southern critics of Sherman [like Walters (1948 and 1973)] by arguing that Stonewall Jackson, a Southern general, “was well in advance of the northerner in his early and zesty embrace of the concept of war as inherently unlimited and remorselessly destructive.”

If, as the academic social historians contended, historians were competent to analyze the social structure, then it stands to reason that sociologists must be competent to analyze history. One professor of sociology to take advantage of this new corollary was Charles Edmund Vetter of Centenary College in Shreveport, Louisiana. Vetter’s book on Sherman was a direct response to Walters 1973 volume furiously attacking Sherman. Vetter saw Walters’ approach as overly monolithic since “after the war Sherman urged his friends to work together, both North and South, to restore the country to its former prosperity.” Accordingly, Vetter titled his book so as to be both an echo of and a rebuttal to Walters. Sherman: Merchant of Terror, Advocate of Peace argued that Walters’s view was “moralistic, which infringes on his objectivity.”

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John Marszalek (1939 - ), a history professor at Mississippi State University, focused much of his previous work on African-American history—a major area of interest to the Social History School. Marszalek’s 1993 biography of Sherman was described as being “definitive” in The Publisher and Choice. Although many readers may continue to prefer the readability and analysis of earlier classic Sherman biographers like Lewis (1932) and Liddell Hart (1930), Marszalek’s work is likely to remain highly influential for some time to come because of the impressive documentation.
Marszalek, whose own biographical sketch failed to reveal any training in psychology or psychiatry, nonetheless undertook to produce a psychological analysis of Sherman.\textsuperscript{110} He argued that the sudden death and financial problems of Sherman’s father were “pivotal events in Sherman’s life” causing him to worry throughout his life “that his death would leave his wife and children poor and dependent.”\textsuperscript{111}

Marszalek then proceeded to assert that Sherman’s childhood was full of “parental and familial ambiguity” which caused him to be virtually obsessed with achieving order.\textsuperscript{112} This central thesis of the work would be attacked as unsupported and “unconvincing” not only by reviewers (such as Thomas Fleming in \textit{The New York Times Book Review}) but also by future Sherman biographers like Hirshson (1997).\textsuperscript{113} Despite the constant references to an alleged obsession for stability, however, Marszalek’s biography of Sherman could still be called sympathetic.\textsuperscript{114}

Consistent with the growing interest in women’s history fostered by the Social History School, Marszalek was one of the first authors to make a detailed exploration of Sherman’s relationship with his wife and other women.\textsuperscript{115} Marszalek also did not mince any words about Sherman’s racism. His Sherman had “anti-black attitudes.”\textsuperscript{116} Marszalek’s biography did not condemn Sherman even though it raised the issues of an unstable psyche and extra-marital affairs. This book laid the groundwork for a new wave of discussions.

Perhaps the apex of the New Left School interpretation of Sherman was reached with Michael Fellman’s biography entitled \textit{Citizen Sherman: A Life of William Tecumseh Sherman}.\textsuperscript{117} Fellman (1943-2012) has been posthumously described by a scholarly admirer as “a hippie at heart” who deliberately eschewed heroic models. Fellman was, according to that obituary, “an opponent of militarism who devoted a lifetime to the study of war.” He took “delight in upending conventional military history.”\textsuperscript{118} A biographical sketch published during Fellman’s lifetime described him as “a historian whose books illuminate the social and psychological experience of war.”\textsuperscript{119}

Fellman was described as “a bold and provocative scholar” who “embraced humanitarian and liberal causes throughout his life.”\textsuperscript{120} He had been born in Madison, Wisconsin, a city which later became a hot bed of anti-war radicalism during the Vietnam War. Fellman received his Ph.D. from Northwestern University near the peak of the Vietnam War (1969). He immediately thereafter took a job in Canada teaching history at the Simon Fraser University, where many of his students were American draft resister. Fellman taught at that British Columbia institution for the remainder of his life. An obituary noted that although Fellman became “an American-Canadian dual citizen, he liked to claim that he was ‘equally alienated from two societies’. “\textsuperscript{121}

Fellman portrayed Sherman as depressed, furious, angry, and repelling.\textsuperscript{122} As prominent Civil War scholar Gary Gallagher noted in his book review, Fellman presented “perhaps the darkest portrait of William Tecumseh Sherman since former Confederates wrote about their great antagonist.”\textsuperscript{123} Fellman (without any listed mental health professional credentials) diagnosed Sherman as suffering from “clinical depression,” “obsessiveness,” and “delusional misjudgments.”\textsuperscript{124} Fellman’s Sherman was “a seething cauldron of hostility” due to a “frustrating childhood” and an “unhappy marriage.”\textsuperscript{125} As one historical commentator noted, “[i]n Fellman’s mind, the Union general was a dangerous and unstable man.”\textsuperscript{126}

Consistent with the anti-military philosophy of the Social History School, Fellman spent little time on the details of Sherman’s military campaigns. He preferred instead to focus on Sherman’s personal life. He had a “trial separation” from her, but since “divorce was unthinkable ... they tortured one another to the grave.”\textsuperscript{127} In contrast to the vast majority of biographers who had looked at Sherman, Fellman asserted that Sherman engaged in “philandering” and that Sherman “must have been a very energetic womanizer.”\textsuperscript{128} Two alleged lovers (sculptress Vinnie Ream and Army widow Mary Audenreid) were even named.\textsuperscript{129} As one reviewer noted, Fellman’s allegations concerning “Sherman’s many love affairs are unsubstantiated and could easily be seen as mere flirtations.” The same reviewer, however, also praised Fellman’s work as “perhaps the best psychological biography of Sherman to date.”\textsuperscript{130}

Fellman was so busy psychoanalyzing Sherman’s psyche that he chose to ignore the eye witness testimony contradicting his book’s theories about a maladjusted Sherman.\textsuperscript{131} Fellman’s Sherman was not only chronically unhappy and sometimes mentally ill but also a bigot against Blacks, Mexicans, American Indians, and Jews. In general, Fellman’s Sherman was so unappealing that Fellman’s book cannot adequately respond to the question put forth by Gary Gallagher in his review: “And how did Sherman—so unsympathetic a character in Mr. Fellman’s reading—earn devotion from his soldiers and adulation from fellow Northerners?”\textsuperscript{132}

Given that Fellman’s 1995 interpretation had been so controversial, it should be no surprise that a response was not long in coming. That response, however, would attempt to rebut Fellman by falling into the same trap as Fellman. Stanley P. Hirshson (1928-2003), a professor of history at Queens College, City University of New York, made a
direct attack on the Social History School. In his 1997 biography The White Tecumseh: A Biography of General William T. Sherman he decried Fellman’s “deemphasis of Sherman’s military career, which is, after all, the reason why he is today remembered.” Hirshson claimed to have written a unique biography since it was more focused on military history than previous biographers and it was based upon a review of 1500 regimental histories of which 600 referred to Sherman. Hirshson also claimed that his biography was “far more sympathetic to Sherman than any of the” other 1990s biographies of Sherman.

Hirshson’s biography nonetheless contained elements reflective of the 1990s. He felt compelled, for example, to be “psychologically penetrating” as his book cover advertises. In contrast to the cheerful, happy Sherman depicted in the biographies of the Yankee School, Hirshson’s Sherman was from his early days “a brilliant but tormented soul” who “knew much sadness and only occasional happiness.” Hirshson diagnosed Sherman’s “troubles” as coming “not from the loss of his father but from the realization that mental instability plagued his mother’s family. Sherman’s maternal grandmother, his maternal uncle, and his son Tom all died in, or spent years in, insane asylums.”

Hirshson attacked Fellman’s biography with ferocity, stating that he disagreed with it completely and that he did “not see Sherman as a racist, an anti-Semite, and a philanderer.” Hirshson saw Sherman as a man who theoretically believed in the superiority of the white race but who on a personal level got along very well with African-Americans. Furthermore, Hirshson insisted that although Sherman always enjoyed flirting with women, “absolutely no evidence exists to show that he carried on with them.” He cited testimony from Sherman’s youngest son to the effect that both Sherman and his wife immensely enjoyed each other’s company.

The fascination with Sherman continued into the 21st century with the 2001 publication of Lee Kennett’s Sherman: A Soldier’s Life. Although a Southern historian from the University of Georgia, Kennett (1931-2011) rejected the harsh attack approach used by some earlier Southern historians like Walters (1973 and 1948) and Coulter (1931). In an apparent reaction to Fellman and Marszalek’s focus on Sherman’s domestic affairs, Kennett stated that he would focus on Sherman’s military career since that was “central to his being.” His “marriage, domestic and social life” were only secondary. Nonetheless, Kennett’s work reflected the influence of the social history school since he promptly renounced a dissection of campaigns and battles. Kennett then uncritically endorsed Fellman’s assertion of two extramarital affairs and even named a new (married) paramour.

Kennett even stepped up the level of psychological analysis by retaining a psychologist (thus providing a defense against challenges to his own expertise and competence). Kennett, while admitting that a posthumous diagnosis based primarily on an examination of letters was questionable at best, rejected Hirshson’s theory about mental instability running in unusual proportions in Sherman’s mother’s family. Instead Kennett argued that Sherman suffered from a short term “mild anxiety state” and a long term “narcissistic personality disorder.” Kennett’s Sherman was a “turbulent driven spirit.”

Neither Marszalek, Fellman, nor Hirshson seemed to give much weight to the fact that Sherman was never divorced from his wife, despite long periods of geographic separation early in his career, that he held high-level Army positions for over 20 years including, head of the Army from 1869 to 1883, that he continued to have close relationships with some of his children right up to the end of his life, that he was sociable and affable right to the end of his life, and that he continued to gain pleasure from reading, dinner engagements, and theater right up until his death. These facts all suggest a stability of personality unacknowledged by the major post-1990 biographies.

Despite the enormous post-1990 interest in Sherman, his reputation has been unfairly diminished by the psycho-biographies that appeared during the last decade of the twentieth century. The interpretations of Sherman by Marszalek (1993), Fellman (1995), Hirshson (1997), and Kennett (2001) portrayed Sherman as a mentally unsettled
individual. These biographers have chosen to ignore W. B. Hes-
seltine’s warning against the “mumbo jumbo of the ‘psychological’
school of biographers.” The traditional dispute about whether
Sherman was justified in using his method of warfare has now been
allocated secondary or tertiary importance. Strategy and tactics are no
longer seen as significant as family life and racial views.

Yet the old classics by Lewis (1932) and Liddell Hart (1929) remain
in print and readily available when much more recent Sherman biographies collect dust on library shelves. As recently as 2011, history professor Wesley Moody observed that the modern view of
Sherman is as much a product of the view of British professional military men” (of whom Liddell-Hart was the most important) as it is
of northern critics and southern advocates of the “Lost Cause.”

Prior to the advent of the Social History School, William Tecumseh
Sherman had been quite fortunate in the historical interpretation he
had received. Had the full extent of his pro-slavery views been
common knowledge during the period of the Yankee school (1861-
1891), it is unlikely that he would have received such favorable
treatment from early biographers. Sherman’s racial views contra-
dicted the words of the Declaration of Independence that “all men are
created equal” and failed to support the view that slavery was
incompatible with the national spirit.

When the full extent of Sherman’s racial views became known after
his death in 1891, it was quite acceptable to be a racist in the thinking
of the then current Nationalist School. During the Blundering Gen-
eration school, Sherman again escaped attack in a full scale biography
because he had no political influence before the war, had been living
in the South, had hoped the war would be avoided, had accurately
predicted a lengthy, costly war from the beginning, had been cautious in
the expenditure of his soldiers’ lives, and had avoided politics after
the war. During the period of the American studies school, Sherman
embodied the lack of American class conflict since he was not a care-
ful dresser, was very approachable by the enlisted men, was
employed in many different jobs, and was never particularly wealthy.

The biographical interpretation of Sherman has been subject to an
interesting paradox. Those like Walters (1948 and 1973) who attacked
Sherman for his destructive strategies also saw his importance to the
war effort to be significant. Those biographers who viewed Sherman’s
tactics as consistent with the standard conduct of warfare often had
the effect of diminishing Sherman’s contribution to the war effort.

The biographies have moved in a path from hero-worship, to eulo-
gies, to balanced analysis, to specialization, to criticism, and finally to
psychoanalysis. During the reign of the Social History School, the

view of Sherman shifted. The historians adhering to this New Left
interpretation are strongly committed to minority rights, whereas
Sherman was a racist. Some biographers of this era seemed to have
assumed that since Sherman did not agree with their racial views
(and indeed was adverse to the prevailing American racial views of
the late 20th/early 21st century), that Sherman must have had some
sort of mental imbalance. Such broad assumptions may well provide
the fodder for historical critique of modern biographers in future
epochs of Civil War interpretation.

ENDNOTES

1. These famous words are actually a shortening of a phrase used by
Sherman in a speech at Columbus, Ohio on August 11, 1880. “There is
many a boy here today who looks on war as all glory, but, boys, it is all
hell.” Marsha Landreth, William T. Sherman (New York: Gallery Books,

2. For example, Mexico’s ambassador to the United States, eager to intim-
idate the French forces invading Mexico, asked that the Americans
establish a large American force under Sherman’s command ... forces under Benito Juarez. William E. Hardy, “South of the Border: Ulysses S. Grant and the French In-

Tecumseh Sherman (New York: NAL Caliber, USA, 2014).

Proteus 17, No. 2 (Fall 2000): 15-21, 17.

5. Sherman published his own memoirs ten years after the war (1875).
William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman [New York:
(Original publication date 1875)].

6. Among the specialized biographies are the following: Walter L. Fleming,
General W.T. Sherman as College President (Cleveland: 1912); Robert G.
Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman and the Settlement of the West
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956); Dwight L. Clarke,
William Tecumseh Sherman: Gold Rush Banker (San Francisco: California
Historical Society, 1969); and John F. Marszalek, Sherman’s Other War:
The General and the Civil War Press (Memphis: Memphis State University

7. Among the campaign studies are the following: General Jacob D. Cox,
Sherman’s Battle for Atlanta (original title: Atlanta), [New York: Da Capo
Press, Inc., 1994 (original publication date 1882)]; John G. Barrett,
Sherman’s March Through the Carolinas, (Chapel Hill: The University
of North Carolina Press, 1956); Buckley Thomas Foster, Sherman’s


14. Dawley, *Sherman*, introduction and 17. The “Southwest” refers to the Southwestern region of the United States east of the Mississippi, i.e. Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, etc.


20. Bowman and Irwin predicted that Sherman would fare well in future historical judgment because a “more honest man than General Sherman does not live, and he is as generous as he is honest...Time ever withers the laurels of the selfish and base, but freshens the beauty of virtue.” Bowman, *Sherman*, pp. 489-490.


23. In Senour’s view, Sherman was a “patriot, soldier and hero”. The country, under God, owed Sherman “a debt of gratitude” for the “finishing blow” which he dealt to the rebellion. Senour, *Sherman*, p. 430. According to Senour, Grant and his soldiers “could not have accomplished” the defeat of Lee and the army of Northern Virginia “without the cooperation of Sherman and his noble army. The long and successful march of Sherman through Georgia and the Carolinas, made that event possible.” Senour, *Sherman*, pp. 415-416.


25. Senour, *Sherman*, 409. Furthermore, the kindness of the Union surgeons who cared for the Confederate wounded was “a most striking contrast” to the “inhumanity of the men who have lifted their rebellious hands against the Government and the civilization of the age...” Senour, *Sherman*, pp. 194-195.


36. Force, Sherman, preface.
37. For a more detailed discussion of the Nationalist School interpretation, see generally Pressly, Interpret, chapter 4.
40. McMurry, “Rhodes.”
41. McMurry, “Rhodes.”
42. McMurry, “Rhodes.”
43. James Ford Rhodes, “Sherman’s March to the Sea,” The American Historical Review 6, No. 3 (April 1901): 466-474. Rhodes used the article to justify the extensive foraging by Sherman’s troops in Georgia during the March to the Sea. Thus the acclaimed dean of the Nationalist School gave a ringing endorsement to Sherman even after taking into account the new tougher Nationalist School standards of impartiality.
47. Robins, Sherman, p. 234.
51. Brainerd Dyer, “Years of Madness: A Reappraisal of the Civil War,” (book review) The American Historical Review 57, No. 3 (April 1952): 700. The 1951 book under review was authored by William E. Woodward who also asserted that the Civil War “could have been avoided without loss to any American citizen”.
56. Sherman was “one man at least who needed no lesson in the truth that mobility is the mainspring of war.” Liddell Hart, Sherman, p. 85.
57. Liddell Hart, Sherman, p. 81.
64. Lewis, Sherman, p. 344.
65. Lewis, Sherman, p. 474.
66. Introduction to Lewis, Sherman, by Brooks D. Simpson, x.
67. Lewis, Sherman, p. 67.
68. Lewis, Sherman, p. 515.
69. Lewis, Sherman, p. 475 citing a letter from Thomas Ewing to Sherman dated December 18, 1864.
scrambled to defend academic historians from an attack by the National Association of Scholars (NAS). That group was highly critical of American history survey courses where “the course ... diminished the attention given to other subjects in American history...” James Grossman and Elaine Carey, “Throwing Stones,” Perspectives on History (February 2013): 7-8.


Richard M. McMurry, “Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War,” (book review) The Journal of Southern History 40, No. 3 (August 1974): 494. McMurry, in reviewing a 1973 book by Walters on the same topic, noted that Walters’ dissertation advisor at Vanderbilt (1947 dissertation) was Frank Owsley. McMurry asserted that Owsley (as well as one William A. Dunning) were proponents of the “view of an evil North versus a good South.”

John Bennett Walters, Merchant of Terror: General Sherman and Total War (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), p. 16. [This book will hereafter be cited as “Merchant of Terror” to distinguish it from Walters’ 1948 article which asserted very much the same position. See John Bennett Walters, “General William T. Sherman and Total War,” The Journal of Southern History 40, No. 3 (August 1974): 494. McMurry, in reviewing a 1973 book by Walters on the same topic, noted that Walters’ dissertation advisor at Vanderbilt (1947 dissertation) was Frank Owsley. McMurry asserted that Owsley (as well as one William A. Dunning) were proponents of the “view of an evil North versus a good South.”]

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Walters, Merchant of Terror, pp. 178-179.

Walters, Merchant of Terror, p. xiii.

Vetter, Sherman, infra, p. 20.


Wheeler, Sherman, p. 91.


Hirshson, Sherman, infra, p. ix. “Cump,” short for Tecumseh, was one of General Sherman’s nicknames.

David Nasaw, “Historians and Biography: Introduction,” American Historical Review 114, no. 3 (June 2009): 573-578, 573. In the same issue, the journal itself confirmed its reluctance to review biographies. American Historical Review, supra, xiv.
98. She argued that Sherman’s march to the sea was intended to give “Southern women a taste of the miseries of war.” Landreth, Sherman, p. 62. She discussed Sherman’s relationship with his wife Ellen. Landreth portrayed Sherman as deferring “to Ellen on all family matters.” Landreth, Sherman, p. 76.

99. In marked contrast to Fellman’s later biography (1995), Landreth viewed Sherman as “actually sympathetic to the Indian cause” (despite newspaper accusations that he favored exterminating the Indians). Landreth, Sherman, pp. 74-75. In regard to Blacks, she pointed out that Sherman refused to enlist Black soldiers but excused him as having “certain anti-black prejudices common to the time”. Landreth, Sherman, pp. 63-64.


101. Russell F. Weigley, “War as Apocalypse in Nineteenth-Century America” Reviews in American History 20, No. 3 (September 1992): 326. Professor Weigley of Temple University was, until his death in 2004, viewed by some late 20th Century academics as the unofficial “dean” of American military historians. Thus his comments on Royster’s work have added significance in the historiographical analysis of Sherman biographies.


108. See also Jean V. Berlin, “Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order,” (book review) The Historian 56, No. 2 (Winter 1994): 434-435. “Marszalek’s Sherman is a fine and worth study, one that should stand as the final work of the general’s life for years to come.” Writing in 2000, historian Marion B. Lucas made the following evaluation: “Marszalek’s psychological interpretation, though provocative, is unconvincing, but his attempt to reassess Sherman’s place in history as a military innovator is first rate and his biography currently reigns as definitive.” Lucas, “Sherman v. The Historians,” p. 17.

109. Marszalek’s bibliography extends for 24 pages and lists around 20 previous biographical works on Sherman.

110. A biographical sketch of Marszalek can be found at “John F. Marszalek.” Contemporary Authors Online. Detroit: Gale, 2009. Literature Resource Center. Web. 22 Aug. 2012. Perhaps it is just as well that Marszalek is not a psychologist or psychiatrist since those professions frown on their members providing a diagnosis for “patients” whom they have never met nor interviewed. This type of diagnosis is notoriously inaccurate in a field where the absence of visible physical symptoms already makes diagnosis challenging.

111. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier’s Passion for Order [New York: Vintage Books, 1994 (original publication date: 1993)], p. 6. Yet despite Sherman’s massive writing and speaking during his lifetime, Marszalek was unable to find any direct support for this allegedly enormous impact. Marszalek sought to reverse the usual burden of coming forward with the evidence by turning the lack of data into alleged proof of his thesis. He argued that “Sherman’s failure to make any substantial comment on his father during his life attests to the intense feelings this death provoked. Marszalek, Sherman (1994), p. 6.

112. Marszalek, Sherman (1994), p. 25, p. 71. Sherman went to live with the Ewing family when his father died and that family undertook his financial support due to his mother’s limited financial resources. He later moved to the old house and he still saw her regularly, so his move was probably less disruptive than it might have been.” Marszalek, Sherman (1994), 10.


114. Marszalek asserted that Sherman left 400 buildings undamaged and unburned when he left Atlanta, that Sherman’s bummers rarely burned houses or injured anyone, that rape and murder “were practically nonexistent” and that Confederate deserters participated in the plundering that went on. Marszalek, Sherman (1994), 299, 301-302 and 305-306. Marszalek described Sherman’s life as faithful and honorable. He maintained that without Sherman, “the United States might not have remained whole.” Marszalek, Sherman (1994), p. 499.


116. Marszalek, Sherman (1994), p. 314. A Sherman letter from the mid-1840s was quoted to show that Sherman was offended by the existence of Black lawyers and priests in Brazil and “believed blacks should be slaves”. Marszalek, Sherman (1994), p. 59. Marszalek noted that late in the war one “Richmond newspaper quoted him as saying that slavery would survive the war and he would own slaves himself.” Marszalek, Sherman
Sherman as “cheery as a lark, flying about as restless as ever, kissing all the pretty girls, full of original sayings, and rich with quaint humor.” Fellman, Citizen Sherman, p. 411.


121. Phelps, “Fellman,” 54.

122. Fellman, Citizen Sherman, p. x.


127. Fellman, Citizen Sherman, p. 370, p. 348. Fellman is the only biographer this author is aware of who contended that Sherman and his wife had a “trial separation.”


129. Fellman avoided displaying weaknesses in his theory by refusing to cite or even acknowledge one of Sherman’s letters to Mary Audenreid (quoted by Marszalek in 1993) which said “I...love you as a child rather than a woman.” Letter from Sherman to Mary Audenreid dated July 11, 1882 cited at Marszalek, Sherman, p. 420.


131. See for example, Johnson, Sherman, pp. 564-575, p. 586.

132. Gallagher, “Citizen Sherman” (book review), p. 24. Indeed, one of the sources cited by Fellman himself included a 1888 article describing Sherman as “cheery as a lark, flying about as restless as ever, kissing all the pretty girls, full of original sayings, and rich with quaint humor.” Fellman, Citizen Sherman, p. 411.


134. Hirshson, Sherman, p. xi.

135. Hirshson, Sherman, pp. x-xi.

136. Hirshson, Sherman, p. x.

137. Hirshson, Sherman, pp. x-xi.


139. Hirshson, Sherman, p. x.

140. Hirshson, Sherman, pp. 391-392.


144. Kennett, Sherman, pp. xi-xii.

145. Kennett, Sherman, p. xii.

146. Kennett, Sherman, p. x.

147. Kennett, Sherman, p. xii.


149. Kennett, Sherman, p. 146.


151. Kennett conceded that there is no simple litmus test symptom to prove that a patient has this narcissistic disorder. Kennett, Sherman, p. 147.

152. Kennett, Sherman, p. 353.


154. Moody, Demon of the Lost Cause, p. 32, p. 34.
“Don’t Cut! The Point! The Point!”: The U.S. Army Model 1913 Cavalry Saber

By Bob Seals

“At Wagram, when the cavalry of the guard passed in review before a charge, Napoleon called to them, ‘Don’t cut! The point! The point!’”

—2d Lt. George S. Patton, Jr., 1913

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For some 159 years, the United States Army used an edged sword, the saber, as the primary weapon for mounted troops. Whether called light horse, dragoon, or cavalry, the Army cavalry trooper on horseback carried a saber, with which to engage the enemy. The last issued Army saber in a long line, the model 1913 saber, became popularly known as “The Patton Saber,” after then 2d Lt. George S. Patton, Jr., who it is commonly believed was somehow responsible for the design and adoption of the new saber, during that very same year. Over the years, some authors, and historians, have questioned the veracity of conventional historical wisdom in naming the model 1913 saber “The Patton Saber,” since, after all, how much influence could a lowly second lieutenant have had on the U.S. Army’s procurement of a new weapon?

The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to the U.S. Army model 1913 saber and examine the facts surrounding the adoption of this last saber issued until its subsequent withdrawal as a modern weapon in 1934. A review of the historical record, and timeline, surrounding the saber, does indicate that 2d Lt. George S. Patton, Jr. was indeed responsible for the Army’s adoption of the saber, displaying those considerable powers of single mindedness, will, dedication, and zeal that made him such an effective maneuver combat general three decades later in North Africa and Europe. Patton’s thinking, study, experimentation, and advocacy of this new edged weapon were indicative of his professional development as a military leader. This drive was to ultimately lead the young and talented officer, to recognize the value of the tank replacing a shiny saber as the weapon of choice for a modern mounted Army.

George Smith Patton, Jr. was born on 11 November 1885 on his family’s cattle ranch near San Gabriel, California. He enjoyed an idyllic western childhood in Southern California with loving parents, a sister, dogs, horses to ride, fish to catch, birds and wild goats to hunt, and an interest in history. As a child he was surrounded by mementos of his paternal grandfather’s service with the 22nd Virginia Infantry. Patton had a fondness for toy swords. His father used a Civil War Confederate sword to play with young George, “kneel[ing] down and we would fight.” Later, Patton’s father bought him his first sword, “A store in Los Angeles was having a sale of 1870 French Sword bayonets and I asked for one ... later I attacked the cactus with it and got well stuck.”

This edged weapon enthusiasm extended into his college years at the Virginia Military Institute and the United States Military Academy at West Point. A versatile and gifted athlete, by the standards of the day, Patton pursued several sports with gusto. At West Point, this included football, polo, and track and field, where he earned his varsity letter for breaking a school record in the 220-yard
hurdles. Additionally, Patton was an enthusiastic fencer. As a cadet he competed with the broadsword against a visiting New York City German fencing club, registering ten touches against an opponent while receiving only two in return. Proudly writing his future wife Beatrice in March 1908 of his feat, Patton stated "... pardon my boasting but ... I would so like to be good with the sword."\(^4\) Graduating 46th out of 103 graduates in the class of 1909, Patton choose the cavalry, the branch that still used the saber. Assigned to the 15th Cavalry Regiment at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, 2d Lt. George S. Patton Jr. was to get his chance to become better with the sword.\(^5\)

The next several years found Patton assigned to K Troop, 15th Cavalry, at Fort Sheridan, engaged in normal duties and responsibilities as a new lieutenant. These included getting married, fathering a daughter, learning to use a typewriter, and discovering that he enjoyed writing and producing short military papers. His writing was noteworthy for a junior officer. As historian Martin Blumenson has written, the process was more important than the actual product, as Lieutenant Patton taught himself how to organize material, think critically and challenge accepted doctrine or tactics of the day.\(^6\) These abilities are clearly seen in the development and adoption of the model 1913 cavalry saber.

In 1911, the U.S. Army convened a board of cavalry officers to examine new equipment and make recommendations. One of the items of cavalry equipment the board recommended changing was the model 1906 saber. An experimental model 1911 saber under study was to retain the traditional Army curved single edged blade, similar to those carried since the Civil War era. But the model 1911 was never to be adopted, due to Patton’s advocacy of a straight, double-edged cavalry saber, ultimately given his name. That same year, Lieutenant and Mrs. Patton were transferred to the showplace of Army cavalry of the day, Fort Myer, Virginia. Assigned to A Troop, 15th Cavalry, Patton was close to powerful and influential Army officers and governmental officials in Washington, D.C., and he made the most of this opportunity.\(^7\)

Early in 1912, Patton was assigned duties as squadron quartermaster but was informed in March that he was under consideration to be the Army’s representative in the Modern Pentathlon at the Fifth Olympic Games the upcoming summer in Stockholm, Sweden. Consisting of five events—pistol, swimming, fencing, riding, and running—the pentathlon was, in effect, a test of military skills a soldier might utilize on the battlefield. Informed in May he had been selected, Patton began intensive training in the five disciplines and dieting. Brushing up on his sword skills, he fenced three times weekly and competed in the National Championship fencing tournament held that spring in New York. Additionally, during the sea voyage to Sweden, on the ship Finland, Patton fenced for two hours daily.
Competition began on 7 July with Patton performing well in all five events. Two days later the fencing portion of the pentathlon was held at the Royal Tennis Courts. Armed with a dueling sword, Patton finished third out of the remaining 29 competitors, and proudly wrote later, “I was fortunate enough to give the French victor the only defeat he had,” during the two days of intense fencing competition. 

In the end, he finished fifth in the pentathlon: 6th in swimming, 3rd in fencing, 3rd in riding, 3rd in running, but his pistol score of 21st place knocked Patton out of the medals; still a strong performance by a young lieutenant in front of friends and family. While in Sweden, Patton had a chance to meet many of the finest swordsmen in the world, who informed him that a French army cavalry officer was considered the best in Europe. This officer was Adjutant Maurice Clery, the master of arms and fencing instructor at Saumur, the French Army’s cavalry and equestrian center in western France. Clery was the European Champion in foil, dueling sword, and saber. He was the acknowledged master of the edged weapon and a man Patton had to meet, and possibly learn from, before returning to the states. While his parents and sister toured Europe, Patton and Beatrice traveled to Saumur, for private lessons from Clery in the dueling sword and saber disciplines, during the last half of July.

The experience was to be life changing, Patton took full advantage of the opportunity at Saumur with Clery; not only improving his sword skills, but also his thinking about military training, instruction, and the nature of the European and American saber of the day. Even in the early 20th century, swordsmanship was still considered a valuable military skill. The French Army, and Adjutant Clery, stressed the advantage of a straight, powerful, aggressive thrust in a mounted or dismounted attack with the saber, versus a slashing assault with the weapon’s edge, as favored by the U.S. cavalry. Patton was impressed by what he saw and became convinced of the superiority of a straight blade, as opposed to a curved, single-edged blade saber, such as the model 1906 or experimental model 1911 U.S. Army Cavalry saber under consideration. In his report later that fall to the Army’s Adjutant General, Patton listed five advantages of a straight saber, summarizing that, “For these reasons the French, English ... Swedes and I believe most other nations are adopting straight swords or sabers.” In the months ahead, Patton fought hard to convince the Army of this superiority.

Returning to Fort Myer, Lt. Patton plunged back into his duties with the 15th Cavalry. His commanding officer, Col. Joseph Garrard, USMA class of 1873, was impressed with Patton’s report from Saumur and encouraged him to publish it in the *Cavalry Journal*.

Patton wrote his wife of his intention to do so, and added “They [the Army] are almost certain to adopt my sword blade as the new regulation [saber] so I may get some prominence yet, I hope so.” Perhaps due to his noteworthy Olympic performance, or well-received writing, in December 1912 Patton was selected for detached service for duty with the Office of the Army Chief of Staff. This was significant, even for a lieutenant such as Patton, with an automobile and chauffeur, who did not have to depend upon his Army salary of $170 a month. Lieutenant Patton’s duties brought him into close contact with both Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood, the Army Chief of Staff, and Henry L. Stimson, the Secretary of War. Patton’s analytical writing and typewriting skills came in handy, as he prepared various staff papers for both, to include a study on the benefits of polo play for Army officers.

In the New Year, the *Army and Navy Journal*, the most influential U.S. defense journal at the time, published an article on 11 January 1913 entitled, “Use of the Point in Sword Play,” citing a lengthy discussion upon the virtues of a straight-pointed saber with an unnamed officer at the War Department, who was without a doubt Patton. Additionally, in a superb display of showmanship during his short tenure, Patton exhibited a French sword, used in the Battle of Waterloo that he had purchased in Paris to the Chief of Staff, presumably supporting his straight-edged saber theory. The lieutenant had General Wood’s ear, writing the Military Academy to inquire on behalf of the Chief in reference to the upcoming Intercollegiate Fencing Tournament, and mentioned that the General was thinking of adopting a straight-edged saber for Army cavalry. More than just thinking, Wood allowed Patton to travel to the
Six days later, on 24 February 1913, General Wood signed a memorandum to the Chief of Ordnance ordering the production of 20,000 new U.S. Army cavalry sabers, with a straight double-edged blade, according to a design example specified by Patton. The next week Patton, rode in the Wilson Inaugural Parade as Wood’s aide. As an acknowledgement for the lieutenant’s industriousness, the Chief of Staff presented him with a letter of appreciation in March on the occasion of Patton’s release from his temporary staff duty. In that day, before our current extensive Army system of awards and decorations, such a letter was extremely significant. In that same month Patton was sent on temporary duty for three days to the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts “to approve the new sword.” A second letter in April was entered into Patton’s record after this short duty at the armory by the acting Chief of Ordnance to express appreciation for his skill and assistance regarding the new Army saber. It seems clear that Patton was indeed instrumental in the model 1913 saber coming into being.

Lieutenant Patton had “The Form and Use of the Saber” accepted for publication in the March 1913 edition of the Cavalry Journal, the first of some 16 articles he wrote for this professional journal during the next 30 years. A summary of his learning from the French cavalry school and Adjutant Clery, the article was a forceful argument for the straight saber and French tactics and training. Patton had also discussed with all those who would listen the idea of introducing a course in swordsmanship at Ft. Riley, Kansas, the home of the cavalry. Accordingly, in June he received orders from the Secretary of War stating the War Department “authorizes you to proceed to France [at no cost to the government] for the purpose of perfecting yourself in swordsmanship ... [and] arrive at Fort Riley, Kansas by October 1.” The Mounted Service School at Ft. Riley had approved a new position of Master of the Sword, who was to conduct a six-month course of instruction for selected NCOs from each cavalry regiment later in the year. Lieutenant Patton was off to Saumur again, for additional training, on his way to becoming the first U.S. Army Master of the Sword.

Arriving back at the now familiar Hotel Badan in July with his wife, Patton had less than two months to perfect his saber skills with Adjutant Chef Clery, who had been promoted. He worked hard to perfect his French, and improve his teaching and fencing skills, ably assisted by wife Beatrice, who with her superior level of French, translated lectures and manuals for Patton. The time passed quickly. On his last day, Clery presented Patton with an inscribed photo of himself in fencing uniform, saying “to my best pupil, le Lieutenant Patton.” Back in the United States, production of the U.S. Army model 1913 cavalry saber had begun. Lieutenant Patton reported to Fort Riley towards the end of September in 1913 to prepare his course and begin duties as the first U.S. Army Master of the Sword.

The saber was produced at the Springfield Armory, which had produced U.S. Military arms since 1777. The model 1913 saber, with a double-edged blade made of forged steel, had a sheet metal hand guard and hard black rubber grips. It was 41.5 inches long, with a 1.175 inch wide blade that was 35.25 inches long. A leather washer at the base of the blade protected the guard when in the scabbard. The scabbard itself was constructed of treated hickory wood, covered in rawhide and khaki drab canvas, with a tip and mouthpiece of steel with two rings for attachment to the saddle. A leather saber knot was attached to the handle of the saber and enabled the trooper keep his saber if the weapon was knocked from his hand.

Rather unglamorously, the original scabbard for the saber produced had a metal tip at the end which enabled the scabbard to be used as a shelter-tent pole in the field by a cavalry trooper. The overall weight of the saber with scabbard was 4.5 pounds. Springfield Armory produced over 35,000 of the model 1913 sabers for the next five years until 1918. Sabers manufactured at the armory were marked with the initials SA, a flaming bomb Ordnance insignia, date...
and serial number on the blade. An additional 93,000 sabers were contracted after the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917, and manufactured by Landers, Frary, and Clark. These models have no serial numbers but were marked with LF & C, and the dates of either 1918 or 1919.

Now that his saber was a reality, Patton continued to defend and promote its use as first U.S. Army Master of the Sword. In 1914, in response to a request from the Cavalry Board, Lieutenant Patton proposed a test, and standards, that were adopted for the new Army swordsman’s badge. This rectangular metal badge, which depicted the new model 1913 saber superimposed over the word SWORDSMAN, was awarded for proficiency with the new saber during a mounted timed and scored designated course, while engaging 10 dummies and successfully jumping a 5-foot hurdle. This badge was awarded annually to the best two enlisted soldiers in each cavalry troop, as a highly prized emblem of distinction. That same year Patton graduated from the Mounted Service School at Ft. Riley and wrote the Army Saber Exercise manual to help spread the M1913 gospel. In the 1914 Rasp, the Mounted Service School’s annual yearbook, Patton penned an article entitled “Mounted Swordsmanship,” describing the new model sword as “an ideal thrusting weapon.”

In 1915, Patton made arrangements to be assigned to the 8th Cavalry Regiment at Ft. Bliss, Texas, anticipating further troubles along the border with Mexico. After Thanksgiving, Patton’s troop was alerted and moved to the Rio Grande to intercept Mexican bandits. Patton viewed this as a perfect opportunity to lead a glorious saber charge, “I thought I had my medal of honor sewed up and laid awake planning my report.” The bandits, however, slipped back over the border, frustrating his plans. Patton attracted the attention of the post’s commanding general, John J. Pershing, who chose the young lieutenant as an aide during the Punitive Expedition into Mexico, perhaps influenced by his romantic interest in Patton’s single older sister, Nita. Before leaving Ft. Bliss with the expedition force in 1916, Patton watched a parade of mounted cavalry carrying the M1913 saber and wrote “My eyes filled with tears ... The nearest similar feeling I can remember is on the occasion of certain very noisy Opera music.”

Patton’s subsequent writings include several Cavalry Journal articles; a July 1916 article “Defense of the Saber;” a January 1917 article “Cavalry Work of the Punitive Expedition;” and the April 1917 article “Present Saber: Its Form and Use for Which It Was Designed.” Promoted, at last, after seven years of service to first lieutenant in 1916, Patton continued to argue that “...expert use of the pistol or saber are demanded for successful mounted attack,” and “In the charge, the point will always beat the edge.” Interestingly enough, Patton modestly wrote about the 1914 saber manual that “If I were to claim any originality in the manual, this statement would be presumptuous. I do not; it is an almost verbatim copy of the new French manual.” Receiving a check for the princely sum of $2.50 for one of his articles, Patton returned the money, writing his wife that “I returned the check as I will not take money for defending the saber. It would be sacrilege.”

By now widely considered as the Army’s saber expert, the Cavalry Board wrote Patton in March of 1916 to ask his opinion on proposed changes to the M1913 saber, to include changing the form back to a curved model. He was violently opposed to such a concept in a six-page single-spaced response back to the board.

Patton, and two provisional cavalry brigades, served in Mexico during the 1916 Punitive Expedition with General Pershing, but there is no record of the M1913 being used during those operations. The following year, in 1917 the U.S. entered the World War I. Four Army cavalry regiments served in France during the First World War, with
one mounted regiment, the second, seeing combat in the waning days of the conflict, but again there is no documented use of the saber.28

On 8 July 1932, now Major Patton reported for duty as the executive officer of the 3rd Cavalry Regiment at Ft. Meyers. Twenty days later, after the District of Columbia believed it had lost order and requested federal troops, Patton, 13 officers and 217 enlisted men from the 3rd Cavalry deployed along Pennsylvania Avenue to help disburse the so-called “Bonus Army.” These demonstrators, composed of World War veterans, were protesting in Washington, D.C., to demand their congressionaly authorized bonus payments.

Writing afterwards, Patton commented “The soldiers were magnificent. They set grimly on their horses and made no reply... Bricks flew, sabers rose and fell with a comforting smack, and the mob ran.” No veterans were killed in the incident, and the M1913 saber appears to have been used as a flat-edged crowd control tool in order to move Bonus protestors along. Major Patton also made a point to praise the discipline of all troops involved, writing that “It speaks volumes for the high character of the men that not a shot was fired.” This unfortunate and controversial incident was only two years before the saber was finally withdrawn from cavalry service in 1934, after some 21 years of faithful use. An era in Army history came to a close.

But what did not come to a close was Patton’s interest in sabers, with or without the M1913. In the spring of 1938, while stationed at Fort Riley, he sent three sample saber models to the new Chief of Cavalry, Maj. Gen. John K. Herr, for inspection and consideration. Patton also discussed the benefits of a bayonet being issued versus a full-sized saber. Perhaps one of the samples was a sword bayonet similar to his first purchased by his father many years before. In any event General Herr was instrumental in Patton’s continued success, with the last Chief having the Army Adjutant General promote Patton to full colonel so he could subsequently command the still horse-mounted 5th Cavalry Regiment at Ft. Clark, Texas, and back to Ft. Myer to command the 3rd Cavalry Regiment. Regimental command was to be a key step towards Patton afterwards becoming a general officer in the waning years before the Second World War.30

As late as the fall of 1939, after the 3rd Cavalry’s participation in the First Army Maneuvers at Manassas, Virginia, Patton continued to advocate saber use, writing in the Cavalry Journal that, “Time and again in these exercises the vital necessity of providing cavalry with sabers was demonstrated because in close terrain cavalry can and did ... approach unobserved ... [and] make a mounted charge with ‘cold steel’... securing a decisive result with a minimum loss of time and personnel.”31

By 1942, the Army’s cavalry branch, with or without the saber, was effectively finished. Horse-mounted regiments traded in their steeds for tanks, personnel carriers, and jeeps, as the Army prepared for a global war against the Axis powers. The cavalry’s mission had not changed much, as units with “steeds of steel” continued to perform the doctrinal missions of reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, screening, and pursuit when called upon by the Army. The Army’s largest mounted cavalry organization, the 1st Cavalry Division, fought in the Pacific, the first formation into the capital cities of Manila and Tokyo.

The Second World War gave the M1913 saber a new lease on life, but not for the mounted service Lieutenant Patton had foreseen years before. The U.S. Government, possessing large numbers of such high quality swords in storage, cut many up in order to make fighting knives for the Army and Office of Strategic Services (OSS) operators engaged overseas in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Thus, troopers in the war did carry, to an extent, Patton knives vice sabers, during combat. This was a rather fitting end for thousands of Patton sabers, which like their superb advocate, served their nation right to the fighting’s end in 1945. Today, the M1913 Patton saber, and scabbard, are prized military antiques, and as such are eagerly sought by collectors, with a brisk business online and at many trade shows.32

The M1913 saber owes its life to the single-minded determination of George S. Patton. He displayed a considerable amount of professional acumen and intellectual curiosity as a lowly second lieutenant with his advocacy of this new edged weapon. He certainly influenced the Army, and wrote history, by becoming the first ever Master of the Sword, instructing, writing, and promoting the manly virtues of an aggressive, pointed thrust towards a potential enemy. Never wavering, to an extent, in his saber beliefs, he continued to
believe that “Truly, a saberless cavalry … would be like a body without a soul.”

Eventually, Patton did get a chance to use his namesake saber, but not under the conditions that he, or anyone else, could have foreseen in 1913 before the start of the First World War. In the end, the M1913 Model saber should be remembered as the Patton saber, to honor the remarkable man, and many thousands of other cavalry troopers, who honorably rode “Forty miles a day on Beans and Hay,” as the famous barracks ballad proclaimed, with a U.S. Army saber by their side.

ENDNOTES
4. Ibid., pp. 142-43.
5. Ibid., pp. 174-78.
6. Ibid., pp. 212-222.
7. Ibid., pp. 223-225.
8. Ibid., pp. 227-232.
10. Ibid., p. 234.
11. Ibid., p. 240.
15. Ibid., p. 249.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., p. 15.
18. Ibid., p. 256.
19. Ibid., p. 262.

27. Ibid., p. 312.
Arizona’s Last Admiral: Rear Admiral Isaac C. Kidd, USN

By Bryan Dickerson

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On Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japanese Navy carrier planes conducted a devastating surprise attack on U.S. Navy and Army forces on the island of Oahu, Hawaii. Among the 2,402 Americans killed that infamous day was Rdml. Isaac C. Kidd, Commander of Battleship Division One. A distinguished naval officer whose career spanned over 35 years, Rdml. Kidd was the last admiral to serve aboard the battleship USS Arizona.

Isaac Campbell Kidd was born in Cleveland, Ohio on 26 March 1884 to Isaac and Jemina Campbell Kidd. He was educated in the public schools of Cleveland, and graduated from West High School in 1902. After high school, Kidd received an appointment to the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. His classmates included future Navy admirals William F. Halsey, Chester A. Nimitz, Raymond Spruance, John S. McCain Sr., and Henry K. Hewitt. During his final year at Annapolis, Kidd served as Adjutant for the 2nd Battalion of the Brigade of Midshipmen, assisting the Battalion Commander with the unit’s administration. He graduated with the Class of 1906 on 12 February 1906 as a passed midshipman. Under the commissioning requirements of the day, passed midshipmen had to complete two years of sea duty before being commissioned as ensigns.¹

Accordingly, Passed Midn. Kidd was assigned to the cruiser USS Columbia. A veteran of the Spanish-American War, Columbia was part of the Atlantic Training Squadron when Kidd reported aboard on 1 March 1906.² From then until November 1906, he was assigned to engineer duty aboard ship. When a revolt broke out in Cuba in August 1906, Columbia was one of several warships sent to support an armed intervention to restore order. For his service aboard Columbia during this time, Kidd was awarded the Cuban Pacification Medal. The following April, Columbia was withdrawn from service and decommissioned at Philadelphia.²

With Columbia no longer in commission, Passed Midn. Kidd was transferred to the battleship USS New Jersey on 17 May 1907. New Jersey was a Virginia-class battleship commissioned only a year before and was armed with a mix of twelve-inch, eight-inch, and six-inch guns. On 16 December 1907, New Jersey set out from Hampton Roads, Virginia with fifteen other battleships and six destroyers on a world-wide tour. Known as the “Great White Fleet,” this formidable flotilla circumnavigated the globe on a cruise to demonstrate American naval power and preserve peace through deterrence. The Great White Fleet made numerous ports of call, including in South America, Australia, Japan, and Italy. On 13 February 1908, Kidd was commissioned as an ensign. The Great White Fleet returned home to Hampton Roads on 22 February 1909. “In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world,” President Theodore Roosevelt wrote in his autobiography.³

Ensign Kidd remained aboard New Jersey for over a year before being transferred to another battleship, USS North Dakota. Placed in commission on 11 April 1910, North Dakota was larger and more heavily armed than New Jersey. As part of the Atlantic Fleet, North Dakota performed naval maneuvers along the East Coast and in the Caribbean Sea. In late 1910, she crossed the Atlantic to make ports of call in England and France. While serving aboard North Dakota, Kidd
was promoted to lieutenant junior grade effective 13 February 1911 and then to lieutenant effective 26 October 1911.4

With his naval career well on its way, Isaac C. Kidd also embarked upon a journey of another kind: marriage and family life. He married Inez Gillmore of Cleveland, Ohio, on 29 May 1911. Their first child—daughter Inez Gillmore Kidd—was born on 3 November 1912 but sadly died that same day. Kidd’s personnel records do not indicate whether she was stillborn or died shortly after birth. Seven years later, their son Isaac Campbell Kidd Jr. was born on 14 August 1919.5

Kidd left North Dakota in early June 1913 and reported aboard USS Pittsburgh on 30 June 1913 as a First Lieutenant. She had originally begun her life as USS Pennsylvania but was renamed Pittsburgh on 27 August 1912 so that the name could be used for a new battleship. In 1911, experiments were conducted aboard her with small airplanes taking off and landing on a temporary wooden platform on her afterdeck. Around this time, Mexico was gripped by insurrection and political upheaval. In response, Pittsburgh was sent to patrol the west coast of Mexico. For this service, Kidd received the Mexican Service Medal.6

Lieutenant Kidd detached from Pittsburgh in April 1914 and relocated with his family to California to join the staff of Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet Adm. Thomas Benton Howard as his Aide and Flag Secretary. As such, Kidd was assigned to Howard’s flagship, the armored cruiser USS California. On 1 September 1914, California was renamed San Diego so that her original name could be used for a new battleship. In March 1915, San Diego suffered a boiler explosion and was laid up in Mare Island Navy Yard for extensive repairs that lasted nearly six months. With his flagship out of service, Adm. Howard selected USS Colorado as his new flagship. When Adm. Howard’s term was over later that month, Lt. Kidd requested and was granted permission to remain as Aide and Flag Secretary for his successor, Adm. Cameron McCrae Winslow. The repairs to San Diego were completed in September 1915, and Adm. Winslow made the cruiser flagship for the Pacific Fleet again. In August 1916, Lt. Kidd was transferred to serve as an instructor at the U.S. Naval Academy.7

While American forces were occupying Veracruz, the European powers went to war with each other in August 1914. Despite escalating tensions between the United States and Germany, the United States managed to remain out of the brutal war, even after the German submarine U-20 sank the passenger liner RMS Lusitania, killing 128 Americans. In early spring 1917, Germany began unrestricted submarine warfare and unwisely tried to get Mexico to declare war on the U.S. For these reasons and because of his desire to affect the post-war settlement of Europe, President Wilson asked

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5. Their son Isaac Campbell Kidd Jr. was born on 14 August 1919.
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Congress for a declaration of war, and they obliged.

Lt. Kidd was still an instructor at the Naval Academy when the U.S. entered World War I. On 1 July 1917, he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander. He was not, however, destined to see combat service.

In December 1917, Lcdr. Kidd was re-assigned to the new battleship USS New Mexico. Launched on 13 April 1917, New Mexico boasted a main battery of twelve 14-inch guns in four triple turrets, and a secondary battery of 5-inch and 3-inch guns. She was placed in commission on 20 May 1918. On 1 July, Kidd received a temporary promotion to Commander. For the remainder of 1918, New Mexico conducted her initial training and was still in American waters when the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918. Two months later, New Mexico departed New York City for Brest, France. New Mexico’s mission was to escort the transport George Washington which carried President Wilson home to the United States from the Versailles Peace Conference. New Mexico and her charge arrived at Hampton Roads, Virginia, on 27 February 1919. For his wartime service aboard New Mexico, Kidd was awarded the World War I Victory Medal (Atlantic Fleet Clasp).


For his next assignment, Cdr. Kidd returned to Annapolis where he served as aide in charge of buildings and grounds for the superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy. In February 1922, his promotion to commander was made permanent. He remained ashore for that assignment until May 1925.

In early May, Cdr. Kidd reported aboard the battleship USS Utah to become the ship’s executive officer. Commissioned on 31 August 1911, Utah’s primary armament was ten 12-inch guns. Aboard ship, the XO serves as the commanding officer’s second-in-command. In the event that the captain is absent, incapacitated or becomes a casualty, the XO assumes command of the ship. As XO, Cdr. Kidd was responsible for the general efficiency of the ship, overseeing such matters as maintenance, crew discipline, and logistics. Being Utah’s Executive Officer was thus Kidd’s most important assignment to that time.

Cdr. Kidd’s time aboard Utah occurred during one of the most significant times in the life of the ship. In the summer of 1925, Utah began a major modernization and overhaul at the Boston Navy Yard. The ship’s original “cage” mainmast was replaced by a lighter pole mast and her anti-aircraft armament was improved. Most importantly, her original coal-burning engines were replaced by more powerful and efficient oil burning ones. Utah completed her overhaul on 1 December 1925 and resumed sea operations.

Thus far in his career, Cdr. Kidd had not held a command at sea, but on 24 November 1926 he assumed command of the cargo ship USS Vega. Displacing 11,200 tons, the 401-foot long Vega was a steel-hulled freighter originally built in 1919 as the ship Lebanon. The Navy acquired her in December 1921 and employed her with the Naval Transportation Service. While under Kidd’s command, Vega transported supplies and stores from Seattle, Washington, to naval facilities in Alaska.

Detaching from Vega in June 1927, Cdr. Kidd spent the next eight years in shore billets. From June 1927 to June 1930, he served as captain of the port at Cristobal, Panama Canal Zone. “Commander Kidd is one of the finest Naval officers in every respect, that I have ever known, and it has been a real pleasure to have him under my command,” wrote Governor Harry Burgess to the Chief of the Bureau of Navigation at the end of Kidd’s tour.

After serving in Panama for three years, Cdr. Kidd was assigned to serve as the chief of staff to Commander, Fleet Base Force. This required relocating his family to San Pedro, California. At this time, the U.S. Fleet consisted of the Battle Force, Scouting Force, and the Base Force. This one fleet was responsible for both the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, and primarily operated in the former. Only a few ships were regularly assigned to the U.S. East Coast. A separate Asiatic Fleet operated in the Philippines and Western Pacific. The Base Force operated the fleet’s seagoing logistics and support vessels, including oilers, cargo ships and tugs. Kidd was promoted to Captain in early January 1931, with a date of rank of 1 November 1930.

Capt. Kidd’s next assignment required another relocation for him and his family. In May 1932, he became Officer in Charge, Officer Detail Section of the Bureau of Navigation in Washington D.C. As such, Capt. Kidd was responsible for detailing naval officers to billets. He also served on ten selection boards for officer promotions. For part of this time, he worked for RADM. William D. Leahy. During World War II, Leahy would serve as a personal military advisor to Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S. Truman.
After serving with the Bureau of Navigation, the next several years of Capt. Kidd’s naval career were planned out for him. His next assignment would be a sea command, followed by attendance at the Naval War College. Nevertheless, he foresaw the advantages of gaining experience in aviation. Accordingly in October 1934, he requested flight training after completion of war college courses in 1937. At the time, Kidd was fifty years old. Taking flight training at that age was not unheard of; Capt. William F. Halsey Jr. received his Naval Aviator wings at age 52. Though Capt. Kidd was deemed medically qualified for aviation duty, his request for flight training was denied.

Capt. Kidd returned to sea duty on 25 February 1935 as Commander, Destroyer Squadron (DESRON) One, Scouting Force. Since the squadron was based in San Diego, California, assuming command of DESRON One required another cross-country move for the Kidds. Kidd’s new command consisted of the destroyer tender USS Whitney and four destroyers. Capt. Kidd made USS Dallas his flagship. Dallas had been commissioned on 29 October 1920 and was armed with four 4-inch guns and four 21-inch torpedo tubes. For over a year, Capt. Kidd led DESRON ONE, overseeing its training and operations.

Capt. Kidd’s tenure as Commander, DESRON One came to an end on 7 June 1936. After being relieved, he and his family proceeded to Naval Station Newport, Rhode Island, by automobile. There he was enrolled as a student in the senior course at the Naval War College on 29 June 1936. The Naval War College was established in 1884 to provide professional military education for naval and military officers in the strategy and tactics of warfare. The college also played a key role in the development of naval strategy. In 1936, Radm. Edward C. Kalbfus was president of the college. Instructors included Captains Raymond A. Spruance and Richmond K. Turner. All three would play important roles in World War II. Kalbfus would serve on the Navy’s Court of Inquiry for the Pearl Harbor attack; Spruance would command Task Force 16 at the Battle of Midway and command the U.S. Fifth Fleet later in the war. Kelly would serve as Director of the War Plans Division in 1940-41 and command the Navy’s Amphibious Forces throughout the Pacific campaigns.

During his time at the Naval War College, Capt. Kidd completed two year-long courses of instruction: the senior course and the advanced course. With Kidd in the senior class of 1936-37 were thirty-nine Navy officers ranging in rank from captain to lieutenant commander, six Army officers, and five Marine Corps officers. Among his classmates was future Commandant of the Marine Corps Lemuel C. Shepherd Jr, who was then a lieutenant colonel. After graduating, Capt. Kidd enrolled in the 1937-38 advanced course, which was relatively new, having only been started in July 1934. Kidd’s classmates were three Navy captains, a Marine colonel, and an Army colonel. Midway through the 1937-38 Term, Radm. Charles H. Snyder became the college’s president.

With his war college studies due to end in May 1938, Capt. Kidd actively sought the command of a surface warship. On 6 January 1938, he sent a formal written request to the Chief of BUNAV, Radm. Adolphus Andrews. “Capt. Kidd’s work here at the Naval War College, in both the Senior and Advanced Classes, has been uniformly excellent,” wrote RADM Snyder in his endorsement of Kidd’s request. “While Captain Kidd has had command of a destroyer squadron in the Fleet, it is believed that the duty he has requested will benefit him at this time and should react to the best interests of the Navy.”

Five days later, Radm. Andrews replied to Kidd’s request for sea command. In his letter, Andrews wrote:

Due to the fact that you are not due for sea duty until 1939 and owing to the fact that there are insufficient combatant vessel commands available at the present time for an officer of your seniority, it will be impracticable to grant your request for sea duty to command a combatant vessel in the spring or summer of 1938.

Capt. Kidd and his classmates graduated in May 1938. Following graduation, Kidd remained at the college as a staff member. Though denied a sea command back in January, he could reasonably expect to gain one sometime in 1939. That sea command came much sooner than anticipated. On 17 September 1938, Capt. Kidd assumed command of the battleship USS Arizona under very unusual circumstances.

USS Arizona was the second and final ship of the Pennsylvania-class of battleships. Constructed at the New York Navy Yard, Arizona was placed in commission on 17 October 1916. Her length was 608 feet, her beam was 97 feet and she drew 28 feet 10 inches of water displacing 31,400 tons. Her primary armament was twelve 14-inch guns mounted in four triple-turrets and twenty-two 5-inch guns in casemates. After the U.S. entered World War I, the oil-fired Arizona was not forward deployed because of an oil shortage in the British Isles. Instead, she spent the war patrolling the mid-Atlantic coast of the United States. Following the war, Arizona served on the East Coast and routinely steamed in Caribbean waters. From May 1929 until March 1931, she underwent a major overhaul at the Norfolk Navy Yard. Her original cage masts were replaced with tripod masts,
Two days later, Capt. Kidd detached from the Naval War College and started west for California. His wife would follow him later. His son Isaac Junior was then a midshipman at the Naval Academy. 29

17 September 1938 was a momentous day for USS Arizona and her crew. On that day Capt. Kidd assumed command of Arizona and Radm. Chester A. Nimitz became the Commander of Battleship Division One. He made Arizona his flagship. 30

Chester Arthur Nimitz had graduated from the Naval Academy a year ahead of Capt. Kidd. He had spent much of his career in submarines. His previous commands included Submarine Division Twenty, Cruiser Division Two and the heavy cruiser USS Augusta (CA-31). He had also served as Assistant Chief of BUNAV from 1935 to 1938. 31

Though left behind on the West Coast, Nimitz’s Task Force Seven was far from idle. Under his direction, the task force conducted training in underway refueling and amphibious landings. With Marines of the 2nd Marine Brigade, the task force conducted amphibious landings on San Clemente Island off the California coast. The operations proved the inadequacies of the small boats then being used for amphibious operations and led to the development of new specialized landing craft. The lessons learned in underway refueling and amphibious operations would prove beneficial several years later when the U.S. went to war against Imperial Japan. 32

Radm. Nimitz served aboard Arizona until 27 May 1939. Around this time, the Chief of BUNAV, James O. Richardson had been selected to become Commander, Battle Force, U.S. Fleet. At Richardson’s urging, Radm. Nimitz was selected to become the new Chief of BUNAV. Accordingly, Nimitz was relieved by Radm. Russell Willson and proceeded to Washington to assume his new post. 33

As the commanding officer of USS Arizona, Capt. Kidd once again demonstrated his proficiency in naval tactics and leadership. In August 1939, Arizona earned a commendation from Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Harold R. Stark for gunnery efficiency during Fiscal

and her anti-aircraft armament was upgraded. Additional armor, new boilers, and new main and cruising turbines were also installed. During her time in service, Arizona was frequently a flagship for admirals. 27

Capt. Kidd assumed command of Arizona under very somber circumstances. On 7 September 1938, Arizona’s commanding officer, Capt. Alfred Winsor Brown, Jr. suffered a fatal heart attack at the age of 52. A 1907 graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy, Capt. Brown had assumed command of Arizona less than a year before on 11 December 1937. He left behind his wife Margarita, and four children. Capt. Brown’s family and crew were stunned by his sudden death. On 9 September, a memorial service led by Arizona’s chaplain, Ltge. E. P. Wuebbers, CHC, was held on the ship’s quarterdeck. The mourners included the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet Adm. Claude C. Bloch, five admirals and the captains of all the battleships at Pearl Harbor. 28

At the time of Capt. Brown’s unexpected death, Capt. Kidd was still at the Naval War College. On the day following Brown’s death, Capt. Kidd sent a Western Union Telegram to Chief of BUNAV, Radm. Andrews requesting that he be placed in command of Arizona. The next day, Andrews sent a naval message to the president of the Naval War College ordering him to detach Capt. Kidd from his current assignment so that he could assume command of Arizona.
Arizona was authorized to display a White ‘E’ in recognition of her achievements. The following year, Arizona earned another such commendation. Kidd’s career was clearly on the ascendancy.  

In December 1939, Radm. William S. Pye was selected to become the new Commander, Battleships, Battle Force and temporarily promoted to Vice Admiral. After being selected, Pye requested that Capt. Kidd be re-assigned to serve as his Chief of Staff. A week later, BUNAV Chief Radm. Nimitz approved Pye’s request and sent a Naval Message to Capt. Kidd informing him of his new upcoming assignment. Capt. Kidd remained in command of Arizona until 3 February 1940 when he was relieved by Capt. Harold C. Train, USN. As Vadm. Pye’s flagship was USS West Virginia, Kidd left Arizona but not for the last time.  

That same day, Capt. Kidd reported aboard West Virginia and assumed his new duties as chief of staff for Vadm. Pye. As such, Kidd assisted Vadm. M Pye with the training, administration and operations of most of the Navy’s battleships, including Arizona. Several months later, on 1 July 1940, Kidd was promoted to rear admiral.  

World War II had broken out in Europe when Nazi Germany invaded Poland in September 1939. The Germans then overran most of western Europe the following spring. President Roosevelt and his allies in Congress pressed to significantly expand America’s armed forces in response to the potential Nazi threat. As part of this effort, additional warships were assigned to the East Coast.  

In the summer of 1940, the U.S. Fleet participated in fleet maneuvers near the Hawaiian Islands. Radm. Kidd participated in these maneuvers as part of Vadm. Pye’s staff. At their conclusion, President Roosevelt decided to keep the U.S. Fleet at Pearl Harbor instead of returning it to California as a means of deterring Japanese aggression in the Pacific. The fleet commander, Adm. James O. Richardson, objected to this move, citing the Hawaiian Islands’ vulnerability to air attack and the lack of sufficient shore support facilities. The matter reached a climax at a confrontational meeting between Roosevelt, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Stark and Adm. Richardson in Washington in October 1940. Rather than address the serious issues raised by Richardson, Roosevelt replaced him as Commander in Chief of the Pacific Fleet with Radm. Husband Kimmel in late January 1941. A month later, the Atlantic Squadron was re-named the Patrol Force, U.S. Fleet. Three months later, the U.S. Navy’s forces were re-organized again into the Asiatic Fleet, the Atlantic Fleet, and the Pacific Fleet, with the latter being the largest of the three.  

On 23 January 1941, Radm. Kidd relieved Radm. Willson as Commander of Battleship Division One, which consisted of USS Arizona, USS Nevada and USS Oklahoma. All three battleships were similar in size and armed with fourteen-inch main guns in four turrets. All three had been commissioned in the years immediately prior to World War I. Kidd returned to Arizona and made her his flagship. Capt. Franklin Van Valkenburgh was her commanding officer and Lt. Col. Daniel R. Fox, USMC, commanded Arizona’s Marine Detachment and served as Division Marine Officer. With the exception of a brief visit to Long Beach, California, in June 1941, Arizona operated in Hawaiian waters for the duration of 1941.  

On 23 October 1941, Arizona was involved in a serious collision with Oklahoma. The battleship force was in a column formation performing zig-zag maneuvers that involved a series of ninety-degree turns to starboard. Apparently, Oklahoma turned one too many times and struck Arizona just aft of the bridge. Extensive damage was done to the torpedo protection blisters along Arizona’s port side and serious flooding resulted. Timely counter-flooding on the opposite side of the ship corrected her list. Arizona sailed back to Pearl Harbor and went into dry dock for several days to repair the damage. Altogether, Arizona was out of action for about two weeks. Oklahoma suffered minimal damage.  

Throughout the 1930s, Imperial Japan embarked upon a major re-armament program and aggressively expanded into China. Increasingly alarmed at Japan’s conduct, President Roosevelt ... Japan began planning surprise attacks to cripple American and British military and naval forces in the Pacific.  

As December 1941 began, the U.S./Japanese negotiations appeared to have reached their terminal point. Months earlier, American cryptologists had broken the Japanese diplomatic codes. From these decoded messages, President Roosevelt and his senior military and diplomatic advisers concluded that war would soon be breaking out in the Pacific. In addition, Roosevelt was also trying to provoke Nazi German leader Adolf Hitler into declaring war on the United States. The only question was where the first blow would fall. While Roosevelt was looking to the Far East and Europe for war to come, the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carrier strike force was heading for Pearl Harbor.  

In the Hawaiian Islands, none of this was known to any of the military commanders. Training and operations continued under a peacetime routine. On 4 December 1941, Radm. Kidd oversaw a night
Ens. Douglas Hein was in the junior officers mess when general quarters was sounded. He rushed up to the Signal Bridge where he found Radm. Kidd. Then he went to the Navigation Bridge where he found Capt. Van Valkenburgh and the Ship’s Quartermaster. At about 0810, a Nakajima B5N2 Type 97 attack plane piloted by Lcdr. Kasumi Tadashi from the carrier Hiryu dropped an 800 kilogram bomb on Arizona. The bomb glanced off the face plate of Turret Two, penetrated the deck and exploded in Arizona’s black powder magazine. This in turn set off other adjacent powder magazines. This caused a tremendous explosion that ripped apart the forward section of the battleship.

“Suddenly the whole bridge shook like it was in an earthquake, flame came through the bridge windows which had been broken by gunfire,” Ens. Hein later reported. Somehow, he managed to escape from the bridge and survive the attack.

The massive explosions that tore apart Arizona caused fires which burned for nearly two days. These fires consumed the bodies of numerous Arizona sailors and Marines, including Rdm. Kidd and Capt. Van Valkenburgh. Kidd was officially declared deceased on 27 December 1941. Later, the admiral’s Annapolis class ring was recovered from Arizona’s superstructure and his sea chest was recovered from his cabin. The ring had been fused to a bulkhead by the intense heat.

Radm. Kidd’s Battleship Division One suffered heavily during the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Arizona was struck by eight bombs, one of which exploded her forward magazines. 1,177 of her 1,512 crew members perished including Rdm. Kidd, Capt. Valkenburgh, Lt. Col. Fox and the battleship’s chaplain, Capt. Thomas L. Kirkpatrick. Oklahoma was struck by five aerial torpedoes which opened up her port side and caused her to capsize. 415 of her crew were killed or missing. Nevada was the only battleship to get underway during the attack. She suffered one torpedo hit and at least six bomb hits before being ordered to beach herself so as not to block the channel if she sank. Sixty of her crew were killed and another 190 were wounded.

Radm. Kidd was the first U.S. Navy flag officer to be killed in action in the history of the U.S. Navy. He was also the first of five Navy flag officers killed in action during World War II. Rear Admirals Daniel J. Callaghan and Norman Scott were both killed during the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal 12-13 November 1942. During this battle, Callaghan was serving aboard the heavy cruiser USS San Francisco and Scott was aboard the light cruiser USS Atlanta. Radm. H. M. Mullinix was killed when his flagship the escort carrier USS Liscome Bay was torpedoed and sunk by a Japanese submarine firing exercise for Battleship Division 1. The following day, the division returned to Pearl Harbor and its battleships were moored along Ford Island. Nevada was moored singly at berth F-8. Ahead of her, Arizona was moored at berth F-7. Oklahoma was moored outboard of USS Maryland at berth F-5. Arizona was scheduled for repairs, so accordingly the repair ship USS Vestal moored alongside her on Saturday 6 December. That night, Arizona hosted a “battle of the bands” for the Pacific Fleet battleships’ bands.

Shortly before 0800 on the morning of Sunday, 7 December 1941, Japanese warplanes appeared over Oahu. Fighters strafed American aircraft parked on the airfields. Torpedo bombers came in low over the harbor to release torpedoes at the moored American battleships. Dive bombers and horizontal bombers rained bombs on ships and military installations below.

Aboard USS Arizona, members of her crew soon realized that they were under Japanese air attack. The air raid alarm was sounded at 0755, followed by general quarters. Shaking off initial disbelief, sailors and Marines rushed to their battle stations. Gun crews struggled to operate their anti-aircraft guns. An aerial bomb struck Arizona near turret four and penetrated three decks before exploding.
Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor. In fact, he was having lunch with his mother at Annapolis at the time of the Japanese attack. They did not learn of the senior Kidd’s death until the following morning. On 11 December, an official telegram was sent by Radm. Nimitz to Mrs. Kidd:

_The Navy Department deeply regrets to inform you that your husband Rear Admiral Isaac Campbell Kidd United States Navy was lost in action in the performance of his duty and in the service of his country._

The U.S. Navy has honored the service and sacrifice of Radm. Kidd by naming three destroyers after him. Interestingly enough, all three ships are still afloat. The first USS _Kidd_ was a _Fletcher_-class destroyer that was commissioned on 23 April 1943 and served in the Pacific Theater. Decommissioned on 19 June 1964, she has been preserved as a museum ship in Baton Rouge, Louisiana. The second USS _Kidd_ was a guided missile destroyer and lead ship of her class. Commissioned on 27 March 1981, she served for nearly seventeen years. In May 2003, she was sold to the Taiwanese Navy. Re-named _Tso-Ying_, she continues in active service. The third USS _Kidd_ is an _Arleigh Burke_-class guide missile destroyer. She was commissioned on 9 June 2007 and currently is serving with the Pacific Fleet out of San Diego, California.

In a career that spanned over 35 years, Isaac Campbell Kidd rendered distinguished service to his country and to the United States Navy during two major wars and several armed interventions. As a staff officer and commanding officer, Kidd served with distinction and accomplishment. Undoubtedly, he would have made important contributions to the American victory in the Pacific had his life not been ended that fateful Sunday morning in December 1941 aboard USS _Arizona_.

ENDNOTES

7. Kidd Biography 1941; Kidd Biography 1937; For USS California see DANFS entry at http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/california-ii.html and for USS Colorado see http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/c/colorado-ii.html both accessed online 28 August 2015. Colorado was renamed Pueblo on 9 November 1916 so that its name could be used for a new battleship.


10. Ibid.; For USS New Mexico see DANFS entry http://www.history.navy.mil/research/histories/ship-histories/danfs/n/new-mexico.html accessed on 26 August 2015. When the Navy changed its ship designations, New Mexico became BB-40. Though she missed seeing action in World War One, New Mexico later fought in the Pacific during the Second World War.


12. Kidd Biography 1941; Kidd Biography 1937; Kidd’s date of rank for Commander was 28 December 1921.


14. Ibid.


21. Kidd Biography 1941; Kidd Biography 1937; For more about the History of the US Naval War College, see John B. Hattendorf, Benjamin Mitchell Simpon and John R. Windleigh’s Sailors and Scholars: The Centennial History of the U.S. Naval War College (Newport RI: Naval War College Press, 1984) or visit the Naval War College website https://www.usnwc.edu/About/History.aspx

22. Kidd Biography 1941; The composition of the 1936-37 Senior Course and 1937-38 Advanced Course were obtained from photos posted online by the Naval War College https://usnwcarchive.org/items/show/1169 Accessed on 26 August 2015 and https://usnwcarchive.org/items/show/1171 Accessed on 26 August 2015.


26. Ibid.


29. Isaac Campbell Kidd, Captain, USN. Western Union Telegram to Chief of Bureau of Navigation Rear Admiral Adolphus Andrews. 4:05 p.m. 8 September 1938. Kidd MPF. Kidd noted in his telegram that Rear Admiral Snyder approved his request; Adolphus Andrews, Rear Admiral, USN.


32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Harold R. Stark, Admiral, USN. Chief of Naval Operations. U.S. Navy Department. Letter to CAPT Isaac C. Kidd, Commanding Officer, USS Arizona. Subj: Commendation for Gunnery Efficiency, Fiscal Year 1938-1939. 4 August 1939. Kidd MPF. This commendation was sent down through the Chain of Command; Harold R. Stark, Admiral, USN. Chief of Naval Operations. U.S. Navy Department. Letter to RADM Isaac C. Kidd, Commander, Battleship Division One. Subj: Commendation for Gunnery Efficiency, Fiscal Year 1939-1940. 20 September 1940. Kidd MPF. This commendation was sent down through the Chain of Command to Kidd in recognition of his leadership while commanding Arizona.


36. Kidd Biography 1941.

37. USS Arizona DANFS. In his memoirs, Admiral Richardson devoted several chapters to discussing the basing of the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor and his ultimate removal from command by President Roosevelt.

38. Kidd Biography 1941. USS Arizona DANFS.


42. “Statement of Ensign D. Hein, USN.” Enclosure (c) of USS Arizona Action Report.

43. Statement of Ensign D. Hein, USN.” Enclosure (c) of USS Arizona Action Report.

44. Ibid.


46. For more about the Pearl Harbor attack, see Walter Lord, Day of Infamy (New York: Henry Holt, 2001).


Any CAMP member who would like to review books for this journal is encouraged to consult the list of books that can be found at our website: campjamp.org. The list is relatively short at the present time, but it is updated every few weeks.


Sandy Berger, former national security advisor in the Clinton administration, was convicted years ago of purloining potentially incriminating documents from the National Archives. He was not the first federal official to commit such an offense. Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of war, Edwin M. Stanton, has long been suspected of engineering the 1865 removal from the records and probable destruction of papers incriminating him in the alleged plot to assassinate Confederate President Jefferson Davis during the infamous Kilpatrick-Dahlgren cavalry raid of 1864. Independent historian Bruce M. Venter, who has devoted more than 15 years to researching and writing about the raid, here retells the complete story.

The origins of the raid began with a plan to rescue thousands of Union prisoners of war held in pitiable conditions in Richmond, Virginia. One unsuccessful attempt had already been made before reckless Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick, commanding a cavalry division in the Army of the Potomac, went over the heads of his superiors and somehow wangled personal interviews with President Lincoln and Secretary Stanton to present his concept of how to rescue the POWs. Lincoln and Stanton approved, reluctant acquiescence was won from the military chain of command, and Kilpatrick was appointed to lead the foray. His command of 3,500 men was expected to have little trouble penetrating the “weakly held” Richmond defenses, releasing the POWs, destroying large swathes of Rebel infrastructure in Richmond and elsewhere, and distributing amnesty leaflets encouraging southern soldiers to desert. Another column of 1,500 men under Brig. Gen. George A. Custer was to move toward Charlottesville, Virginia, to divert the attention of Confederate forces away from Richmond.

Kilpatrick’s division set out for Richmond in atrocious weather on 29 February 1864. Part of his command was a 500-man force that would separate from the main body and effect the release of the
POWs. The commander of this unit was one-legged, 21-year-old Col. Ulric Dahlgren, son of RAdm. John Dahlgren, a senior naval commander and close friend of President Lincoln. Col. Dahlgren, while brave and intelligent, was a strange choice to lead this daring cavalry raid. He was still recovering from the loss of his leg, could not mount a horse unaided, had limited command experience, and was completely unknown to the officers and men serving under him. His assignment was due in large part to his political connections and Kilpatrick’s liking for him. As Venter writes, “[Adm.] Dahlgren’s son rode his father’s coattails into...the power elite.” (p. 78)

In essence, the raid was a failure. Kilpatrick found Richmond more stoutly defended than predicted and was forced to withdraw. Dahlgren’s column became fragmented; his own party of 100 men got lost, as a result of which he hanged his Negro guide. Wandering around in the Virginia countryside for three days, they were repeatedly bushwhacked by local defenders until a final ambush which killed Dahlgren.

After Dahlgren’s death, papers found on his body explicitly stated the plot to kill Jeff Davis and his cabinet. They were published verbatim in the Richmond press, and Union commanders quickly distanced themselves from the plot. At the end of the war, the Dahlgren papers were transferred to the War Department, and it was then that Stanton arranged to have them disappear from the archives. Early charges that the papers were forgeries have long since been abandoned, and Venter agrees that they were genuine. He also accepts the theory that the plot may very well have originated with the rebel-hater Stanton, who found a willing acolyte in Ulric Dahlgren.

This is not the first book about the raid, but Venter presents a lively narrative in meticulous, well-documented detail, including a lot of what he claims is newly discovered or previously unreported material. Kilpatrick and Dahlgren’s idiosyncrasies, the relationships of the principle characters, the details of the march and the military engagements, and the tribulations of the raiders are all clearly set out, with frequent use of direct quotations. CAMP members will enjoy a good read in this fresh look at a notorious but relatively minor incident in the war. All will agree that “However ignominious his end, [Ulric] Dahlgren would be immortalized and the raid remembered, albeit layered in myths, legend, truth, and confection.” (p. 249)

Russell K. Brown


Grant Rising is an oversize atlas depicting the early military career of Ulysses S. Grant, from his cadet days at West Point (Class of 1843), through his service as a lieutenant in the Mexican War, and during his first year-and-a-half of service in the Union army during the Civil War. The text is written by James R. Knight, who has written four other books on Civil War themes, and the maps are drawn by Hal Jesperson, who has produced more than 800 maps for publication in other books and magazines.

The heart of the book is a series of 46 color maps, which use shaded relief to enable readers to easily visualize the effects of terrain features on tactical movements in battle. A few of the maps deal with the Mexican War, but the majority of them cover the specific Civil War campaigns and battles that established Grant as an effective military commander, allowing him to rise to the rank of major general of volunteers by mid-February 1862.

After his Mexican War service, Ulysses S. Grant decided to leave the Army, and he resigned his captain’s commission in 1854. He did not rejoin the Army until June 1861, when he was appointed colonel of the 21st Illinois Volunteer Infantry. In August, he was promoted to brigadier general, and in November he commanded the federal forces that fought in the Battle of Belmont in southeastern Missouri. The book devotes three maps to that fight.

General Grant than moved south, and in February he engaged Confederate forces at the Battles of Fort Henry and Fort Donelson, in western Tennessee. Seven maps and a detailed double-page order-of-battle chart show the details of these two fights. Grant’s demand that his enemy unconditionally surrender at Fort Donelson brought him national fame and a second star. In April, his tactical abilities were again demonstrated at the Battle of Shiloh, which was fought about ninety miles south of Fort Donelson. Although Grant’s army was initially surprised by the Rebels at Shiloh, Grant rushed to the scene of the fighting, and he was able to restore enough order to survive the first day’s fighting, accept reinforcement from the Army of the Ohio, and drive the enemy from the field on the second day. Ten maps and two double-page order-of-battle charts explain the details of the bloody fighting at Shiloh.

The remaining maps cover the Union advance farther south and the resulting battles at Iuka (one map) and Corinth (two maps and an
worked out between the antagonists, numbers were low enough that the camp was virtually emptied, yet from the middle of the war on, as the cartel collapsed, the total rose again to the point where the usual problems cropped up.

Just like those other prisons, officers incarcerated on the island still suffered from the same privations of hunger, cold, lack of water, firewood, clothing, and other basic necessities, ... of retaliation against them once word got out that Union prisoners in the South were suffering and dying in large numbers.

With the well-known frugality of the Union commissary general of prisoners, Lt. Col. William Hoffman, and despite the moral, monetary, and edible support from home in the way of relief packages, many prisoners were still forced, as in enlisted camps, to supplement their diet with rats, cats, and dogs. They also planted vegetable gardens, to combat scurvy, and turned their obvious idle time to crafting rings and jewelry, furniture, and other items to earn money to combat lingering hunger and boredom.

Having the free time that they did, thoughts did turn to escape, but there were relatively few inmates whose ingenuity was sufficient to enable their return to Dixie. Many were unsuccessful, ... Of course, also described is the most famous, but futile, attempt by Confederate agents in Canada to hijack the USS Michigan, patrolling on Lake Erie, and use it to transport escapees to that country.

As the Confederacy approached its nadir, there were some further exchanges in addition to those whose despair was such that they were offered the oath of allegiance in return for better ... being declared surplus and sold at auction to its original owner, L.B. Johnson, who was also the wartime post sutler.

In telling the tale of Johnson’s Island, the author has mined archives and manuscripts, newspapers and other primary sources in a bibliography sufficient for such a short volume. If there are any highlights, they would be the photographs in the text showing the post commanders, the USS Michigan, the post garrison, and a theatrical playbill advertising an inmate entertainment production. The front cover features a hand-drawn illustration, from the Southern Historical Collection, of a portion of the camp by Joseph Mason Kern, who was among those held there.
In spite of its relative brevity, this is still an informative account of the Johnson’s Island prison camp which should interest all who wish to broaden their knowledge of every aspect of our great American tragedy. It is recommended to the CAMP readership.

Stuart McClung


It is doubtful that any American citizen in August 1914 would have predicted that the United States would become involved in the fighting in Europe, much less on the side of Great Britain and France. The United States in 1914 had a large population of citizens of German and Austro-Hungarian heritage, as well as a significant population of Irish descent who were violently anti-British. The United States had also fought two wars with Great Britain and one with France. This book looks at how Germany sought to build support for its war aims within the United States during the period 1914 – 1917, and why it failed.

As World War I continued into 1915, the Allies, the United Kingdom and France, sought to bring the United States into the war on their side. Germany’s efforts were to keep the United States out of the war as a neutral, in both thought and action. The problem the German government faced was that it was never able to present the same continuous message to the American public as the Allies. Far too often, the German propaganda message had to change due to German military actions, such as unrestricted submarine warfare, or to counter Allied war atrocity accusations. In addition, too much of the German government propaganda effort was directed at the German-American population and not the general American public as a whole. The German government did not understand that while German-Americans were proud of their heritage most had left Germany due to dislike of the German governing system. German-Americans were actually United States citizens of German descent, who for their numbers had very little clout in the halls of Congress. German-American originations were social rather than political.

In setting up their propaganda machine in the United States, the Germans established it within their embassy, making its propaganda machine a visible part of the German government. The Allies, however, hid their propaganda machine and denied having such an official operation in the United States. The Allied governments thus could claim that they had no direct connection to the private citizens releasing pro-Allied material to the American public. The German propaganda machine also worked under a handicap, in that the Royal Navy had cut all direct communication links between the German government and its embassy in the United States. This meant that diplomatic messages sent between Germany and its Washington, D.C., embassy were often out of date, having been overtaken by fresh events. As a result, all too often German propaganda directed at the American public was issued in the form of a denial of anti-German claims made by the non-official Allied propaganda machine.

The author’s thesis is that German propaganda, as directed at the American public, failed because it was issued only in written form and was so worded as to only appeal to reason and not emotion. Thus, German World War I propaganda told you in academic and political writing why you were wrong in your beliefs about the Allied war aims. The Allies in contrast used not only words, but posters and movies that did not appeal to reason but had as the underlying purpose to stir emotions by dehumanizing the German as the “HUN.” The German propaganda machine never dehumanized the Allies. It never directly appealed to the American public by exploiting the emotions of hate, fear, or love. It did not graphically invoke human sentiment by showing weeping woman and children, martyred citizens, destroyed cultural icons, or heroic German actions. German propaganda also did not portray the Allies as a villain or despoiler. Thus, German propaganda was not successful, because it failed to develop within the American public a visual image of the Allies as someone to fear, as the Allied propaganda did of the Germans. Since Germany was waging war in territory beyond its borders, it had its work cut out to portray itself as a victim.

One can summarize this book as an excellent study of how not to try to win the hearts and minds of a population. It should be read not only by World War I historian but by anyone interested in swaying public opinion or in shaping American society.

Charles H. Bogart


In a nine-day raid, a modest British contingent, without cavalry and with little artillery, far from covering naval forces, marched over 100 miles in stifling heat and humidity to burn the public buildings of Washington, D.C. The humiliation of the new republic was complete.
President James Madison’s cabinet was splintered, and the Federalist press excoriated Madison as the source of this national abasement. The man who commanded this operation was Maj. Gen. Robert Ross.

The story of the burning of Washington has been told many times over the past two centuries. Recent scholarship has challenged the myths and revealed step-by-step the bold British offensive, and the immense American incompetence at stopping it. This study, however, focuses on the British commander. The authors attempt to re-balance our understanding of the prominence of Robert Ross at securing this exceptional victory.

Ross was highly experienced, having fought in Holland, North Africa, Italy, and the Iberian Peninsula. Loved by his troops, the modest and brave commander came to the attention of Arthur Wellesley as well as army headquarters in London. With the capture of Paris and Napoleon’s exile, British attention shifted to the American War. Public opinion and government policy were parallel; it was high time to punish the upstart United States for dishonorably declaring war, while Britain was fighting the French dictator for the good of all mankind. With the Duke of Wellington’s recommendation, the ministry selected Ross for a small yet vital independent command. Ross, with about 4,000 troops, sailed to join Vice Adm. Alexander Cochrane’s command in the western Atlantic.

Cochrane’s ultimate goal was to seize New Orleans when he had amassed sufficient forces. Meanwhile, he considered attacks on the major cities of America’s Atlantic coast, but rejected these possibilities because Ross brought with him so few troops. Cochrane’s subordinate, Rear Adm. George Cockburn, was anxious to inflict destruction in Chesapeake Bay. The authors carefully describe how Ross’s interplay with the two Royal Navy commanders resulted in the burning of Washington and the attempt to seize Baltimore. In doing so, they challenge the long-held notion that Cockburn was the prime instigator of these operations.

Ross’s direction of the Battle of Bladensburg, Maryland, was competent, but the result was due as much to general American ineptness. Ross pressed on to the national capital. When Ross entered Washington, he fully expected negotiators to offer a “contribution” for the safety of the city. The civilian leaders of Georgetown and Alexandria would negotiate such an agreement in the following days. The mayor of Washington, however, with the approbation of the president, refused to meet with the invaders. Thus, no one “surrendered” the capital. Some civilians or military men shot at Ross’s party, which reportedly displayed a flag of truce, killing two corporals, as well as the general’s horse. This prompted Ross to order the burning of a few civilian homes, from which the shots were believed to have emanated. While firing on the British within the city would have, by the laws of war then understood, opened the entire city to destruction, Ross ordered his men to refrain from burning anything other than public property. Cockburn, accompanying the expedition, was vastly disappointed. Had he been in command, he would have left the entire city a smoldering ruin.

Ross was stunned at the unwillingness or inability of his foe to put up a good fight for their national city. Weeks later, Ross and Cockburn persuaded a reluctant Cochrane to attack Baltimore. Perhaps the Baltimoreans would cave in as had the defenders of Washington. Ross, leading from the front as was his custom, was shot on the approach march to Baltimore. As every American should know, the British attack failed with the dauntless defense of Fort McHenry. The British packed Ross’s corpse in a barrel with 129 gallons of rum and sent it to Halifax, Nova Scotia, where Ross was interred in a profoundly mournful ceremony. Back in Britain, Ross was hailed as a martyred hero. In America’s national memory, however, the disgrace of the burning of Washington was quickly erased by the improbable victories at Baltimore and on Lake Champlain, and finally with Andrew Jackson’s stunning triumph at New Orleans. In Britain, Ross’s conquest of Washington paled in comparison to Wellington’s final subjugation of Bonaparte at Waterloo. Today, Robert Ross is all but forgotten, except to those who relish stories of the War of 1812, itself a forgotten conflict.

This biography is a collaborative effort between American, Chris George, author of Terror on the Chesapeake, and John McCavitt, author of The Flight of the Earls. It is the product of exhaustive research in Britain, the Republic of Ireland, and the United States. The text is engaging, largely because the story is so dramatic. The authors have successfully brought to life an accomplished, brave, and charismatic commander who heretofore has been relegated to the shadows of military history.

Richard V. Barbuto


Keith W. Mason and Sen. George McGovern had a number of things in common. Both were born in mid-western agricultural states, both were B-24 “Liberator” bomber pilots in the 15th Air Force in World War II, and both were awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross.
back to base because of concerns over whether there was enough gas to get home (there was), or if the plane might explode (it didn’t). On another occasion, during a mission to Romania, an engine oil leak caused Mason to decide to drop out of formation and return alone to Italy, crossing the mountains in Yugoslavia and the Adriatic Sea. This was dangerous, because lone bombers were sitting ducks for enemy fighters. Fortunately for Mason and his crew, no enemy aircraft were encountered, and they made it safely back. What Mason describes as his most harrowing combat mission occurred over northern Italy when his plane lost two engines from enemy flak. Reduced power meant he was unable to keep up with his group’s formation, and he fell further and further behind, but using all of his expertise, he nursed his B-24 back to base and made a successful landing. The entire incident was a tribute to his skill and experience as a pilot.

Mason writes well. The book might have benefited from an index to help in finding characters and incidents, but otherwise the author’s colorful narrative makes this engaging story a fast and easy read. CAMP members will enjoy it.

Russell K. Brown


Over the past sixty years, Sir Alistair Horne has written more than twenty works of history, most of which have demonstrated his excellence as a military historian. His most recent book is _Hubris_, which examines how excessive human pride has contributed to major military defeats by Russian, Japanese, German, American, and French commanders during the first half of the twentieth century (1904-54).

The author begins by devoting about one-third of his text to the great naval battle of Tsushima (1904), which was fought between Russian and Japanese fleets off the southeastern coast of Korea, during the Russo-Japanese War. The Russians thought that they would make short work of the Japanese, but the hard-fought contest resulted in the humiliating defeat of the Russian fleet – twenty-one of its ships sunk (including eight battleships) compared to the loss of just three Japanese torpedo boats. Unfortunately, this lopsided victory created the Japanese delusion that its victorious Admiral Heihachiro Togo was “the reincarnation of Horatio Nelson” and “the Japanese national spirit, coupled with an illusion of invincibility at sea, encouraged leaders of both the navy and army to contemplate an expansion to the Asian mainland and the Pacific islands.” (p. 124)

Thirty-five years later, Japanese hubris in turn led to its army’s
defeat at the hands of Russian forces under Gen. Georgy Zhukov at the now largely forgotten Battle of Nomonhan, in Manchuria, in the summer of 1939. The Japanese had won the Russo-Japanese War and taken Manchuria, so they “persuaded” themselves that they could now with equanimity take on the Soviet colossus as well as China – and what else besides?” (p. 144)

Zhukov’s victory made him one of Stalin’s favorite generals, and after the German Army invaded the Soviet Union and was approaching Moscow in late 1941, Stalin called upon Zhukov to save the day. He did, and the Germans never threatened the Soviet capital again. In part, the victory was achieved with fresh Russian divisions transported from eastern Siberia. Stalin was convinced those troops were not needed to defend against Japanese attack, and he was correct, because Nomonhan had taught the Japanese that it was not wise to taunt the Russian bear.

Japanese hubris surfaced again, however, and led to another key loss at the naval Battle of Midway in mid-1942. After handing a significant defeat to the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, in Hawaii, Japan was convinced that it would have no trouble capturing the American base at Midway Island. Unfortunately for Japan, American cryptologists had broken their naval code and knew exactly what the force commanded by Adm. Isoroku Yamamoto (who had been wounded at Tsushima) had in mind. Japanese and American fleets fought each other with carrier-based aircraft, and the Japanese lost four carriers (and 248 planes) and a heavy cruiser, while the Americans lost only the carrier Yorktown (and 150 aircraft) and a destroyer. After Midway, the Japanese could only manage a defensive war in the Pacific, and it was only a matter of time before they were forced to surrender.

The American officer who accepted the 1945 Japanese surrender in Tokyo Bay was General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, and his hubris later caused his otherwise brilliant military career to come to an ignoble end during the Korean War. After planning and executing the magnificent Inchon landing that crushed the North Korean right flank in September 1950, MacArthur soon recaptured the South Korean capital of Seoul and then began pushing United Nations forces northward toward the border with China. MacArthur ignored warnings that the Chinese would intervene if he pushed too far north, and he convinced himself that he was invincible. He wasn’t, hordes of Chinese “volunteers” pushed UN forces back south, and MacArthur’s public criticism of American foreign policy forced President Harry S. Truman to relieve him in 1951. The author writes: “Few acts of hubris in the twentieth century were punished more savagely or more swiftly than MacArthur’s.” (p. 310)

The final example of hubris involves the French defeat in Indochina in 1954. Convinced that they could bleed their Viet Minh enemy dry by forcing them to do battle at a place of their choosing, the French created an inland stronghold at Dien Bien Phu that could not be adequately resupplied and was ultimately overwhelmed.

Hubris represents a master historian at the top of his craft, and it is one of those books you hate to finish. All readers interested in military history will definitely want to add this book to their libraries.

Roger D. Cunningham


The Confederacy’s hopes for outright success on the battlefield, and for that matter, foreign recognition were never greater than in the period listed in the sub-title. Indeed, the odds for independence were never better than then over the course of the four-year conflict. In this instance, author Phillip Leigh has neatly consolidated, in just over 200 pages of text, the political, diplomatic, and military ups and downs for each opponent in this seven-month period, without becoming bogged down in too much detail. His conclusion regarding the climactic event of this important term should come as no surprise.

As it turns out, the year in question was very much a Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, day and night kind of experience for North and South. Leigh initially summarizes the first half of the year to set the stage for his thesis that the second half was the Confederacy’s “flood tide,” using that term as opposed to the more common and popular “high tide” surrounding the events at Gettysburg in 1863.

He lists the various Union successes which seemed to indicate the South’s pending denouement, beginning in January with the victory at Mill Springs, Kentucky, continuing through Grant’s successes in Tennessee (Fort Donelson and Shiloh), Union victory at Pea Ridge in March, the capture of New Orleans in April, the capture of Corinth in northern Mississippi and McClellan’s Peninsula campaign threat to Richmond in mid-spring.

The latter half of the year is given to describing the resurgent Confederacy’s maximum effort to at least restore equilibrium and regain the initiative from the enemy. Of course, the advent of Robert E. Lee to command of the now-styled Army of Northern Virginia was only the first step in this process. His audacity in attacking and then
pinning the Army of the Potomac to its “change of base” at Harrison’s Landing was only the first phase in seizing that initiative, as he then campaigned to suppress John Pope before turning his sights on Maryland and perhaps points even further north.

In the West, the intended coordination and combination of the armies of Braxton Bragg and Edmund Kirby Smith would carry the conflict into Kentucky, and hopefully to the banks of the Ohio River to regain all that had been lost, and then some, earlier in the year. Cooperation between the two, however, was not to be, resulting in the early October defeat at and subsequent retreat from Perryville.

As military events progress, the author also details the ongoing behind-the-scenes political and diplomatic events in each respective government, with particular attention paid to relations with Great Britain and France. The latter would do nothing without the intervention of the former, yet the former always seemed to wait for that one more indication from the Confederacy that intervention was justified and perhaps a viable and worthy nation-state entitled to recognition.

With the flood tide receding as a result of the battles of Antietam and Perryville, President Lincoln’s confidence in the importance and effect of the Emancipation Proclamation, on 1 January 1863, was increased to the extent that the abolition of slavery, added to the original objective of restoring the Union, would forestall any possibility of foreign intervention or recognition. This event was the real denouement of the Confederacy, Leigh contends.

Creditably, the eleven maps included not only have scale but also accompany the text in conjunction with its immediate and relevant thrust. The photographs are essentially thumbnail size mainly in the upper right hand corner of a page. They are of the two presidents, many of the generals referenced in the text, Charles Francis Adams (Ambassador to Great Britain) and Secretary of State William Seward.

Curiously, the only inaccuracy noted was Fairfax Court House being described as “only three miles short of Lincoln’s White House.” (p. 63) It is more like twenty-three miles, so it could be due to a missing word in the text. Also, the cover illustration of the Battle of Pea Ridge is not in the period covered by the book.

Although the author employed basic primary sources such as memoirs, personal papers, diaries, and other historical documents, there is evidence of strong reliance on many secondary sources from the 20th Century as well, such as Peter Cozzens, Clifford Dowdey, and William C. Davis. Not necessarily a criticism, but it should be noted that Leigh is not a professional historian, holding degrees in engineering and business administration.

In any event, this is an easily readable and comprehensible account of perhaps the most pivotal period of the war. It provides more than adequate descriptions of the major military operations, battles, and considerations behind them, hand-in-hand with the background diplomatic and political machinations which they influenced, to demonstrate that the last half of 1862 was the Confederacy’s “flood tide.”

Stuart McClung


If you are interested in the assassination of President Abraham Lincoln, you need to read this book. The editors have gathered the writings of fifteen historians, who examine various aspects of the Lincoln assassination and its consequences. All the articles are well written and of interest to a person wanting to know more about Lincoln’s death and its effect upon his family and the nation as a whole.

The book’s fifteen chapters cover five general topics — the plans to assassinate Lincoln, the assassination itself, the events that took place immediately afterward, the effect of the assassination on contemporary Americans, and how the assassination has come to affect American society. While each chapter can be read on its own, the editors of this book have performed an outstanding job in allowing each chapter to provide a stepping stone into the following chapter. It is true that many of the essays in this book cover topics delved into in greater detail by other noted authors, yet as I read them, I found each of them holding my undivided interest.

Michael Kline starts the book with his “The Baltimore Plot: Was John Wilkins Booth Involved in the 1861 Conspiracy to Assassinate Lincoln?” I found this article fascinating, for it contains a diagram showing the inner relationship between the various individuals and organizations linked to the 1861 assassination attempt. One will quickly notice when looking at this chart that many of the 1861 assassination attempt players retained a similar relationship with each other in 1865. Supporting Kline’s writing is Edward Steel Jr’s essay, “John Wilkes Booth’s Confederate Connection.”

Chapters Three to Five look directly at the assassination of President Lincoln. These three chapters show various links between John Wilkes Booth and individuals directly and indirectly involved in the Lincoln Assassination. Blaine V. Houmes discusses whether modern science could have saved Lincoln in “The Wound of Mr.
Federal troops engaged in the East and inexperienced volunteers spread thin, assets in the Southwest, as well as the gold fields of California were considered vulnerable. With poor communication throughout the area, rumor and speculation played a dominant role in strategic planning. Concerns thus grew that the next Confederate incursion into New Mexico would come across the Texas panhandle along the Canadian River valley. In the summer of 1863, the construction of Fort Bascom commenced on a bluff overlooking the Canadian River, some sixty miles west of Texas. It was named for Capt. George Nicholas Bascom, who died in 1862, leading his regiment at the Battle of Valverde.

The environment around the fort was desolate, to say the least. Arid, with little grass and no timber, there were few resources to construct or sustain a fort. The soil was of poor quality, and the sod was too thin to provide effective roofing, allowing the occasional rains to erode walls and drip through ceilings. Life at the fort was challenging for soldier and livestock alike. Although the surroundings were desolate and life at the fort often monotonous, the social and military context of the area was quite complex and dynamic. The broad, arid region to the east of Fort Bascom had long been the center of trade between the Comanches and the Comancheros—Hispanic traders willing and able to deal in anything from corn and textiles to stolen horses and human captives. The pressure of white expansion and military efforts to move the Southern Plains native population onto reservations made the Comanchero trade the last lifeline of the Comanches and affiliated tribes, such as the Kiowa. Fort Bascom took on an important role in the attempt to shut down this traffic, but the participants in this illicit trade were more familiar with the region’s few springs and hidden canyons, and the long patrols straggling out of Fort Bascom were rarely successful. Furthermore, when arrests were made, there was little cooperation from white civilian authorities. As is frequently the case, the thriving black market activity distributed benefits throughout the region, providing an incentive for the people of New Mexico to look the other way.

In November 1864, Kit Carson led 321 volunteers, 72 Ute and Apache warriors, and a long supply train out of Fort Bascom to confront Native American forces to the east. The arduous journey culminated in the Battle of Adobe Walls, where outnumbered three-to-one Carson turned back with little to show for his efforts, beyond the destruction of an evacuated Kiowa village. Several days later, the massacre at Sand Creek took place in southeast Colorado, further complicating relationships between the whites and the Native tribes.
The U.S. declared war on Spain in April 1898. With Wood as colonel and Roosevelt as lieutenant colonel, the Rough Riders were organized at San Antonio, Texas, in May, and with barely any drill, they were on their way to Cuba in June, sans horses, with Maj. Gen. William Shafter’s Fifth Corps. Ten troops of the twelve in the regiment were filled with men from Arizona, New Mexico and Oklahoma territories, some with a levassing of Eastern dudes. The other two troops were recruited from all over the country. One, which contained an element of bona fide New York millionaires, was dubbed the “silk stocking” troop. Competition for a place in the regiment was fierce: more than 6,000 men applied for the fewer than 1,000 vacancies available. Unique among regiments of the period, the Rough Riders had their own machine gun section, privately funded, and their own artillery piece, a “pneumatic dynamite gun,” slow firing but lethal.

The Spanish American War was a model of chaos from beginning to end, and Roosevelt’s volunteers suffered through all of it. Execrable conditions in the camps, both at home and in Cuba; inadequate and sometimes non-existent supplies, including food and ammunition; substandard health care, leading to thousands of non-combat deaths from tropical diseases; even insufficient shipping to get the troops from Tampa, Florida, to Cuba, meant that four of the regiment’s troops and all of their horses, except the officers’, had to be left behind.

Management of the fighting in Cuba was no better. Superannuated generals, most of them Civil War veterans, provided uneven leadership. One officer deemed it “a battle without tactics and a campaign without strategy.” (p. 202) Mauser rifles and smokeless powder for their ammunition gave the Spanish superior firepower over American forces, but the Rough Riders performed well in action. Their achievements in combat as dismounted cavalry at the celebrated Battle of San Juan Hill, and throughout the Santiago campaign, are well told. Roosevelt, elevated to regimental command and wounded, lived up to his own expectations and proved to be an inspiring leader. In a letter to a friend, he wrote, “I commanded my regiment, I think I may say, with honor.” (p. 195) The post-fighting rehabilitation and discharge of the survivors of the regiment at Montauk, New York, completed their brief service. According to official records, the Rough Riders lost 23 officers and men killed in action or died of wounds and 20 died of disease. The latter number masks the hundreds who became sick while in Cuba. A volunteer surgeon estimated that more than 60 percent of the regiment was sick at one point in mid-July 1898.


They were an amalgam of real cowboys and real Indians, Eastern college men, and a few Regular Army officers. Their leaders were an army surgeon who had earned a Medal of Honor in the Indian Wars and a talented, boisterous, “larger-than-life” aristocrat who was destined for bigger things. Their theme song was “There’ll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight.” “They” were the 1st United State Volunteer Cavalry, better known to history as Teddy Roosevelt’s Rough Riders.

Theodore Roosevelt wanted to be a soldier. Despite impressive accomplishments as author, rancher, politician, and public administrator, brief service in the New York National Guard did not satisfy his appetite for military life — he craved combat action. The explosion of the USS Maine at Havana in Spanish Cuba in February 1898 presented the opportunity he was looking for. Well placed in the McKinley administration as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, and already friends with the energetic army surgeon Leonard Wood, Roosevelt unleashed a salvo of entreaties to the president and the War Department to recruit a regiment of volunteer horsemen for service in the conflict he saw coming. He got his wish.
Riders’ saga, using frequent direct quotations from the soldiers’ own writings. Although earlier historians believed there was little primary material available, Gardner notes, “Many of the Rough Riders were prolific letter writers and several kept diaries.” (p. 284) He credits the Internet with helping him find those sources. Gardner includes a chapter on the later careers of some of the Riders, including Roosevelt’s posthumous receipt of the Medal of Honor in 2001 for his performance of duty at San Juan Hill in 1898. CAMP readers will enjoy this lively book.


For many years, Civil War historiography tended to ignore the fighting—guerrilla warfare and smaller encounters, rather than large battles—that occurred in the Trans-Mississippi Theater. Over the past twenty years, however, historians have paid much greater attention to events in that region. In *Extreme Civil War*, Matthew M. Stith, an assistant professor of history at the University of Texas at Tyler, examines the bloody total war that was waged on the western edge of the Trans-Mississippi Theater. To be more specific, he looks at the region straddling the border between Kansas/Indian Territory (today’s Oklahoma) and Missouri/Arkansas and running roughly 180 miles north to south, from Fort Scott, Kansas, to Fort Smith, Arkansas.

In 1861, most of the citizens in the newly admitted state of Kansas were staunchly opposed to slavery, while Missouri, although it did not secede from the Union, was a slave state with many of its citizens retaining strong pro-Southern sympathies. Missouri formed a Confederate government-in-exile, and about 30,000 Missourians fought in gray. Arkansas was a Confederate state, but many Arkansans remained loyal to the Union, and about 14,000 of them (including many freed slaves) fought in blue. In the Indian Territory, where slavery was allowed, the Five Civilized Tribes allied themselves with the Confederacy, but some Indian Home Guard regiments were also organized for the Union army. These conflicting loyalties were a volatile mix, and throughout the war they resulted in much bloodshed and destruction for the people living in that area.

The author notes that armed violence had characterized the border region well before the Civil War. Beginning in the mid-1850s, bands of Kansas “Jayhawkers” had ridden east into Missouri to liberate slaves and gather plunder, and Missouri “bushwhackers” had ridden west to exact retribution in “Bleeding Kansas.” The outbreak of civil war only increased the frequency of these raids, such as the one that was inflicted by Jim Lane’s “Kansas Brigade” on Osceola, Missouri, in September 1861. Nine Osceolans were killed, about 200 slaves were freed, and almost every building in the town of 3,000 was burned to the ground. In southwestern Missouri, Confederate guerrilla bands also tried to drive out Unionists, but “they mingled terror and theft with their higher goals of military defense.” (p. 39) By 1864, even Confederate Brig. Gen. Jo Shelby had to admit that the Confederate forces on the border “had devolved into lawless bands of thieves and murderers.” (p. 122)

In spite of the great brutality that characterized the border fighting, it should be pointed out that the lives of women and children were almost always spared. As the author notes, however, those non-combatants still suffered greatly, as they watched their husbands, older sons, or brothers be murdered, their homes plundered and often burned, and their livestock stolen. Many starving families became refugees, and needing food and shelter, they fled to nearby towns that were ill-equipped to provide them with any assistance. Late in the war, in northwestern Arkansas, one unique defensive solution was the organization of about fourteen military farms—collective farms of over 100 people each, taking advantage of protection that was offered by federal troops stationed nearby.

The author writes well, and he has researched scores of primary sources to assemble a compelling account of the miserable existence that many families on both sides were forced to endure during the war. This book is highly recommended for Civil War buffs, especially those who are interested in the Trans-Mississippi Theater.

Roger D. Cunningham


Writing a memoir can have a cathartic effect for those who have experienced combat and its accompanying horrors. Unfortunately, not all do so and even then it may take years for those who do for the effort to come to fruition. In the case of prisoners of war, especially in this country’s more recent conflicts, it must be especially trying, as they have largely been forced to endure captivity not always with the protections of the Geneva Conventions, experiencing psychological abuse, torture, and deprivation of food and basic medical care.

Capt. William Reeder Jr. was the last U.S. Army member captured
There are numerous highlights to be noted. The five maps are helpful and detailed and the photographic section shows many of the personnel mentioned in the book. In his epilogue, Reeder has listed many of those figures who played an integral part in his story and their postwar fates, many of which tended to be unfortunate and tragic as a result of their captivity. He reveals that Jim Thompson actually surpassed, by four months, Everett Alvarez Jr. as America’s longest held prisoner of war.

An appendix lists Reeder’s personal eight steps for surviving prison camp, and they continue to be employed in the current Army program of escape and evasion training. The few notes for each chapter provide additional context, clarification, and explanations of events, equipment, weaponry, definitions of terms and other information.

This is a book, at times, not for the squeamish or faint of heart. It is a revealing story of how our fighting men, and now women, can find themselves in harm’s way at multiple levels. It is also a story of how one can adapt, survive, and overcome the worst trials and tribulations with faith and belief in oneself and country. The book is recommended.

Stuart McClung


This is a nicely written history of the American/Filipino defense of Bataan and Corregidor during the opening days of World War II in the Pacific. A total of eighty-nine graduates of Texas A&M University were serving in and around Manila Bay on 8 December 1941, when war commenced in the Philippines between the United States and Japan. Of these eighty-nine Texas A&M men stationed in the Philippines, five were killed in action, two had their Missing in Action status changed post-war to Killed in Action, thirty-one died as POWs onboard Japanese ships while being transported to Japan, fifteen died in POW camps in the Philippines and in Japan, and five escaped capture. Thus only thirty-five of these eight-nine Aggies survived the war.

These eighty-nine Texas A&M men held ranks from sergeant to major general. The majority of them had less than two years in the Army when the war began and held the rank of 2d or 1st lieutenant. These eight-nine men served in every branch of the Army, from the Army Air Corps, to the Finance Corps and Coast Artillery Corps. Commanding the Harbor Defense of Manila Bay was Maj. Gen.,
in early October when Price, countered by forces commanded by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, abandoned his plan to take the capital of Jefferson City and headed west into friendlier, pro-Confederate territory. Ostensibly a raid to rally Confederate sympathies in Missouri and turn a war-weary population against the re-election of Abraham Lincoln, the operation quickly degenerated into plundering, settling old scores, and foraging for sustenance. By the time Price’s army reached west-central Missouri, one of its objectives was to remain in the state as long as possible and avoid a return to the barren landscape of Arkansas, long depleted of food and fodder. Along the way, the Confederates had accumulated a huge amount of plunder that took the form of a long and burdensome supply train.

By mid-October, federal forces had finally managed to cobble together an organized response to Price’s actions. This was due in large part to Maj. Gen. Samuel R. Curtis’s Army of the Border, constructed for the defense of Kansas. Concerns that the actual object of the raid was Fort Leavenworth, with the towns of Independence and Kansas City to be picked clean on the way, motivated a brigade of Kansas citizen-soldiers, under the command of Col. Thomas Moonlight, to take the controversial step of crossing the border to meet Price on Missouri soil. With the Union forces under Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, no longer required to protect Jefferson City, approaching from the east and Kansas forces to the west, the showdown, long in coming, finally began on 21 October on the banks of the Little Blue River, near Independence. The Federals staged a number of strategic withdrawals until 23 October, when the Confederates were routed at the Battle of Westport. Price crossed into Kansas and headed down the state line, generating fear that the substantial supply depot at Fort Scott was now in his sights. Exhausted Union troops followed him, often close enough to witness the smoking ruins of farmsteads plundered by Price’s men. The borderland between Kansas and Missouri had long been an area of brutal contention, and the Confederates took advantage of their final opportunity for reprisals.

Attempting to flank Price to keep him from turning west into Kansas, Union forces were able to hit him hard at Mine Creek where his cumbersome supply train was held up crossing the creek. What remained of his forces limped on, desertions causing their numbers to dwindle, as exhausted horses and abandoned loot trailed behind them. The Kansas men followed as best they could. They had long outrun their supply line and were faring little better than the Confederates, in terms of food and fodder.

Though long a neglected aspect of Civil War history, Price’s Raid

George Moore, Class of 1908.

The author starts his book with an account of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s visit to Texas A&M in May 1937. This Presidential visit is used by the author to set the stage to explain America’s unpreparedness for war in 1937 and the changes that took place in America’s military preparedness over the next four years. Much of this discussion centers around Texas A&M. As the war in Europe intensified and diplomatic relations with Japan started to breakdown, more Texas Aggies found themselves called to service or volunteering for service in the U.S. Army.

Those seeking to learn something personal about these eighty-nine Aggies will be disappointed. There are few first-hand or second-hand accounts of the lives of these men while fighting and dying, being captured, or dying or surviving as POWs. The author has chosen to tell the story of these eighty-nine men by writing a generic tale of the defense of Bataan and Corregidor and life as a Japanese POW. As the author tells his story, he plugs into the text the names of Aggies who were involved in this action or event, but there are few individual stories concerning what these men were doing or thinking. One can only assume that they were preforming their wartime duties as required under Army regulations. Thus, the reader never gets to know these men as individuals.

The author does provide an appendix, in which each of the eighty-nine Aggies are listed. This list provides the rank, graduation date, unit, and fate of each of these men. There is also a section of individual photos of sixty of the Aggies who served in the Philippines in 1941-1942.

Overall the book is a nice informative read about the fall of the Philippines and the fate of the Americans captured there. The book, however, adds nothing new to the general knowledge of the defense of Bataan and Corregidor, life as a POW, and the fate of those who sailed from the Philippines on the “Hell Ships” to Japan for employment as slave laborers. The audience this book seems to be directed at is not the military historian, but those who are interested in the military culture of Texas A&M.

Charles H. Bogart


This book comprises the second of a two-volume history of Price’s Raid, the first volume being Price’s Lost Campaign: The 1864 Invasion of Missouri (2011). That volume covered the raid to the point
that warrants inclusion, as well as an outline of additional biographic information. While this is a worthwhile effort in illuminating the careers of some successful commanders or staff officers, a critic might find fault on several planes. First, some of the names are too prominent to deserve the appellation “forgotten.” Second, there are some inclusions that hardly merit the attention Phillips gives them. Third, other historians could recommend other names that could/should have been included.

First, the good news. Phillips has made some great choices for unsung heroes. Prominent among them is Jacob Jennings Brown, militarily untutored but successful commander during the War of 1812. Brown was largely responsible for the positive results the Army achieved on the Niagara Frontier theater in 1814. He went on to become the Army’s first commanding general. Also noteworthy was William Jenkins Worth, resourceful commander in the Second Seminole War and valiant subordinate in the Mexican War. Although he was breveted major general in recognition of his successes, his own vanity and pride prevented Worth from ever attaining substantive general rank, a fact not mentioned by Phillips. Also in this group is Nelson A. Miles. Like Greene and Brown, Miles had no formal military education. After a stellar career in the Civil War, he embarked on a 25-year campaign of subduing recalcitrant native American tribes, showing time and again that infantry was as, or more, effective than cavalry in fighting Indians. In his later years, he too was rewarded with command of the army. Phillips gives Miles’s accomplishments their due while not overlooking his unpleasant mannerisms or his use of political influence for advancement. Others who get deserved mention are “Lighthorse” Harry Lee, Battle of Lake Champlain victor Thomas McDonough, Civil War Union Quartermaster General Montgomery Meigs, and strategic and tactical innovator Emory Upton. Says Phillips, “Many later reforms of the nation’s armed forces can be traced to Upton’s proposals.” (p. 189)

As for the down side, one questions why Phillips places some of his choices “in the shadows.” Nathanael Greene’s 1781 aphorism, “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again,” to Brig. Gen. Nelson Miles’s dogged pursuit of Indian bands a century later, persistence has been a hallmark of their strategic and tactical style. Thomas D. Phillips, an Air Force retiree who now specializes in the military history of the Central Plains, has collected about two dozen successful commanders or staff officers from the first century of our nation’s existence who, in his opinion, have been unfairly overlooked by many chroniclers. Phillips used his own criteria with input from the history faculties of the national service academies. He gives a lot of space to Indian Wars commanders, his major area of interest, playing up names that might not merit consideration otherwise.

The entries range from the American Revolution up to the Indian Wars. Some of the officers, army and navy, are major army, squadron or theater commanders; a few never achieved general or flag officer rank. For each selectee, Phillips describes in detail the reason or event has been the subject of a number of studies in the past few years, each with its own virtues. Lause explores in depth the contentious relationship between the Union leadership in Missouri and Kansas. Rosecrans was eager to get Price out of his jurisdiction and resented Curtis’s actions, which threatened to turn Price back to the east and into territory he had already plundered. Curtis felt that he received little cooperation from Rosecrans and Pleasonton, as his Kansas troops bore the brunt of the work, especially after Price crossed into Kansas. The poor relationship among the various Union commanders led to a number of unfortunate consequences.

The style and level of detail of this study matches well with the previous volume. Unfortunately, like its predecessor, it suffers from an abundance of inserted details which often interferes with the flow of the narrative. The first volume featured only two maps, quite inadequate to the task of describing the military action from the southeast corner of Missouri to its central region, but this volume has no maps whatsoever. Given the complex geography around which Union and Confederate forces struggled, this is, to say the least, a puzzling editorial decision.

Steven C. Haack


If there is one word to describe the military leaders selected for inclusion in this discourse, it is perseverance. From Nathanael Greene’s 1781 aphorism, “We fight, get beat, rise and fight again,” to Brig. Gen. Nelson Miles’s dogged pursuit of Indian bands a century later, persistence has been a hallmark of their strategic and tactical style. Thomas D. Phillips, an Air Force retiree who now specializes in the military history of the Central Plains, has collected about two dozen successful commanders or staff officers from the first century of our nation’s existence who, in his opinion, have been unfairly overlooked by many chroniclers. Phillips used his own criteria with input from the history faculties of the national service academies. He gives a lot of space to Indian Wars commanders, his major area of interest, playing up names that might not merit consideration otherwise.

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historian or history buff doesn’t recognize the name of George H. Thomas, the “Rock of Chickamauga” and victor at Nashville in 1864? A survey in 2005 ranked Thomas in fourth place among all Union generals of the Civil War. Phillips recognizes Thomas’s importance by giving him thirty pages of description, more than any other entry. As to “Why is this guy included,” a few names will suffice to raise question marks: Revolutionary Gen. John Glover for his amphibious support of Washington’s army. Ignoring Benedict Arnold, Phillips writes that Glover was the only officer to command land and sea forces; Capt. Stephen Decatur, whose major claim to fame is a daring exploit in the Barbary Wars: Benjamin Isherwood, engineer-in-chief of the Union navy; and William S. Harney, pre-Civil War Indian fighter, whose victory at Blue Water Creek in 1855 established peace on the Plains for the next dozen years, or so claims Phillips. There are others; readers can determine for themselves which leaders deserve inclusion.

Finally, who should be here but isn’t? How about Anthony Wayne, organizer of America’s first effective army in 1792 and winner of the first victory over native Americans at Fallen Timbers in 1794? Or Stephen Watts Kearny, whose march from Fort Leavenworth in 1846-1847 legitimized the U.S. claim to New Mexico, Arizona, and California? Or even militia general Samuel Smith, successful defender of Baltimore in 1814, an event leading indirectly to Andrew Jackson’s victory at New Orleans in 1815.

Everybody knows what opinions are like and everybody has one. Phillips offers his here in well-written prose. While we may disagree with some of his choices and carp at his factual misstatements, being reminded of and reading about these officers’ achievements is an enjoyable experience. Phillips predicts a second volume covering the subsequent century of U.S. military history, and we look forward to it.

Russell K. Brown


Throughout the nineteenth century, the United States maintained a small Regular Army. When wars were declared, larger volunteer forces were raised to augment the army, and state units ended up fighting alongside the regulars—sometimes distinguishing themselves and sometimes failing. In Panting for Glory, Richard B. Winders examines the contrasting experiences of Mississippi’s two volunteer infantry regiments during the Mexican War: “fame and glory for one and disappointment and heartbreak for the other.” (p. vii)

After Congress declared war on Mexico in May 1846, President James K. Polk issued a call for volunteers, and almost 61,000 men eventually answered that call. Volunteer units ranging in size from independent companies to regiments were eventually raised in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia. In June, the 1st Mississippi Rifles was organized in Vicksburg. Its ten companies came from eight different counties, and they sported colorful names, like the Vicksburg Southrons and the Raymond Fencibles. The man selected to command the regiment was Jefferson Davis, a West Point graduate who had served on active duty from 1828 to 1835 and was then serving his state as a U.S. Congressman. Colonel Davis was an outstanding commander, and he did his men a great favor by using his influence to arm them with model 1841 rifles, instead of the smoothbore muskets that other infantry units carried. This allowed his men to deliver a more accurate and deadly fire against the enemy.

The 1st Mississippi was transported to northern Mexico, where it joined the army commanded by Maj. Gen. Zachery Taylor, Davis’s former father-in-law. The regiment distinguished itself in the fight to capture Monterey in September, and in February 1847 Davis and his men earned even greater praise for their exemplary performance in the Battle of Buena Vista. General Taylor credited the regiment with saving the American left flank from being turned by the enemy, and Jefferson Davis became a national hero. The 1st Mississippi had been raised to serve only one year, so a few months later it returned to the United States and mustered out of federal service at New Orleans.

Meanwhile, as the war was dragging on longer than had been anticipated, more volunteers had been called for. In January 1847, the 2d Mississippi Rifles was organized in Vicksburg. Commanded by Col. Reuben Davis, the unit’s companies came from ten different counties, and thanks to later recruiting the regiment was eventually slightly larger than its sister unit. Sadly, the 2d Mississippi seemed to suffer from bad luck, and from the start very little went right for its citizen-soldiers. Cold and wet weather in Vicksburg and New Orleans caused many men to become ill, and by the time the regiment reached Mexico scores of its men had contracted smallpox. One hundred and sixty men died from disease within the first six months of service. One company, which had mustered ninety men at Vicksburg, had only forty-one men by June.

The 2d Mississippi also found itself stationed in northern Mexico, but that area had become a backwater, as the main fighting shifted south. The unit lacked the strong leadership that had characterized its
sister regiment, and without meaningful work, its men often got into trouble. Finally, the regiment was allowed to leave Mexico, and in July 1848 it mustered out in Vicksburg, having lost more than 40 percent of its aggregate strength.

The author notes that many veterans took their “Mississippi Rifles” home with them after they were discharged, and about fifteen years later those same weapons were used against the U.S. government during the Civil War. Regimental alumni also served the Confederacy in senior leadership positions. The 1st Mississippi provided the president, four generals, and five colonels, while the 2d Mississippi provided two state governors, four generals, and three colonels.

The author has crafted a well-researched study of two Mexican War volunteer regiments that followed different paths. Although the thin volume seems to be priced a bit high, readers who are interested in nineteenth-century American military history will enjoy Panting for Glory.

Roger D. Cunningham

An Illustrated History of the 1st Aero Squadron at Camp Furlong: Columbus, New Mexico 1916–1917, by John L. Deuble, Jr. Albuquerque, N.M.: n.p., 2016. 182 pp., $25.00 softcover (contact the author at jld7619@mac.com or 505-823-6659).

At the request and encouragement of some military historians, Western historians, and others, author John L. Deuble, Jr. has turned an apparent labor of love, along with his related previous articles and presentations, into this publication. It photographically details, with some accompanying explanatory text, captions, and lists, the history of the Army’s 1st Aero Squadron and its support of the American Punitive Expedition into Mexico, following Pancho Villa’s raid, from its base at Camp Furlong in Columbus, New Mexico, in March 1916.

For over a year, the squadron provided reconnaissance, scouting, intelligence and logistical support with its aircraft, mostly different models of the early “Jenny” type biplane. Its pilots included some of the early, and even later “who’s who” of the pioneering class of American aviation, including Benjamin D. Foulois (America’s first military aviation prisoner of war, albeit only briefly), Carl Spaatz, and Millard Harmon. Interestingly, information is also provided on the first American military motorized, as in vehicular, component employed to render additional logistical and maintenance support to an aviation mission.

As an illustrated history, there is relatively little straight-out text and more emphasis on statistics, accomplishments, and of course photographs. What might actually be considered the text is the prologue and first chapter relating the actions of the punitive, yet unsuccessful, expedition and the air support it received during its “sojourn” in Mexico. Any additional text would be the lists of statistics, descriptive information on equipment, and biographical data.

Although the basis of the book revolves around the squadron’s actions during this military campaign into Mexico, its format is composed of eight chapters which cover a multitude of topics: Pilots and other personnel, quarters, aircraft flown and their equipment (in particular, the aerial camera used for purposes of reconnaissance, scouting, and intelligence), the creation and employment of the Motor Transport Division referenced above, machine shops and other support facilities, a description of the aerodrome itself, and lastly a chapter on “special squadron topics,” which is largely a series of lists of the squadron’s aviation accomplishments and other vital statistics such as those killed in the line of duty, decorations and honors received, etc.

Not surprisingly, the many photographs included provide a close look at the pilots, their aircraft, the climatic and topographic conditions under which they operated, the aerodrome from which they flew, aviation badges awarded upon completion of training, campaign medals and other ephemera. Each is given a caption, usually in paragraph length, specifying the subject shown and other pertinent information such as the individual’s name, date, location, etc. Many might not be interested in such things as photographs of machine shops or hangars, but there is much to glean from those showing the types of available equipment and facilities of the early days of American aviation.

What should be of interest are the photographs taken in Mexico as the campaign progressed, much to the apparent displeasure of the local inhabitants. The involved formations created bases along the way to support their advance, using the motor transport division for provision of parts, materials, supplies, food, and ammunition. The aircraft also were occasionally used to ferry mail.

Creditably, there are two maps. One shows the area of northern Mexico in which the expedition operated in its bid to punish Pancho Villa for his border transgression. The other depicts Columbus, New Mexico, and the airfield’s proximity to the town, and ironically Pancho Villa State Park. Currently, the airfield has been incorporated into the local airport, although the facilities have certainly been updated and modernized.

Although there is no index, the bibliography does show extensive
research in archival materials, books, articles, and newspapers. These sources provided much of the biographical, technical and statistical information listed. A glossary defines many acronyms of which the military is so fond, including REO (for Ransom Eli Olds Motor Car Company) which sold the Army at least one of the truck models, nicknamed the “Speedwagon,” used in transport and apparently the arcane source of the name of the rock band of the same appellation.

Despite the very specialized, if not relatively obscure, nature of the topic of this book, there is something here for those with a bent toward early 20th Century aviation, interest in the 1st Aero Squadron, 100-year-old photography, or just the border war fought with Mexico, thanks to Pancho Villa. To that extent, the book is recommended.

Stuart McClung


John Mullan was born into a military family in 1830. His father, John Sr., was an Army ordinance sergeant, with an assignment in Annapolis, Maryland. In 1845, Congress transferred part of the Army reservation to the Navy for the construction of a naval academy. As he had been maintaining the property recently ceded to the Navy, Ordnance Sergeant Mullan was transferred to the navy, and he became a common seaman.

Residence in Annapolis allowed young John to further his education at St. John’s College, where he received his B.A. at the age of only sixteen. John applied for an appointment to the U.S. Military Academy, and he graduated along with his friend George Crook with the class of 1852. With an education heavy in mathematics and engineering principles, brevet 2d Lieutenant Mullan was assigned to the artillery and posted to Governors Island, New York, to await further orders.

Orders arrived posting him as part of the military contingent for the Stevens Expedition into what was then the Washington Territory. The expedition’s mission was to survey possible road and rail routes from the Missouri River to the Pacific Coast. Washington Territorial Lt. Gov. Isaac I. Stevens (USMA Class of 1839) headed up the expedition, while Capt. John W. T. Gardiner (USMA Class of 1840), of the First Dragoons, was the military commander. Other expedition members included engineers, geologists, meteorologists, and naturalists. The assembly area was Fort Union (now a National Park Service historic site in North Dakota). The Stevens Expedition was the first of its kind since the Lewis and Clark exploration.

The Stevens Expedition explored Milk Creek, the Bitterroot Valley, the Coeur d’Alenes and up the Columbia River all the way to Fort Vancouver, near Portland, Oregon. In addition to scientific and exploratory duties, the expedition made diplomatic contact with Native American tribes and put their expertise and knowledge of the landscape to great use. Construction on what was to become known as the “Mullan Road” began in 1854, and by 1864 it was the first wagon road to cross the Rocky Mountains and run to the Pacific Ocean. It would later be designated as part of Interstate Highway 90.

John Mullan resigned his officer’s commission in 1863 and set up a successful law practice in San Francisco. In 1883, he was appointed as Commissioner of Catholic Indian Missions, a non-governmental agency established to look after both church interests and the various tribal interests as they came to the forefront. With this position, Mullan moved to Washington, D.C., where he died in 1908.

Author Keith Peterson is the Washington State Historian, and as such he knows his subject well. The book is detailed and completely supported by footnotes and primary source material. It is not, however, a book intended for the casual reader. College-level students or readers with more than a passing interest in the Northwest and military history will find this to be a useful volume.

Robert R. Rybolt


Until I read this book, I thought that nothing new could be written about the Confederate submarine *Hunley*, but Mark Ragan, the author, proves me wrong. Yes, the book contains the familiar story of the development and employment of the *Hunley*, and her loss after her only combat mission. The author also reiterates the often told story of the Confederate employment of mines to deny the use of their rivers to Federal ships. Ragan, however, steps back from this familiar story and inserts *Hunley* and mine warfare within the total story of the Confederacy’s search for a military/naval solution on how to guard its coast from Federal naval forays and also how to break the naval blockade that was gradually depriving the Confederacy of the equipment it needed to fight the war.

By 1863, the Union navy had established its dominance in the
coastal waters of the Confederacy. Unable to engage it in a ship-to-ship contest, the Confederacy, as all weak opponents do, tried to find an inexpensive means to defeat the Federals. The naval war fought between the two sides highlights what human ingenuity can accomplish, if given free rein. Starting with no preconceived notions of how to defeat the Union navy, a band of Confederates brainstormed to develop a series of weapons that could win back control of their coastal waters and harbors. The weapons these men developed were refinements of weapons used in the American Revolution, submarines and mines. These two weapons, if deployed during the Revolution, thanks to technical progress, could now be effectively deployed by the Confederacy in naval combat.

The story Mark Regan tells centers around a person most Civil War historians are unfamiliar with, Edgar Collins Singer, a nephew of the inventor of the Singer sewing machine. Edgar Singer gathered around him at Port Lavaca, Texas, a cadre of like-minded young men full of energy and ideas. This group unofficially became the Singer Secret Service Corps. Their mine warfare included not only attacks on naval and merchant ships, but land targets, in particular, railroads. The naval mines they laid sank or damaged some 40 Federal warships and transports, and stopped dead the Federal naval attack up the James River toward Richmond, Virginia. Their man-powered submarine Hunley sank the USS Housatonic, and recently found incomplete documents seem to indicate they were hoping to build an electrical powered submarine.

As with all attempts to tell the story of Confederate secret operations, there is a lack of primary sources. Mark Regan has thus been forced to shift through thousands of miscellaneous documents that provide tantalizing glimpses of the work undertaken by Singer and his men. These ordinary civilians, by a quirk of fate, came together with the purpose of defending their land from Federal forces. They engaged in both conventional warfare and unconventional warfare, including carrying out sabotage and terrorist acts behind Federal lines. One question raised by the author, but not answered, concerns the destruction of the packet boat Sultana on the Mississippi River in 1865. Was her sinking the result of an accidental explosion, or was it due to a Confederate mine disguised as a lump of coal?

The Civil War has often been referred to as the first modern war. As you read this book you will find yourself in agreement with this statement. The technology Singer and his men were employing is not much different from that encountered on today’s battlefields. The book ends with a look at the post-war lives of Singer’s men. The prize money in gold the Confederate government promised these men for the sinking of Federal shipping was never paid, and all died struggling economically.

This is a great book about the Civil War and unconventional warfare. If you are a military or naval historian, you need to read this book.

Charles H. Bogart


Medieval theologians are said to have debated endlessly over how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. A modern version of that is the ongoing conversation about the reputations of certain Civil War generals. As Hillary Clinton notoriously said of another dispute, “What possible difference can it make now?” But author “Sam” Hood took up the cudgel on behalf of his much-maligned collateral ancestor, Gen. John Bell Hood (JHB hereafter), a few years ago. This is the paperback reprint. Since then, Sam Hood has published his edition of the “lost papers” of JHB, on which he relies for some of his defense. The latter book was reviewed in JAMP 129.

As with the lost papers edition, Sam Hood has arranged his vindication of JHB’s reputation by topic, amounting to some eighteen chapters of material. Central arguments pertain to JHB’s command of the Confederate Army of Tennessee from July 1864 to January 1865, and to his physical and psychological fitness for such command. Some of the issues are JHB’s relations with Jefferson Davis and Joseph E. Johnston; JHB at Cassville; JHB at Atlanta; JHB and the concept of the Tennessee campaign; and JHB at Spring Hill, Franklin, and Nashville. Ancillary topics are JHB’s perceived attitudes toward his subordinate commanders and his soldiers, his attitude about battlefield tactics (i.e., frontal assaults), and his acceptance of responsibility for the sad results of his tenure in command. Sam Hood also addresses JHB’s legacy in myth, lore, and legend.

Author Hood’s basic thesis is that the denigration of JHB began immediately after the Civil War by Southern historians, principally of the Virginia-centric “Lost Cause” school, who were looking for a scapegoat on whom to blame Southern defeat. Beginning in the middle part of the 20th Century, historian-authors not only continued the refrain of calumny, but embellished and exaggerated it, even at the expense of truth. Sam Hood calls out several historians for their staple but inaccurate (in his opinion) assessments of JHB: Stanley Horn in his The Army of Tennessee (1941), and Thomas L. Connelly for
In an extensive introduction, Sam Hood defends his approach by writing, “[T]his book does not require balance because it represents the balance that is missing from most [publications about JBH].” (p. xxxii) On JBH’s behalf, the author uses his sharpest pin to deflate some of the allegations made against him by one modern historian. Writes Sam, “Of [JBH’s] critics,... Wiley Sword stands out as the one who seized almost any opportunity to diminish the young general.” (p. 254) Citing what he calls Sword’s “fertile imagination” (p. 286), Hood accuses the former of fabricating details, cherry picking quotations, giving incorrect or vague citations for sources, and otherwise defaming or derogating JBH. Horn and Connelly come in for similar harsh words, but their transgressions are relatively pale in comparison to Sword’s. Sam, however, commits some of the same sins he faults in others. For example, one persistent complaint about JBH is his tendency to blame his subordinates for his failures. Yet Sam Hood takes up the same refrain. Defeats at Atlanta were due to the dilatory efforts of William J. Hardee. The lost opportunity at Spring Hill was a result of inaction on the part of Benjamin F. Cheatham. JBH’s delay in advancing into Tennessee was due to Nathan Bedford Forrest’s procrastination in joining the Army of Tennessee at Tusculumia, Alabama.

The Civil War historical community can only benefit from Sam Hood’s dedication and perseverance in presenting a full, although favorably biased, review and strong defense of JBH’s life and service. Readers will certainly understand the general better, but whether or not they think his reputation has been “resurrected” will depend on individual perception.

Russell K. Brown


Since the 2001 attack on New York City’s World Trade Center, Americans seem to have become much more interested in the special operations forces (SOF) that have been successfully waging the global war on terrorism. In this book, Fred Pushies, a military journalist, profiles most of the elite military forces that have served in American conflicts, beginning with the French and Indian War.

The author divides his book into six sections, one devoted to each of the armed forces, as well as one covering the OSS/CIA, and one on Special Operations Command (SOCOM). Each section comprises a series of entries on the famous individuals, weapons, insignia, training programs, and military operations that are unique to each armed force. The entries are never longer than one page and sometimes two per page, and they include photographs, usually in color. This means that coverage is somewhat brief, and detailed information on each entry must be sought elsewhere.

The Army has the longest section and begins with an entry on Rogers’s Rangers, a British colonial force that skillfully fought the French and their Indian allies during the mid-eighteenth century. There’s also an entry on the Confederate rangers who fought in Virginia under the command of Col. John Singleton Mosby during the Civil War. World War II entries cover Darby’s Rangers, Merrill’s Marauders, the “Devil’s Brigade” (1st Special Service Force), and the Alamo Scouts. Vietnam featured the first operations of the Special Forces units, or “Green Berets,” that had been organized in 1952. Post-Vietnam elite force entries include the 75th Ranger Regiment, the Delta Force, and the 160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment.

The Navy’s first special operators were the Underwater Demolition Teams (UDTs) that began to be organized in 1942. UDT “frogmen” served during World War II and in the Korean War, and in 1962 the Navy formed the first SEAL teams, one stationed on each coast. The SEALs fought in Vietnam, and have continued to serve in more recent military operations, including Grenada, Panama, Desert Storm, Iraq, and Afghanistan. One entry is also devoted to Operation Neptune Spear, the 2011 mission to capture Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, conducted by SEAL Team Six.

Coverage of Air Force special operations begins with an entry on the Air Commandos that served in the China-Burma-India Theater during World War II. The Air Force’s use of various models of heavily armed gunships in Vietnam is also profiled, as are the current-day combat controllers and Pararescue jumpers.

The Marine Corps organized four Marine Raider battalions that served briefly (1942-44) during World War II. Force Recon units were first formed in 1957. Special Operations Command Detachment One served in Iraq, but it was disbanded in 2006, the same year that the Marine Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was formed.

The Office of Strategic Services (OSS) was created after the United
States entered World War II. Its three-man Jedburgh Teams parachuted into Nazi-occupied Belgium, France, and the Netherlands to conduct sabotage and conduct guerrilla warfare. After the war, the OSS became the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

SOCOM was created in 1997 to command all of the U.S. military SOF. Most the entries in its section profile the specialized weapons, equipment, and delivery vehicles that have been developed to give America’s special operators an edge in their combat operations. An appendix at the end of the book lists most of the SOF personnel who have been awarded the Medal of Honor, from the Korean War to Iraq.

This book features a stylish layout and should be of great interest to all those readers interested in elite military forces, and especially to those readers who are interested in SOF specialized weapons and equipment.

Roger D. Cunningham


Tom Killebrew offers the reader an interesting, well-researched story that is new, absorbing, and candid about the training of British fliers in the United States before and after our entry into the world conflict. Clearly, the act of training pilots of a belligerent nation was a violation of the norms of neutrality, but the British had proven themselves worthy by winning the Battle of Britain. The Roosevelt administration got around the problem of neutrality and a hostile Congress by allowing civilian aviation schools to do the work. British fliers sailed to Canada, cross the border in “gray suits” and took the trains to their training destinations. Civilian contractors, with Washington’s full knowledge, did the basic training and then advanced to the second phase of instruction, before sending the new pilots back to Great Britain for further training, usually with combat-experienced pilots of the Royal Air Force. One of the major stumbling blocks was the lack of British funding. FDR’s advisors found a way around that by including the planes, training site construction, etc., under the Lend-Lease program’s broad terms. The main figure behind this clever plan was Maj. Gen. Henry H. (Hap) Arnold. Arnold knew that if the U.S. was drawn into the war, the country would have to expand its training facilities, which would take time and money. To cut the time for training, Arnold contacted ten flight school operators to expand the Army’s program. At the time Arnold proposed this expansion, the Army Air Corps had only one base in operation, Randolph Field, in San Antonio, Texas. After some difficult negotiations, within and without the Army General Staff, it was agreed to lend one-third of the new training capacity to Great Britain. Killebrew takes the reader through these trying negotiations and Arnold’s important discussions in Great Britain with skill and aplomb. The end result was expanded American training facilities, instructors and machines shared with the British, and increased cooperation between the soon-to-be allies.

The British delegation to the United States to discuss the training was led by Group Capt. D. V. Carnegie, an experienced pilot familiar with the United States, having lived a short while in Montana and traveled across the land as a young man. Carnegie’s main job was to coordinate the training and assist in choosing the right contractors and locations for schools. The places chosen all had strong points that would fit possible situations, but they varied in climate, accessibility, and surrounding communities. Terrell, Texas; Lancaster, California; Miami, Oklahoma; Phoenix (Mesa), Arizona; Ponca City, Oklahoma; and Clewiston, Florida, were the sites finally agreed upon for the training bases. How the courses were to be taught and the length of time spent in each phase had to be negotiated between the two groups because of some fundamental differences. Like any start-up project, there were numerous “bugs” to be worked out, such as aircraft to be used, hours of flight-time to be logged, and getting men and equipment to the bases before the students arrived, which did not happen at every base. The British Flying Training Schools (BFTS) proved to be very successful in getting the first two phases of flight training accomplished in a short time. The pressures of the war drove almost every move made by the staffs and high command. Once Japan attacked the United States, however, the open cooperation and mutual respect came through, and the programs progressed rapidly. No more attempting to hide the obvious.

Killebrew provides many humorous stories about the training the British boys received, and some of the problems of adjusting to life in America. Climate was one of the big changes these men faced, particularly in Arizona and Florida, where the heat and humidity were sometimes almost unbearable. One thing the men experienced once they arrived in their schools after the long, dangerous voyage from home was the great amount of food available at meals. Britain was under wartime rationing, shortages were the norm, so to come to a country not in the war yet and experience the abundance of America was something they did not expect but loved. American hospitality almost overwhelmed many, and most were taken into
private homes for the weekends and holidays. The course work was difficult and new to most, and the actual flying offered new experiences and some fatalities. The accommodations were crude at first but improved over time. Construction was an on-going enterprise at nearly every school, as the demands for more fliers grew. With the United States entering the war, the Army Air Corps took over some of the schools outright and in some cases began combining its courses with those being taken by the British pilots. This created some frictions but not enough to endanger any major operations. As the war went on and more experienced instructors became available, the courses changed, and as new planes were developed, new techniques and methods of training were devised. Killebrew does an excellent job in describing these demands and changes.

The author’s final chapters concern the experiences and sometimes tragic ends of the graduates of these schools. He spends considerable time going over the lives of these men. One of the most outstanding contributions of these schools to the war effort was the number of instructors who developed out of them and then passed on their knowledge to the hundreds that followed. Many of the graduates received the Distinguished Flying Cross for their bravery and courage under fire during the raids over Germany and elsewhere. Although the training received in the United States was the basic flying skills and learning the ability to turn and roll in the more advanced stage, it is remarkable how adaptable these young fliers became when switched to two or four-engine planes or going into the latest Spitfires and forcing down V-1 rockets. It speaks highly of the caliber of training given at the schools. The human stories of the students after they graduated are one of the strong points of this book and many are quite inspiring. There were a large number of casualties, especially among the first graduates, who faced the more experienced German fliers, but the RAF received a number of highly intelligent and qualified fliers from the schools who helped turn the tide in their favor.

The only criticism this reviewer has of this fine book is the sometimes redundant nature of the stories of the men, especially in the fourth chapter, “Journey to America.” The final chapter suffers somewhat from this same problem, but readers do want to know what happened to the men in later life and whether they maintained their friendships made during their training in America. It may be a fault, but it is totally excusable. This is a fine volume on an unknown topic that needed to be explored. It is readable, sometimes inspiring and almost always interesting. Who could ask for more?

Joe Knetsch


This short pamphlet is the first entry in the U.S. Army Center of Military History’s “Campaigns of World War I” series. It covers a somewhat little-known and comparatively little-covered event in American military history: The “Pancho” Villa Raid on Columbus, New Mexico, on 9 March 1916, and the Army’s consequent “punitive expedition” into Mexico to kill or capture Villa.

Villa’s Raid was part of the ongoing, and convoluted, revolutionary unrest in Mexico in the early 1910s. With United States interests, properties, and citizens being threatened by violence from many of the various competing factions, President Woodrow Wilson’s prior interventions in Mexico and recognition of the legitimacy of the government of Venustiano Carranza was the final straw for Villa, who raided Columbus with a relatively small force. Brig. Gen. John Pershing was authorized to cross the border into Mexico and pursue him with a force which came to include not only traditional infantry and cavalry—including African-American “Buffalo soldiers”—but also radio communications, motorized transport for logistical purposes, and aircraft (for the first time) for communications, scouting, and reconnaissance.

Although, as author Prieto says, Pershing’s forces never caught so much as a glimpse of Villa, who had dropped from sight as the result of an ostensible friendly fire wound, there were a surprisingly considerable number of fights, encounters, and actions in Mexico’s Chihuahua state with Villa’s forces, as well as those of Carranza’s Constitutionalists. All of this made for a confusing, and at times frustrating situation for the Americans. In the event, the animus of the local people also meant little to no help for Pershing. All of this is detailed in the text.

Pershing’s efforts were supported by the U.S. government by financial appropriations for the organization, provision, and dispatch of motorized truck companies for his supplies, inasmuch as pack animals and mules were unable to provide much of that because of a lack of fodder. The early efforts of the 1st Aero Squadron were hampered by mechanical problems, defects, and limitations with the early model “Jenny” aircraft, as well as the climate and topography. These Jennies were eventually superseded by newer models, but they also had their own problems during the course of their service.

Anticipating participation in the war in Europe (partly as a result of the infamous intercepted Zimmerman telegram and a lack of progress in actually “punishing” Villa), President Wilson looked for a
way to honorably negotiate a means to extricate the United States from the operation. Peace talks between the two governments took place more than once, breaking down largely at the American intransigence in setting a specific date for withdrawal and insistence on retaining the right to intervene across the border in the event of future raids. After establishing a 150-mile cordon (or stop line) for U.S. forces who settled in to more of a garrison or camp life style, the expedition was ended in early February 1917, just in time to prepare for the declaration of war against Germany in April.

Although pamphlet-length, this publication includes black and white photographs of the expedition and its pursuit and tracking efforts, its leading figures (including Villa and African-American cavalry officer Maj. Charles Young), rank and file soldiers in camp—notably, one photo of Apache members of the U.S. Indian Scouts—and one of the 1st Aero Squadron’s JN-3 aircraft taking off on a scouting mission. The one color illustration, from the Army Art Collection, shows soldiers on the march in the Arizona desert.

A lack of footnotes is to be expected, but there is a list of publications for further reading. The four color maps are excellent. The first depicts, over two pages, the locations of significant engagements and Pershing’s headquarters in northern Mexico. The second shows the layout of the town of Columbus during Villa’s raid. The third is of the theater of operations and Pershing’s advance, and the last depicts the skirmish at Carrizal, not exactly one of the campaign’s shining moments for U.S. forces.

For all of its perceived failure, the expedition did significantly contribute to the improvement of training and increased experience for ground troops soon to find themselves in Europe, better organization and subordination of National Guard units to Federal command and service, the establishment of a more efficient system of logistics through motorization, and the first use of aviation technology for U.S. military purposes.

For a short and quick read on the events of this “backyard” event in American history, this booklet is recommended.

Stuart McClung


After the Continental army fought the British to a standstill at Monmouth Courthouse, New Jersey, on 28 June 1778, British commander-in-chief Sir Henry Clinton continued to withdraw his men to New York, fully aware that the bulk of his troops would be redeployed to various outposts in order to defend against potential incursions by America’s new ally, the French, and to open another front in the colony of Georgia. The worst loss was ten infantry regiments embarking for a raid on French interests in the West Indies. Given that he had to find sustenance for his own men as well as provisions for the ships leaving New York Harbor for the Caribbean, Clinton made plans for a “Grand Forage” in the late summer of 1778 to accumulate fodder for transportation animals and food for his soldiers and the inhabitants of New York City. He also sought to provide support for Maj. Gen. Robert Pigot’s 5,000-man garrison in Rhode Island. The battering of a French fleet under the Comte d’Estaing both by the elements and British warships led to the temporary withdrawal of French forces and a decision by Pigot to attack the Americans under Maj. Gen. John Sullivan before the arrival of Clinton’s reinforcements. Sullivan was able to disentangle his Continentals, and Pigot was shipped off to England for his rashness.

Back in New York City in late September, Clinton sent troops up both sides of the North (Hudson) River, protected by warships patrolling the river itself. The bulk of Grand Forage 1778 covers the campaign by Clinton to distract or push back the Americans long enough for his men to gather tons of livestock, hay, and other necessities in the New York and New Jersey countryside near New York City. For his part, George Washington spent his time trying to determine Clinton’s objectives. It was Washington’s good fortune that Clinton did not feel as though he were in the position to mount a major offensive, for—as Braisted points out—four of Washington’s senior generals “were either being tried by court-martial or were under a cloud of suspicion.” (p. 47)

Given their respective goals, the success or failure of Clinton or Washington would depend on the gathering of intelligence, a task which was undertaken by officers and scouts on both sides. The best information, however, came from civilians and deserters, and some of the most interesting details in Braisted’s book have to do with the men and women who risked their lives to spy for one side or the other or who did the same by switching sides and providing information to their former enemies.

According to Braisted, one of the most important British spies was a school teacher named Ann Bates. While young loyalist men might look suspicious hanging around American camps, Bates was able to infiltrate the American lines in the guise of a sutler. While Washington did not have such a successful spy, his officers suspected fairly early during British movements that the British “army seem[ed] to be
however, the ironclads were added to the Western Gunboat Flotilla. These were impressive pieces of technology, covered with angled casements covering the internal decks and boilers. Propulsion was supplied by screws or well-protected paddlewheels, and in a few cases, both. Armed with an impressive array of artillery, these ships were not only capable of naval engagements on the water but threatened well-enforced shore batteries as well. Shallow drafts allowed work close to shore and in tributaries. In addition to the ironclads, the Western Gunboat Flotilla also employed simple mortar boats; stoutly constructed rafts that were capable of withstanding the recoil of the mortars installed on them and could be towed into place to shell land emplacements.

As impressive as the ironclads were, they had their vulnerabilities. Many shore fortifications were on much higher ground, giving them the advantage of plunging trajectories. The gunboats... also under constant harassment from the snipers and sharpshooters that always infested the river banks they passed.

As technologically advanced as they were, the ironclads often employed simple techniques such as covering decks with bales of hay or cotton to absorb the impact of incoming rounds. It was also found that covering casements with tallow would encourage glancing shot to ricochet off rather than punch through.

The initial stages of the occupation of the Mississippi went smoothly, with a number of Confederate forts being abandoned in the face of bombardment from the river. With additional naval forces coming up the delta and taking New Orleans and Baton Rouge, the Confederates made a stand at Vicksburg. General Grant was eager to have naval support for troop transport and suppression of artillery, but Confederate shore batteries were seemingly impregnable, with Union supply ships taking great risk to run the river before them. Union losses mounted, as they attempted to not only support Grant's siege of Vicksburg, but also control the mouth of the Red River to the south. With the fall of Vicksburg on 4 July 1863, the control of the

intended to cover a Grand Forage.” (p. 86) In addition, two British deserters were able to warn about 400 Colonial militia in time to allow them to escape capture by the British, but for the most part British raids covered by Braisted were quite successful. British General Charles Grey, for example, surprised and defeated Col. George Baylor’s 3rd Light Dragoons in Old Tappan, New Jersey (a drawing of which graces the back cover of the book), on 27 September, and British Capt. Patrick Ferguson did the same to part of Casimir Pulaski’s legion at Egg Harbor, New Jersey, in mid-October. In fact, New Jersey suffered so disproportionately that Governor William Livingston asked of the British “Why don’t [they] try [their] hands in Connecticut?” (p. 145)

Unlike with many other books, my major complaint with Grand Forage 1778 is not about the number of maps, of which there are many, but of their usefulness. The publishers have included about a dozen detailed maps from the Library of Congress, but one larger map that showed the area of the campaign on both sides of the Hudson would have been helpful.

Other than that, Grand Forage 1778 is a well-written, well-edited book that adequately covers a sliver of a niche in the American Revolution’s history.

Dave Page


The first major strategic plan initiated by Federal forces at the outbreak of the Civil War was the Anaconda Plan. With limited manufacturing potential, exporting and importing was essential to the South, not only to prosecute a war, but to sustain its population. An effective blockading of ports was seen as the fastest path to ending the rebellion. An important element of the plan also involved controlling the Ohio and Mississippi River systems. Such control would both deny essential commercial activity to the South and facilitate the Union’s movement of manpower and material into the South. Control of the Mississippi would also cut off the western wing of the Confederacy, effectively removing Texas, Arkansas, and Louisiana from participation in the war.

The first vessels to prosecute the Anaconda Plan on the Mississippi were simply commercial riverboats with wooden shielding added to protect the paddlewheels and boilers from enemy fire. Soon,
Mississippi passed to the Union for the balance of the war.

This volume is written with an engaging style and has many personal observations culled from letters and journals of sailors and officers. It’s most significant shortcoming is that it suffers from a lack of supporting maps. The single map covering the region from Illinois to the Gulf of Mexico offers little detail. Some of the most interesting action, such as the Union attempt to bring the ironclads through the tangled system of bayous north of Vicksburg, involves complex topographic descriptions that should be clarified by the use of maps. Likewise, the siege of Vicksburg involved aspects of offense and defense on both land and river, and the descriptions would have benefitted greatly from the inclusion of maps. Nonetheless, this book offers a coherent and comprehensive history of the “Brown Water Navy” in the Civil War.

Steven C. Haack


The best known Allied tank of World War II was the American M4. After seeing its first combat with the British army at the Battle of El Alamein in October 1942, the medium tank fought in many more battles, not only in that war, but in several more conflicts that occurred after 1945. Military historian Michael Haskew tells the M4’s fascinating story in this nicely illustrated volume.

The U.S. Army developed the M4 in 1942, and almost 50,000 of the tanks were eventually manufactured by the Chrysler Corporation (18,000) and ten other contractors. Shortly after the M4’s debut, the British made an urgent request for American tanks to reinforce their Eighth Army in its fight with the German Afrika Corps in Egypt. The Brits nicknamed the tank the “Sherman,” in honor of the Union army’s famous general, and almost 17,000 of those tanks eventually served with the British army. The basic M4 had a 75mm main gun, but the Brits upgunned about 2,300 of their Shermans with a 17-pounder gun. This fighting vehicle, known as the “Firefly,” was on a par with the best German guns, in terms of range and penetrating power.

Beginning in 1944, the Soviet Union also received Shermans through the Lend-Lease program. America sent the Red Army 4,102 M4s, which were almost all the diesel-powered M4A2 variant (there were seven main variants in all). The Soviets called the tank the “Emcha,” and by the end of the war some of their formations were exclusively equipped with them, perhaps because they were less prone to catching fire than their own gasoline-powered T-34s.

Other nations’ armies that used the Sherman were the armored formations of the Free French forces, and a New Zealand armored brigade fielded about 150 M4A2s during the Italian Campaign, from 1943 until the end of the war. More than 800 Shermans were also delivered to the Nationalist Chinese forces.

After American forces invaded France in June 1944, their armored units soon found themselves constrained by the thick hedgerows that bordered the fields they had to cross. An innovative sergeant in the 2d Armored Division developed a system of welding steel blades to the front of the M4 chassis, producing a most effective hedgerow cutter. Shermans equipped in this manner were known as “Rhino Tanks.” Many M4s were destroyed by German soldiers armed with Panzerfausts (a shoulder-fired antitank weapon) or during tank-on-tank encounters with better-armed German Tiger or Panther tanks, but the vast numbers of M4s that the U.S. Army was able to field, as well as the tanks’ superior durability and ease of maintenance ultimately enabled American battlefield victories.

Shermans also served in battles with the Japanese in the Pacific theater. They greatly outclassed the enemy light tanks that they encountered, although tank-on-tank fights were rare. Shermans blasted Japanese machine gun nests, blockhouses, and bunkers, and some M4s modified with flamethrowers in lieu of main guns served with the Marines on Iwo Jima and Okinawa in 1945. They were nicknamed “Zippos,” after the popular cigarette lighter of the day.

The author devotes a final chapter to the continued use of Shermans after World War II. The U.S. Army used them in the Korean War, and the armies of India and Pakistan used them against each other in the wars they fought in 1965 and in 1971. In 1959, when Fidel Castro won his Cuban revolution, he rode on an M4 during his triumphant entry into Havana.

This is a well-written and well-illustrated history of the Sherman tank. Readers interested in World War II or armored warfare in general will want to buy the book.

Roger D. Cunningham


Montfaucon was the opening battle of the Meuse Argonne campaign in 1918. Following on the heels of the St. Mihiel elimi-
nation, it proved to be a very difficult and bloody campaign. In fact, it was the most costly battle in American history for the United States Army. The entire offensive by the American forces cost 26,277 dead and 95,786 wounded, and most were lost in and around the attempts to take Montfaucon. It is the main contention of this fascinating volume that most of these casualties could have been avoided if the original plan of the battle had been followed and everyone had done their assigned duties. That this did not happen was a deliberate choice by one of the key commanders of the Army, Third Corps commander Maj. Gen. Robert Lee Bullard.

Walker’s indictment of Bullard’s decision is the product of nearly twenty years of research started by finding some marginal notes in James G. Harbord’s volume, The American Army in France, 1917-1919. The marginal notes had been written by retired Maj. Harry Parkin, who commanded a battalion of the 79th Division, the division assigned the difficult task of assaulting Montfaucon head-on. As originally drawn up by Pershing’s staff, the green 79th—it had only been in France less than two months and was totally lacking in combat training—was to attack the bastion while the Third Corps’s Fourth Division was to split off and assist in the assault by taking the rear of the hill and forcing Gen. Max von Gallwitz’s men from the fortress. This was a typical assault plan under Pershing and others, attack with the least experienced troops, hold the enemy in place while the experienced veterans surrounded or attacked from the flank, driving the enemy off the heights. Someone, at the last moment, countermanded this order, and the Fourth drove straight on toward the Kriemhilde Stellung, the third and most highly defended portion of the Hindenburg Line. This left the green troops—most had been in the army less than four months—to carry on the attack, unsupported by the Fourth Division of the Third Corps. The result was massive casualties among the four regiments assigned the bulk of the duty, the 313th, 314th, 315th and 316th Infantry.

The main cause of this failure on the part of Bullard’s forces was the rivalry between Bullard and Maj. Gen. George H. Cameron, commanding Fifth Corps. The prize for success was another star on the shoulder, and Bullard was determined to get it. To do so, he indulged in denigrating the lack of leadership in the Fifth Corps and blaming the 79th Division for the failure to take Montfaucon on schedule. Bullard repeatedly noted to Pershing and others that this green division had slowed down the whole advance and exposed his Fourth Division to lethal enemy fire from the flank. Walker’s contention is that Bullard’s push to the north, and refusal to follow orders in flanking the fortress, caused the delay in the advance on this front and blaming the situation on the inexperienced troops was a direct charge against Cameron. Since Pershing was directly responsible to the whole alliance for the success of this vital drive, anyone who imperiled it was suspect and prime for removal. Bullard’s constant harping on Cameron’s forces and the latter’s short answers to Chief of Staff Col. Hugh Drum put the latter in a poor light. In the end, Bullard succeeded in obtaining the elusive third star, and Cameron was sent home and demoted to colonel.

This shortened version of the plot of Walker’s investigation should give readers interested in this important and bloody battle some food for thought. Bullard’s star-studded career comes into question with findings such as Walker presents in this volume. His work also brings to light, more so than some other volumes, the alleged activities of the “Leavenworth Clique” that controlled some of the war’s major decisions and had direct access to Pershing. Bullard had to work around this group to get his way and his promotion. It is inter-office (service) politics at their worst. Walker amasses much evidence to support his argument and make his case. Most of it is well presented and convincing but there are some weaknesses in the conclusions that some may criticize. It is a valuable contribution to the study of command in war and holds the attention of the reader very well. The best writing, surprisingly, centers on the men of the 79th Division, most especially Major Parkin. His story alone is worth the price of the book, as are the stories of men and friends. Most moving is the tale of Henry Gunther, the last recorded American battle death in the war. Overall, it is a volume worth owning and reading thoroughly to get a different view of some well-known heroes of the “War to End All Wars.”

Joe Knetsch


Col. (U.S. Army, ret.) Douglas Macgregor has been a defense policy critic for many years, indeed, his establishment-contrarian views and statements may have blocked his promotion to higher rank when he was an active-duty officer. Some observers have compared his career to that of Brig. Gen. Billy Mitchell, the air power maverick, in the 1920s. Here, Macgregor uses the case study method to examine how change or resistance to change has affected military performance and even survival in the wars of the twentieth century. From national defense policy to defense organization to war-fighting goals, the cases
illuminating foresight or inflexibility in preparing for future combat. Writes Macgregor, “wars are decided in the decades before they begin.” (p. 1)

Macgregor’s first study is of Richard Haldane, Great Britain’s Secretary of State for War in the early years of the twentieth century, who established, against the opposition of the military hierarchy, a reorganization of the British army. He adopted a general staff system and secretly prepared for a war with Germany. The British Expeditionary Force (BEF) of World War I, though initially small in size and unfortified in its senior command, was professional throughout in training and competence. At Mons and Le Cateau, Belgium, in August 1914, the BEF stood up to and slowed the massive German advance long enough for the French army to regroup to protect their center. The eventual commander of the BEF, Sir Douglas Haig, later credited Haldane with successfully organizing Britain’s military forces to fight a European war. Macgregor doesn’t say so, but Haldane himself credited U.S. Secretary of War Elihu Root with the concepts for organizing an army in a democracy.

In his review of the 1937 battle of Shanghai during the Sino-Japanese War, Macgregor gives credit for limited reforms in the Japanese army but notes it was still organized for, and its generals clung to, the concepts of a World War I battle. The author concludes, “The struggle to control Shanghai was harder and bloodier than it should have been.” (p. 67) Macgregor’s take on the great Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944 is that the German army was much better prepared for a short, sharp war in 1941 but the Soviets learned from experience and were able to totally dominate all aspects of the battlefield by 1944. “The Soviet command structure ... created a margin of victory that changed the course of European and world history.” (p. 97) And in the Yom Kippur War, advance planning and preparation by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat caught the Israelis flat-footed in October 1973. But the Egyptians limited their objectives and the Israelis struck back, after their initial shock, swiftly and with vigor. Even so, harsh criticism by the public after combat ended led to major changes in the Israeli defense forces.

Macgregor saves for last a battle in which he played a significant role. During Operation Desert Storm in 1991, the author was an officer in the 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), advancing into Iraq from Kuwait. The 2d ACR dealt a knockout blow to the Iraqi Republican Guard tank forces at the Battle of 73 Easting, “testimony to the superior combination of training, technology and leadership” (p. 160) provided by senior U.S. Army commanders two decades earlier. Despite this decisive result, the Bush administration in Washing-120
ton directed a suspension of operations after 100 hours of combat, a decision Macgregor refers to as “ill-advised.” The result was that the U.S. Army and its coalition partners had to do it all over again twelve years later, and with results that have the fate of Iraq still hanging in the balance.

In conclusion, Macgregor opines that the United States has foolishly taken on the role of “global policeman,” (p. 188) and that in the modern environment the resources for an American margin of victory are “thinner than ever.” (p. 193) Faulty decisions by policy makers, organizing for the last war instead of the next, and failing to heed changes in technology are all pitfalls that can lessen the margin of victory. The case studies presented here have been carefully researched, are well written and expertly analyzed. Whether or not they support MacGregor’s thesis of current shortsighted American defense policy is left to the reader’s judgment.

Russell K. Brown


The historiography of the guerrilla phase of the Civil War has been increasing in recent years, with notable works by Michael Fellman and Daniel Sutherland, among others. Indeed, Joseph Beilein Jr., author of the publication under review—a contribution to the Kent State University Press’s series, “The Civil War Era in the South”—was also part and parcel in the recent release of an anthology entitled The Civil War Guerrilla: Unfolding the Black Flag in History, Memory and Myth.

With this study, Beilein has attempted to delve deeply into the psyche of Missouri guerrillas, in an effort to provide a rationale for their actions and what made them what and who they were. In the event, according to the author, it was not nearly so much a matter of supporting the overall and overarching policies and objectives of the Confederacy as it was one of reinforcing the manhood, civil and domestic traditions, beliefs and perspectives of these irregulars, who preferred to stay and fight close to home to protect their (extended, in many cases) kith and kin, homes and hearths, from the invading “mercenary hordes” represented, in many cases, by anti-slavery German immigrants of the Union army and state militia.

Consequently, this is not a history of guerrilla warfare in Missouri, although each chapter recounts an event that provides context to the topic under discussion. Beilein has divided his book into eight
showing that each of the extended family networks described above was, to a certain extent, its own “confederacy” and contributed much to the guerrillas’ success.

With extensive research in primary and secondary sources, this publication not only provides a possible explanation for the wartime guerrilla’s attitude, perspective, and subsequent actions but is also a fine addition to ongoing contributions to the field of asymmetrical warfare in the Civil War. The book is recommended.

Stuart McClung


This book tells an exciting story of the survival of one family in the waters of the Gulf of Mexico. On 19 May 1942, a United Fruit and Steamship Company-owned 4,700-ton freighter, Heredia, was sunk by German submarine U-506. On board Heredia was the Downs family: thirty-six-year-old Ray and thirty-three-year-old Ina, and their eleven-year-old daughter Lucille and eight-year-old son Sonny. The Downs family was returning to the United States from Costa Rica where Ray had been working.

The United States and Germany went to war on 11 December 1941. The U.S. Navy, with the declaration of war, found itself totally unprepared to conduct protection of trade operations, as ... U-506, during the period 1 May 1942 to 6 May 1942, sank seven ships near the port of New Orleans, Louisiana.

On 18 May 1942, Heredia, on her voyage north from Costa Rica, called at Corpus Christie, Texas, for instructions on how to proceed to New Orleans. Local officials apparently were ... to New Orleans. This failure to allow the passengers to disembark would result in unnecessary deaths and suffering.

The next day, Heredia, while off of Morgan City, Louisiana, quickly sank after she was hit by two torpedoes fired by U-506. Although the
Downs family made it topside from their cabin, the capsizing of the ship split them apart. Once in the water, the family was split into three groups consisting of father and son, mother, daughter. Each of the three segments of the family experienced their own terror in their struggle to survive. The tale of each of three survival stories is well told and gives insight into the will of individuals to overcome adversity. Amazingly, both father and son, Ray and Sonny, and Ina, the mother, were found and rescued by the same shrimp boat. Lucille, the daughter, was picked up by another shrimp boat. Only 27 of the 62 passengers and crew of Heredia were rescued. Ina, during her ordeal in the water, suffered damage to her left eye and would be under medical care for years.

While the family was saved, they had lost all of their possessions when Heredia sank, and under the terms of their ticketing, they were not covered for compensation. The family was truly a group of shipwreck survivors owning not even the clothes they were wearing as they came ashore in Morgan City, Louisiana. The book closes with a tale of how the Downs family restructured their life during World War II, and the authors provide a summary of the post-World War II lives of each member of the Downs family. Overall, this book is a great read about a family struggling to survive.

Charles H. Bogart


Kenneth Roahen joined the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Biological Survey in 1924. Assigned to the Peoria headquarters of the Illinois District as a federal game warden, he soon found out how tough the job could be in the shadow of prohibition-era Chicago. Mob activity extended well beyond liquor, gambling and protection rackets. Peoria was the center of a poaching industry that supplied Chicago restaurants with ducks and its practitioners were as rough in the marshes of central Illinois as they were on the streets of Chicago. The next six years were punctuated by gunfights, beatings, and threats against his life. He was shot twice and underwent six operations. The government finally transferred Roahen to Montana in 1930 to avoid further retaliation.

The high plains must have been a welcome relief. From his headquarters in Billings, Roahen conducted investigations into fur smuggling and illegal trapping in Montana and the surrounding states. In addition to his law enforcement activities, Roahen became a photographer for several federal agencies, documenting construction projects in the parks as well as wildlife and landscapes. When Edward S. Luce took the position of superintendent of the Custer battlefield in 1941, Roahen embarked upon a photographic project that would span the following two decades. Many of his photographs were turned into postcards sold at the visitor center, providing income for the Custer Battlefield Association. Over the years, he produced thousands of photographs, most following his own judgment, others taken at the behest of researchers or authors seeking to illustrate history books. Photographing Custer’s Battlefield reproduces over one hundred of Roahen’s images, along with modern reshoots. Changes in the landscape, both natural and man-made, are discussed. Sandy Barnard is a co-author of an earlier book, Where Custer Fell: Photographs of the Little Bighorn Then and Now, and this is an excellent companion volume.

Although some context is provided with a brief overview of the events of June 1876, this book assumes that the reader is familiar with the topic and can follow the discussions about Reno’s Crossing, Weir Point, and Medicine Tail Coulee without detailed explanations of their significance. Maps are provided with keys identifying the locations and directions of the photographs shown. Over the years, a number of monuments and gravestones have been relocated, some with little or no documentation, and Barnard uses Roahen’s photographs to clarify these issues. Likewise, parts of the battlefield have been privately owned over the years, with structures related to agriculture and commerce being built and falling into disuse. A number of Roahen’s images document their nature and location.

The modern era has witnessed the mixed blessing brought about by an increase in tourist traffic. The desolate, windswept hills that comprise the battlefield have several hundred thousand visitors a year. It is, of course, encouraging to see so many people interested in American history and willing to make the journey to stand at this place and contemplate its meaning and impact. Accommodating them, however, requires paved roads, parking lots, paths, and facilities that cannot help but alter the sense of place. The final chapters of this book provide a detailed look at the changes brought about by modern construction.

From the Crow’s Nest, where Custer caught his first glimpse of the village, through Reno’s failed attack and his flight to the bluffs, to the desperate combat among the ridges and ravines of Last Stand Hill, this volume provides a comprehensive view of Kenneth Roahen’s long and dedicated work at the battlefield.

Steven C. Haack

Although Mark Lender and Garry Stone write there is “no case for deeming” the late June 1778 Battle of Monmouth a turning point in the Revolutionary War (p. 404), just a few pages later they call it “one of the more important engagements of that war” and make a compelling case for why it was. The somewhat schizophrenic nature of these observations may have had a lot to do with the schizophrenic political and military nature of the campaign and battle itself.

On the British side, Commander-in-Chief Henry Clinton had been ordered to move the red-coat army from Philadelphia to New York City for redeployment to other arenas. He considered the safety of his supply train his most important task, but at the same time wanted to hurt the Patriot army. American commander George Washington, for his part, didn’t want to risk a major fight with the cream of the British army, but at the same time desired to prove something to those skeptical of his leadership skills and the capabilities of a professional army, which Washington felt was greatly superior to the strictly militia force many of radical Whigs felt was more in line with the spirit of the Revolution. As a consequence, Washington’s somewhat unclear and perhaps contradictory orders to General Charles Lee may have caused the latter to mishandle the American vanguard in the opening stages of the battle, at least in the eyes of Washington and his supporters.

The authors do a good job describing British General William Howe’s 1777 Philadelphia campaign, the precursor to the Monmouth campaign, but even they do not explain fully why Howe did not make a serious attempt to destroy Washington’s army at Valley Forge. Perhaps Benjamin Franklin, upon learning of Philadelphia’s capture, was correct when he stated that “it would be more proper to say that Philadelphia had taken Sir William Howe.” (p. 10). Or perhaps Howe was making plans based on the mistaken assumption that politics could end the war. By the time the Carlisle Commission arrived in Philadelphia from England in early June 1778 to offer concessions, the French had decided to enter the war, and Congress was in no mood for anything short of independence.

Once Washington learned of Howe’s return to England and Clinton’s retreat toward New York City, the American commander began to move his army in an attempt to “Burgoyne” part of Clinton’s force, a term the Americans had coined in reference to the Battle of Saratoga. Hot weather, somewhat poor roads, American militia stall-