Gen. George S. Patton (1885 - 1945) clashed with subordinates and allies alike during the Sicilian Campaign. He was in overall command during Operation Husky. (Wikipedia)
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Editor’s Note:
Welcome to issue 140 of JAMP. Once again, the editors and editorial board of JAMP, as well as the leadership of CAMP thank you for your support and ask you to help spread the word about our publication. Submissions by CAMP members are always appreciated.
Issue 140 has some interesting articles that span the period from the early 18th century to the mid-1940s. “The Federal Arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina,” by Ed Salo, looks at how arsenals were organized in the United States, as well as the role this specific arsenal played for the U.S. Army.
“Sacramento Capital Park’s Civil War Memorial Grove Then and Now,” by Brendan Harris, looks at one of the unique and less controversial memorials to the Civil War. At a time when we are questioning the use of Confederate statuettes, in the aftermath of the Civil War, California established a memorial park with trees from that war’s battlefields—some of which are still blooming today.
Finally, in “Mission Command & Joint Strategic Planning During Operation Husky,” by Dr. Paul Messina, the importance of communication at the command and subordinate levels is examined in Operation Husky, which can be thought of as a prelude to airborne operations for the Normandy invasion.
Finally, Roger Cunningham presents thirty book reviews contributed by members. We continue to appreciate your feedback and best wishes.

Till next time,
Vincent W. Rospond

“An arsenal on a moderate scale ought to be provided there:” The Federal Arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina

By Edward Salo, PhD

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Edward Salo is an assistant professor of history and historic preservation at Arkansas State University. Before coming to A-State, Dr. Salo spent 15 years working for several cultural resource management firms across the Southeast. He has researched military sites from World War II-era Japanese fortifications in Rota to SAC Alert facilities in the U.S. to Coastal Artillery batteries at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, as well as co-authored the history of the USACE efforts to dispose of munitions in Iraq after the 2003 invasion.

While many people think of Fort Sumter as the primary military installation in Charleston South Carolina, that was captured by the Confederates at the start of the Civil War, other federal military complexes were located in the city, including the lighthouses to the batteries at Fort Moultrie across the harbor. One U.S. Army installation that does not appear in the history books is the Federal Arsenal in Charleston. Constructed during the War of 1812, the arsenal was one of the important ordnance facilities of the army during the early nineteenth century. The arsenal helped to equip the U.S. Army in the Mexican War, and the Confederate Army during the Civil War. After the war, it became the home to Porter Military Academy, one of the most prestigious schools in the area, and later a part of the Medical University of South Carolina.

The site of the first Federal arsenal in Charleston was on land owned by Daniel Cannon. He owned the land, part of Cannon-
paired small arms, primarily muskets and rifles. Springfield Armory had been an ordnance depot for the Army since the Revolutionary War. In 1794, Congress authorized the acquisition of Springfield as an armory, and simultaneously authorized the acquisition of Harpers Ferry. Although both armories pioneered the use of standardized parts in the manufacture of rifles, yet most people consider Springfield as the pioneer in the standardization of industrial techniques.

In addition to these large facilities, the U.S. Army also constructed smaller ordnance installations called arsenals, beginning with the Schuylkill Arsenal at Philadelphia in 1799. In 1849, there were 28 arsenals, which were divided into arsenals of construction; arsenals of deposit and repair; and depots. The arsenals of construction were located at West Troy, New York (Watervliet); Pittsburgh (Allegheny), Pennsylvania; Washington, D.C., and Hampton, Virginia (Fort Monroe). The arsenals of construction fabricated the varied types of military equipment other than weapons, such as gun carriages, caissons, armorer’s tools, ammunition, and gunner’s haversacks. The arsenals of deposit and repair fixed ordnance stores, including small arms; they also stored and maintained ordnance supplies for future issue. The ordnance depots could only perform minor maintenance; they were primarily storage facilities.

The ordnance facility at Charleston, South Carolina, began life as an ordnance depot. Generally, arsenals were composed of nineteenth-century industrial buildings characterized by brick or stone two-story masonry buildings, with large window openings to allow light into the works. Like factories of the time period, little exterior differentiation was needed for buildings housing different manufacturing processes, except for some specialized processes such as the manufacture and storage of gunpowder. Nineteenth-century industrial buildings were surprisingly generic, no matter what was produced inside them.

In the early days of its existence, the arsenal at Charleston was small in scale and technically a depot. The only building was a storehouse constructed by the government at the site during the War of 1812 to store supplies for the military. The facility remained small in size after the war and an Army report from 1828 shows that the Charleston Arsenal only received $200 during the first three quarters of the year. The small scale of the operation at Charleston was even more evident in 1832, when the Army showed that only one storekeeper manned the depot, and that Charleston was the only depot or arsenal with only one person on-site. The report went on to say that Charleston was one of the “minor depots, and [is] used
for depositing the military stores to be distributed to the army and militia.\textsuperscript{13}

By 1836, the one storehouse at the depot was in a ruined state and too small to be used for repairs of modern equipment. Rep. Henry Laurens Pinckney, Congressman from Charleston, crusaded for the establishment of a modern arsenal of construction in Charleston. Pinckney came from a family with a strong political tradition in Charleston. He was the son of Charles Pinckney, a member of the Continental Congress, the Constitutional Convention, governor, senator, and representative. Henry Pinckney was a lawyer and founded the \textit{Charleston Mercury} in 1819, serving as its sole editor for fifteen years. He was elected as a Nullifier to the Twenty-third and Twenty-fourth Congresses (1833-1837). John C. Calhoun started the Nullifier Party in South Carolina during the 1830s with the main political view that states could nullify federal laws within their borders. Pinckney ran unsuccessfully for reelection in 1836. Later he served as mayor of Charleston (1837-1840) and collector of the port of Charleston in 1841 and 1842.\textsuperscript{14}

On 20 January 1836, Col. G. Bomford of the Ordnance Office stated in a letter to Pinckney:

\begin{quote}
Arsenals of construction are expensive, it is not thought expedient unnecessarily to increase them, and doubts are entertained whether, under existing circumstances, the city of Charleston is a proper location for such an establishment. There is a depot for arms in Charleston, belonging to the United States, which, however, is on too limited a scale. I would therefore respectfully recommend that an appropriation be asked for, either to add to this depot, or to provide such other site in the vicinity of the city as may be found, upon examination, most expedient. An arsenal on a moderate scale ought to be provided there, and such workshops could be attached to it as might be necessary to repair and keep in order the arms and to construct gun-carriages for some of the southern stations.\textsuperscript{15}
\end{quote}

Based on the Army’s opinion, Congressman Richard M. Johnson, chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs, proposed an appropriation of $20,000 to repair and extend the United States Arsenal at Charleston, South Carolina, on 21 March 1836.\textsuperscript{16} On 17 May 1836, the House of Representatives passed the bill, and the Senate concurred in July of the same year.\textsuperscript{17} One might view Pinckney’s attempt to get money for the arsenal as a way to gain votes in the tradition of “pork-barrel” politics. His political position might also explain why the Army did not want to invest money in South Carolina, the political base for President Andrew Jackson’s chief rival.

After receiving the appropriation, Army architects began work on the plans. The 1838 plans showed that the Charleston Arsenal was a U-shaped complex. Figure 1 provides an 1838 plat of the arsenal showing the warehouse building, three small buildings that are probably housing, and a guard house. The designed expansion called for: “Enlarging the U.S. Arsenal, Charleston ... and rendering it a Citadel of great convenience ... The Plan represents a simple extension of the old Arsenal, by adding a Building to the rear, corresponding with that so as to embrace a structure 280 x 200 feet.” The plans make provisions for the new buildings to be placed “100 feet on [the] Potter’s Field” and opposite the “residence of [the] Superintendent of [the] Burial Ground.”\textsuperscript{18}

To facilitate the expansion of the arsenal, on 6 February 1839, the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs authorized an appropriation of $1,585 for the purchase of land adjoining the arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina, offered for sale by the city council.\textsuperscript{19} Figure 2 provides a drawing of the 1838 plan for the arsenal.

Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers entitled “Proposed Arsenal for Charleston, SC” present an 1842 plan for enlarging the arsenal. The new plan called for the buildings:
The beginning of the Civil War in Charleston bred several myths, including one about the capture of the Charleston Arsenal. Newspaper accounts produced years after the event credit the capture of the arsenal to 20 members of the Washington Light Infantry who marched into the arsenal on 7 November 1860. However, the Official Records of the War of Rebellion tells a different story. Based on the accounts of the time, Col. John Cunningham and the Seventeenth Regiment of Infantry, South Carolina Militia, captured the U.S. Arsenal on 30 December 1860, after surrounding the facility for several days. The storekeeper, F. C. Humphreys, had no troops for defense and received no guidance from Washington. He surrendered to the militia after a formal protest and asked that his men remain quartered at the arsenal and that he could salute the flag.

It appears, however, that the plan was not completed. On Figure 1, note what appears to be a wall on the south side of the complex. Figure 3 shows an 1852 drawing of the arsenal illustrating the expansion of the complex; the wall surrounding the complex is very apparent.

Noted Charleston architect Edward Brickell White assisted in the construction of buildings at the arsenal in the 1840s. White, born on 29 January 1806, received engineering training at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, and after graduating in 1826 served as an artillery officer on the Black Hawk expedition and on the staff of Brig. Gen. Abraham Eustis. In the Army, White oversaw the construction of Forts Pulaski and Adams and the bridge over the Potomac. After resigning from the Army, he worked for several railroads until settling in Charleston as an architect. He is credited with construction of buildings at the arsenal, but no record of which buildings could be located.

During the pre-Civil War years, many notable ordinance officials served at Charleston. For example, Josiah Gorgas, a West Point-educated officer, was at the arsenal from June 1858 until July 1860. When the Civil War started, Gorgas joined the Confederate Army and was stationed in Richmond, Virginia, as Chief of Confederate Ordnance. After the war, Gorgas managed the Brierfield Iron Works in Alabama until 1867. He worked at the University of the South in Sewanee, Tennessee, from 1869 to 1877 as professor of engineering and vice-chancellor. He was president of the University of Alabama in 1877-1878.

The Federal Arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina

Figure 2. The 1838 view of the Arsenal, Charleston, SC. (From Historic Charleston Foundation Archives)

To front a square of 250 feet, on the N. East comer of the ground purchased in Cannonsboro ... Four principal buildings to be placed on the four sides of the Square, the Arsenal and principle Store house on the East Side; the workshops on the west, the Officers Quarters on the North and the Barracks on the South Side, the remainder of the Square to be enclosed by a wall 18 feet high with watchtowers at the angles.

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After its capture, the Confederate government used the facility for the manufacture and storage of munitions throughout the Civil War. The Southern forces constructed Colcock Hall, a Greek Revival-style building, in 1862 to develop heavy artillery. They also continued to use the remaining buildings to support their war effort. Figure 4 provides two views of the arsenal from the Civil War period.

After the fall of Charleston in 1865, the federal government regained control of the arsenal. Francis H. Parker served as
commander of the site from 1865 to 1868. He commented in his autobiography that one of his responsibilities was to repair the facility. He described the arsenal in a letter as a collection of brick buildings, “simple rectangular, two-story structures with low-pitched hip roofs, [and] tall windows ... recessed in arches in the outside walls.” After the war, the government had little use for the facilities and all but abandoned them. In 1872, Congress authorized $1,300 for a new slate roof on the Foundry Building, $1,200 for re-laying the floors in the storehouses, and $200 for general repairs of the public buildings and grounds.

In 1879, Rev. A. Toomer Porter began to take steps to acquire the old arsenal for use as a school. In a letter seeking the endorsement of the government for the property, Porter wrote, “I am encouraged to hope that the Government may help me by contracting with me for a lease of the vacant property, which is admirably adapted to the purposes of a school such as mine ... I desire to impress upon you that I am not making application for speculative purposes.”

Maj. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, commanding the post of Charleston at the time, seemed eager to dispose of what he viewed as marginal property. In a response to Porter’s request, Hunt stated:

I have examined Rev. Dr. A. Toomer Porter’s paper with respect to the acquisition of the arsenal grounds, Charleston, for the school of which he has charge, and believe that all the statements found in it are correct. In all excavations made in these grounds human remains are

Porter received a lease for the old arsenal for 99 years at a cost of one dollar per year. Ten years later, by act of Congress, the property was deeded fee-simple to the school under the condition that the property always be used for educational purposes. Porter quickly and tirelessly began converting and using the arsenal for the Holy Communion Institute. “I had to use the old schoolhouse for some months until I could convert the foundry, which the Confederate Government had built during the war, into a schoolhouse, changing its use from molding bullets into molding brains and hearts and characters.”

Rev. Porter hired local African-American contractor Holten Bell to remodel the artillery shed into St. Timothy’s Chapel as well as to work on several other buildings. In addition to Holten Bell’s work, his teenage son, Hiram L. Bell, built the entire brick fence around Porter Academy. Hiram Bell was the grandson of Joseph DeReef, who lived at 42 Amherst Street and owned a woodyard and wharf at the east end of Ann Street. Hiram Bell later organized the Bricklayers Union, Local 1 of South Carolina and served as a foreman at the U.S. Navy Yard in North Charleston.

The 1902 Sanborn Fire Insurance Map of Charleston shows that there were six large brick buildings and one brick church at Porter Academy.
The Federal Arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina

em as “a group of weathered buildings in a shady campus enclosed by a brick wall.” By 1963, the Medical College of South Carolina (now the Medical University of South Carolina) acquired the Porter Military Academy and it has been part of its campus since then. The Porter Military Academy was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1996.

ENDNOTES

1. This project grew out of research conducted for a study of the wall that surrounds the former Charleston Arsenal conducted by the author while he was employed in Charleston, South Carolina.


5. George B. Eckhard, A Digest of the Ordinances of the City Council of Charleston, from the Year 1783 to October 1844: To Which Are Annexed the Acts of the Legislature Which Relate Exclusively to the City of Charleston. (Charleston: Walker and Burke, 1844), p. 126.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 41.

10. Ibid., p. 62.


24. W. Curtis Worthington, St. Lukes Chapel: Birth and Rebirth (Charleston: Medical University of South Carolina, 1996).


29. Ibid., p. 358.

30. Ibid., p. 366.

31. Historic Charleston Foundation Archives record related to the Porter School, n.d.

Sacramento Capital Park’s Civil War Memorial Grove Then and Now

By Brendan Harris

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Brendan Harris is a graduate student at Southern New Hampshire University, with an emphasis in military history. He is currently researching his graduate thesis on the attempts of the Confederacy to expand west to the Pacific and into Latin America during the Civil War. Brendan is originally from Fairfax, Virginia, but he now resides in Sacramento, California.

The winter months in northern California bring the majority of the region’s rain for the year. The storm systems that come through the region bring wind and rain that can be violent. The system that came through northern California the week of 15 January 2017 was no different than storms of wintertime past. The saturation of the ground, however, combined with the wind to fell hundreds of trees and cause property damage all through the state capital of Sacramento. Some of the damage that occurred in the immediate area was concentrated in the park surrounding the capitol building. One area in particular contained three large trees located in Capitol Park’s Civil War Memorial Grove. Two trees that originally hailed from the battlefields of Five Forks, Virginia, and Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga, Tennessee; while the third tree was planted in memory of President William McKinley, who was assassinated in office and the last Civil War veteran to serve as President of the United States. The grove was created during a time of remembrance about the Civil War in the United States and has seen several different iterations since its creation.

The idea of a Civil War memorial grove did not originate from a government entity or from the military looking to honor its past, but from Eliza Waggoner, the leader of the Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic (LGAR) in Sacramento during the late 1890s. Mrs. Waggoner’s goal was quite simple; she wanted to create a living memorial of trees from various Civil War battlefields that were significant to the Union during the war. The idea of memorial groves was not new to cities around the United States in the late Nineteenth Century. One of the recent groves that had been planted in the region was in San Francisco. To commemorate the American Revolution, thirteen trees were planted in Golden Gate Park to signify the original colonies. The reason for the living monument was to signify, “the historic arch along to the Atlantic and linking the colonial history to the west.”

In the eyes of Mrs. Waggoner, if San Francisco had a memorial to America’s past, then why shouldn’t the state capital. The idea of creating monuments to the past was not just a Californian idea — memorializing and remembrance in the United States gained popularity in the last decade of the Nineteenth Century. The idea of a “sacred groves” is an ancient pagan device that invoked the image of a classical memorial. This was in part to the increase of national pride in the expansion of the United States overseas. This increase led in turn to reflection on the historic past of the United States to show the country’s current strength. Up to the 1890s, two main events impacting the nation’s history were the American Revolution and the Civil War. The Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution were created by people who had family members who fought during the war or aided the cause. The Civil War saw the creation of the Grand

1 The grove was created during a time of remembrance about the Civil War in the United States and has seen several different iterations since its creation.

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Army of the Republic and the Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic in the North and similar organizations in the South. Both northern organizations “were dedicated to preserving the history and legacy of heroes who fought and worked to save the Union.”

Both organizations had members across the nation, including California. Even though the majority of the fighting occurred east of the Mississippi River during the Civil War, California contributed to the war effort as well — raising infantry and cavalry units that fought in the eastern battles (see JAMP 137, “The Bear Republic Heads East”). The Californian contribution to the war effort was another reason for Eliza Waggoner’s interest in creating a memorial in Sacramento’s Capital Park.

The majority of Californian troops served in the Indian Territories that needed protection from small Confederate raids and hostile Indian Tribes. Californian served with distinction in several eastern units; one of the most notable formations was the 2nd Massachusetts Cavalry which consisted mostly of Californian men. The unit spent most of the Civil War chasing Mosby’s Rangers in Northern Virginia and fighting with Maj. Gen. Phil Sheridan’s Cavalry in the latter stages of the war. The unit fought bravely and was recognized for its success in the field. By war’s end, over 17,000 Californians had enlisted to serve the Union in some capacity. While a smaller enlistment to other states in the Union, California’s contribution needed to be recognized. This posed an interesting question for Eliza Waggoner and the Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic in Sacramento; how should they honor the bloodiest conflict in American history to date? The local members of the LGAR formed a committee, headed by Eliza Waggoner, to move forward with the Memorial Grove.

The first task of the Memorial Committee was to secure grounds for the memorial. The area around the State Capitol was barren, and a request for land was sent to the California State Land Commission in October 1896. On 14 November 1896, the Committee was sent a reply to their request, stating that a section of land would be granted for the Memorial Grove, and it would be located near the State Capitol. The location of the grove would be on the northeast corner of Capital Park (now between M and L Streets). The Memorial Grove would be the first monument to be placed in Capital Park. With the grounds secured, the Memorial Committee set out to secure funding and trees for the grove.

The largest expense for the grove was securing the trees from the various battlefields and important sites from the Civil War. This required a large amount of fundraising and advertisements in the local newspapers, which were generally supportive of the initiative to build the memorial. The idea of creating a monument to show the importance of the Civil War struck a chord with most people living in the United States, especially in Union states. By 1896, the war had occurred barely a generation previously, with many veterans still living to tell tales about their experiences. To this end, other local GAR and LGAR groups gave money to support the cause. By the start of 1897, the Committee was ready to receive trees and begin placing them.

By March 1897, several trees had been received from various Civil War battlefields. Trees from major engagements in the Eastern theatre and Western theatre arrived with notes of support. A donation from Appomattox Courthouse arrived with a note stating that the tree came from a spot “two hundred yards from where General Robert E. Lee surrendered.” Plans were made by the Committee to have an opening ceremony on 1 May 1897. Veterans of the Civil War, politicians, and the general public were invited to see the monument in Capital Park. Mrs. Waggoner, the driving force behind the monument, gave the keynote address. In her address, she spoke to the crowd about “this historic grove of trees, taken from more than forty leading battlefields of the late Civil War which are to form a sacred grove.” With the grove planted, it was time to let the memorial grow and flourish under the California sun. The history of the grove did not end on that spring afternoon in 1897. The shape of the grove and how it occupied space in Capital Park would change over the next century.

As the grove began the twentieth century, it started to shape the landscape of Capital Park. By 1902, the original grove of trees had lost some of its original members, and some others were added, consisted of trees from the following battlefields:
Some of the trees were lost to vandals, others to old age. Some of the trees were not meant to reside in the climate and soil of northern California and could not survive out of their natural habitat. Capital Park began to sprout other monuments, as California and the nation moved on through history. Located throughout the park are monuments to Californians who have fought in the conflicts that involved the United States after the Civil War. All of these monuments were just as important to Californians, but the Civil War Memorial Grove still remains the first and oldest in the park. In order to preserve the memorial grove, the historical society and concerned groups continue to refresh and maintain the existing trees and monuments within it. The number of trees has shrunk to a handful in recent times, due to the age of the trees themselves. The storms of January 2017 nearly wiped out the original trees from 1897-1902.

As of 2019, there are eleven trees left in the Civil War Memorial Grove; six of which are originals. To augment the small number of trees, some battlefields sent more than one tree to help fill the void. It will be up to today’s generation of historians and beyond to keep the grove going, be it through maintaining the existing trees or finding replacements to be planted to stand for the fallen.

The Civil War Memorial Grove in Sacramento’s Capital Park remains to be one of the interesting monuments about the Civil War in the United States. Instead of large marble and granite statues that reside in most battlefields associated with the war, this one is...
different. Each tree is a part of the ground that saw battle. Each of the original trees had been pulled from blood-soaked fields and had been cultivated around tragedy, triumph, and death. As time went on in the grove, like in battle, there were casualties, with some trees lost for good; be it from nature or man-made influences. The remaining trees and the ones planted to replace the fallen continue to grow and live on as a reminder of the war that was fought from 1861-1865. The crowds moving through Capital Park are heavy during most workdays, filled with state workers and children on field trips visiting the State Capitol.

Battlefields with Trees Remaining in the Memorial Grove  
(As of February 2019)

| Andersonville, GA | Gettysburg, PA |
| Appomattox, VA   | Savannah, GA   |
| Arlington, VA    | Shiloh, TN     |
| Chattanooga, TN  | Wilson’s Creek, MO |
| Fredericksburg, VA | Yellow Tavern, VA |

ENDNOTES

6. Ibid., pp. 848-853.
7. Josephine Todman, “Letter to Eliza Waggoner, November 14, 1896,” Memorial Grove Committee Collection, Box 880, California State Library.
11. Winfield Davis, “Sacramento’s Historical Grove,” Sacramento Daily Union, April 21, 1902. Memorial Grove Committee Collection, Box 881, California State Library.
12. Information Compiled by the author.
Mission Command & Joint Strategic Planning During Operation Husky

By Dr. Paul F. Messina

ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Paul F. Messina is currently an Associate Professor of Mathematics at the University of the Incarnate Word in San Antonio, Texas. In addition, Dr. Messina currently serves as a colonel in the United States Army Reserve. He has commanded at every echelon from company through brigade. His extensive experience in the operations arena and his formal education at the U.S. Army War College serve as catalysts for his cross disciplinary writing. Dr. Messina’s research interests include mathematics education, military history, and military strategy.

Soon after the entrance of the United States into the Second World War, American air, ground, and naval forces were engaged in a joint coalition campaign involving both U.S. and British forces, codenamed Operation Husky, tasked to liberate Sicily from its Axis occupation forces. In terms of operational level execution, Operation Husky suffered from appalling command and control, as well as the inadequate integration of the joint functions of communication synchronization, and fire control. Fortunately for the Allies, as a direct result of the Casablanca Conference, a compromise was reached, which included the decision to implement Operation Husky rather than proceed with a cross-channel invasion into France. This well-timed and favorable decision provided Allied forces the opportunity to evaluate countless lessons learned that would serve them well and eventually lead to the success of Operation Overlord in June 1944. Although the upcoming campaign in Sicily had limited objectives, Operation Husky intended to secure Allied lines of communication across the Mediterranean, divert German military strength from the Eastern front, and pressure Italy to surrender. An overarching military objective for this campaign was the capture and eventual control of Sicily in order to conduct future operations.

With the war in North Africa approaching a favorable conclusion for the Allies, appropriate attention, both strategic and operational, was given to the island of Sicily. The island represented not only a natural bridge between Africa and Europe, but also offered the opportunity to reopen vital sea lanes and give the Allies a base for launching future operations in the region. Despite the clear strategic location of Sicily, the Allies were deeply divided regarding the decision to invade the island, though ultimately the invasion plan was approved and was then influenced by three main factors, the island’s topography, the location of Axis air bases, and the amount of anticipated resistance from the island’s defenders. Regrettably, even with a clearly defined chain of command, throughout the Sicily campaign the commander’s intention was not clearly defined, there was a lack of mutual trust, and a widespread lack of understanding among the involved Allied forces, resulting in poor command and control throughout the campaign.

“Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.” Thus, mission command allows the commander a greater deal of flexibility compared to the traditional command and control process, but the commander must be able to carefully balance the art of command and the science of control, as he or she deftly integrates all the joint fighting functions. The commander’s intent speaks to the end state of a military operation or campaign while simultaneously ensuring that subordinates are clearly synchronized with the assigned mission. Understanding the mission affords decision-makers at different levels the direction to make effective operational decisions, manage risk, and estimate the potential second and third order effects of their decisions. Finally, trust allows subordinate commanders to make time-sensitive decisions, which allows for the execution of the commander’s intent.
Regrettably, a clear commander’s intent was never issued during Operation Husky, leading to confusion and chaos among the major subordinate commanders. To be fair, General Eisenhower faced a multitude of challenges in his role as Allied Commander in Chief, along with his British land, air, and sea component commanders. Some major challenges which directly impacted and influenced effective Allied planning included a dysfunctional joint British and American staff, as well as the geographic dispersion of Eisenhower’s various headquarters by hundreds and in some cases, thousands of miles. Unlike today’s modern military, where distance does not represent a major issue in operational planning, it was indeed a major consideration during World War Two.

From the very beginning, the architects of Operation Husky lacked experience in this type of planning, resulting in initial drafts which were inadequate, lacking any type of bold initiatives. The plan eventually approved by Eisenhower, under political pressure not to delay operations, was extremely conservative and heavily influenced by the British 8th Army Commander, Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery, to concentrate allied forces at a single location on Sicily’s southeastern shore.

Despite several weeks of continued refinements to the plan, there was still no definitive guidance provided by either Eisenhower or his Executive Officer and Fifteenth Army Group Commander, Gen. Sir Harold Alexander. Thus, there was no clear understanding of the operation by the Allied forces tasked to carry out the mission. This would continue to be an issue throughout the campaign and hinder the Allied forces at nearly every step of the way, including but not limited to a lack of operational coordination between air, ground, and naval assets.

To make matters worse, the British had a clear and explicit lack of mutual trust, even to the point of disdain, for their American counterparts. It is generally thought that this lack of trust and respect for American forces was the direct result of the beating American forces endured at the Kasserine Pass by the German Africa Korps.  Despite an overall American success throughout the Sicily campaign the lack of trust by the British would play a key part in American forces taking supporting and secondary roles throughout the duration of Operation Husky.

The British themselves suffered an equally humiliating defeat at Dunkirk in 1940 in addition to major setbacks during the campaign in North Africa. A prime example of the British feeling of superiority occurred when General Montgomery persuaded General Alexander
to shift the boundary line between Montgomery’s and Lt. Gen. George S. Patton’s U.S. Seventh Army forces, allowing the Eighth Army to monopolize the primary approaches to Messina, and giving them the main responsibility for the Allied main effort. General Alexander’s refusal to forward plan past the initial landings, would continue the erosion of mutual trust, as well as be the proximate cause for the widespread lack of understanding, disagree-ment, and contention amongst the two primary army commanders through-out the campaign.

Contributing to the challenges experienced by Allied forces during Operation Husky was the lack of proper communication across forces and fire missions. According to Joint Publication 1, integration is “the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.” Fire missions are one of the functions necessary to successful operations in support of offensive and defensive tasks as well as empower commanders to seize and retain the initiative. When employed in a campaign such as Operation Husky, fire support was necessary to integrate and coordinate attacks, preclude friendly fire incidents, diminish duplication of effort, and shape the operational environment. It was this absence of coordination that caused a number of notable issues in the course of the Sicily campaign. One example of which was the Allies failure to adequately plan their operational fires to prevent the withdrawal of Axis forces across the Straights of Messina. In fact, an Axis withdrawal was not even considered in any of the planning phases of the campaign, resulting in over 52,000 German and over 62,000 Italian soldiers escaping to the Italian mainland to fight another day.

Although inadequately integrated by today’s criteria, the fire support integration was not a comprehensive failure. One notable success was the timely mortar fire from the 83d Chemical Battalion combined with supporting naval gunfire which effectively repulsed an attack at Gela during the invasion’s initial phase. Indeed, naval gunfire would play a crucial role in the fire mission support experienced throughout the campaign. Unfortunately, many support opportunities went awry, allowing the Axis forces to avoid a much more thorough defeat. In the end, the ground commanders had valid concerns over the lack of fire mission integration, including but not limited to a lack of close air support, aircraft coming under friendly fire, and a failure to fully exploit the capabilities of naval support. A direct consequence of this failure was the ability of the Axis to skillfully evacuate more than 100,000 men and 10,000 vehicles, permitting these forces to subsequently contest the Allies during the Italian campaign.

The outcome of the operation was the fault of Eisenhower and his principle subordinate commanders, who were unable to execute communication synchronization to prevent this withdrawal from the island.

In his 2012 communication synchronization memorandum to
combatant commanders, George E. Little, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, stated that every staff product must clearly reflect a leader’s intent and all portions of a command must be thoroughly synchronized. When clear communications do not exist within the joint force, mission success can be negatively impacted due to the confusion it causes, subsequently leading to a potential mis-alignment of operations, actions, words, and images. This clearly played a part in the inefficient use of forces during Operation Husky.

On 11 July 1943, German aircraft were operating within the American sector near Gela. Notwithstanding this activity, U.S. reinforcement forces were programmed for airdrop that evening. Despite all efforts by senior Allied officers to advise friendly ground units of the forthcoming airdrop, Allied antiaircraft guns shot down 25 and damaged an additional 37 of the 144 transport planes, causing a 10 percent casualty rate among the paratroopers. In a subsequent investigation of the incident, evidence surfaced that all units were not notified of the operation. Another Allied gaffe with respect to communication synchronization was the failure to procure Italy’s submission upon Benito Mussolini’s removal from power on 25 July 1943. General Eisenhower clearly recognized the significance of negotiating with Italy before German forces could reinforce the country, but Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt refused to allow hostility termination negotiations with the new Italian government.

In the end, Operation Husky achieved several important results including, but not limited to (1) the downfall of Benito Mussolini and the eventual surrender of Italian forces, which compelled the Germans to commit additional manpower to the Mediterranean theater of operations, (2) a relief in pressure from German forces on the Russian front, and (3) the weakening of German forces across all
theaters of operation in preparation for the D-Day landings nine months later. In spite of the numerous achievements of the Sicily campaign, Allied immaturity in terms of command and control, as well as coalition politics gave rise to a campaign rife with joint operations challenges, specifically the inadequate integration of the joint functions of fires and communication synchronization. Although Operation Husky was a significant Allied victory it was not a decisive victory and this would eventually affect the resulting follow-on campaign in Italy. The greatest future value of Operation Husky would come on 6 June 1944, when the Allied forces, having learned countless lessons from the Sicily campaign, successfully executed Operation Overlord, marking the beginning of the end for the Third Reich.

ENDNOTES

3. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid., p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Ibid., p. 6.
Heliogram – The editor has started the next issue that will include the Tucson Conference. He is holding to three publications a year.

JAMP – Three issues were published in 2018. The first issue for 2019 will be out in about two weeks. Everything has been converted to PDF format. Hardcopy printing is holding at 200 copies. Eight or nine of the articles in JAMP were from first-time authors. The editor would like to encourage members to write articles for the publication. He is still using Sheridan Press for the hard copies but is sending the e-mail and PDFs himself.

Question for JAMP Editor Rospond: How are we archiving the copies of the Journal? All PDF copies are archived. Vincent has started to scan older journals. Tina, the typesetter for the Journal, also keeps a copy of everything she does. The Heliogram is on Mark’s hard drive.

Question for CAMP Webmaster Gordon Bliss: Can we put copies on the website? Do we want part of the website to be for members only. This discussion was tabled to take up after this meeting.

Gordon Bliss has retrieved a complete JAMP collection from Tom Vaughn. He asked if we also want the Heliogram.

Hal Youmans has created and writes The Persistent Preservationist, a new CAMP publication. A motion was made, seconded, and voted with applause to thank Hal for his great work.

Webmaster Report. Gordon Bliss reports that he has 3 to 4 months of JAMP on the Website. He has plans to increase this to 6 months. Would like to link the PDFs not on the active page but this will take some time. He has not yet done a Google analysis. He needs to sign up for the program and check with Greg Kurtz who has been working with Mark Magnussen on marketing ideas for CAMP. Question for Gordon. Can we put copies on the website? Do we want part of the website to be for members only. This discussion was tabled to take up after this meeting.

This discussion was followed by a discussion of CAMP getting into Facebook. The sense of the Board was mixed. Most did not want to be part of Facebook because of the many security issues, but all acknowledged that it could be helpful in reaching young people.

A motion was made and seconded to thank Bret Hart and Julie Hirst for the work they have done refreshing the website and arranging for online payment processes.

Marketing: Mark Magnussen had three proposals. 1. Advertising on Facebook as a three-month test at no cost to CAMP. We would provide the mailing list. He will provide a plan. 2. He also proposed that CAMP reproduce a Military Map of the US, 1944 showing all the airfields and military posts at that time. This could be sold. 3. CAMP could put together a directory of small military museums around the country that are frequently overlooked. It would be a service to CAMP and a publicity boost to the small museums.
Election of Officers for 2019 – CAMP’s officers for the next year as elected are President – Nick Reynolds; Vice President – Marylou Gjernes; Secretary – Ann Todd; Treasurer – Vance Nelson. Continuing in their current roles are Bridget Hart, Membership; Vincent Rospond, JAMP Editor; Roger Cunningham, JAMP Book Review Editor, and Mark Magnussen, Heliogram Editor.

A motion was made that CAMP take a position on recent changes proposed for Historical Preservation. The proposed change would give the federal government the ability to block the listing of historic resources on federal lands. Marylou will work in coordination with Gordon Bliss who is the Historic Preservation Office for the Coastal Defense Study Group (CDSG).

Location for 2020 meeting and after: After much discussion, it was proposed that the 2020 meeting be held in either Lincoln, Nebraska, or Baltimore, Maryland. The decision to be presented to the membership. The 2021 meeting would be a joint meeting with CDSG in the Charleston, Savannah, North Florida Area. If the Joint meeting does not work out, the CAMP meeting would be in the Jacksonville/St. Augustine area. Hawaii was proposed for 2022 and Galveston, Texas, for 2023.

The Hawaii meeting would be in coordination with the Hawaii Military and Warrior Past organization, recently formed by CAMP members Neil Dukas and Tom Wolforth.

The meeting was adjourned at 4:40.

Respectfully Submitted,

Marylou Gjernes
Secretary Pro Tem

Post Library

Any CAMP member who would like to review a book for this journal is encouraged to consult the list of books that can be found in the publications section of our website: campjamp.org. That book list is updated every week or two.


Two of the U.S. Army’s most noted soldier-ethnologists of the late nineteenth century were John Gregory Bourke and William Philo Clark. Both became students of and friends with Native Americans. In life they were associates; both had their books on aspects of their subjects’ culture published, some posthumously. Bourke is the better known because his diaries have survived, ably edited in part by the late Charles M. Robinson III. Author Mark J. Nelson, professional preservationist of the American West, fills in some of the gaps in Clark’s legacy with this book.

Clark was a New York native and a graduate of West Point, Class of 1868. Called Philo by his brother officers and “White Hat” by his Indian associates, as a lieutenant and captain in the 2d U.S. Cavalry, Clark was in the thick of events occurring on the northern plains over a 15-year period. He suffered through Maj. Gen. George Crook’s “Starvation March,” and participated in the Sioux War of 1876-1877. Clark was frequently employed in Army dealings with native tribes. He recruited and led Indian scouts on numerous expeditions; at one time Chief Crazy Horse was a sergeant under his command. Clark was present when Crazy Horse was killed while in Army custody in 1877. He is reported to have cried when given the news, but some blamed him for Crazy Horse’s death. Lt. Jesse M. Lee, the Indian agent, wrote that the chief’s death was “the result of mismanagement by Philo Clark.” (p. 95) Author Nelson does not pass judgment. Clark was successful in “talking in” then-chief Little Wolf and his Northern Cheyenne band after they jumped the reservation in 1879, thus averting another crisis. He also had dealings with chiefs Red Cloud and Spotted Tail and had one meeting with Sitting Bull.

Clark had frequent interface with high-ranking U.S. military and civil officials, as well. In connection with his Indian duties, Clark met with Presidents U.S. Grant and James A. Garfield. When President Chester A. Arthur visited Yellowstone National Park in 1883, Clark was a member of the party. He served on the staffs of Crook and Lt.
Gen. Philip H. Sheridan in Chicago and Washington, D.C., and under Sheridan’s auspices was working on his magnum opus, *The Indian Sign Language*, when he died. Clark was an acknowledged expert in sign language. His book was published posthumously, receiving both praise and criticism. Maj. Gen. John Gibbon thought it a useful contribution to inter-racial relations but an anonymous reviewer panned it. Previously, J.G. Bourke once commented in his diary that Clark was “proficient” in sign language.

As a person Clark was described as “a brave, generous, and noble man and officer.” (p. 61) Former newspaper reporter John F. Finerty, wrote, “I have always found him a perfect gentleman, generous to a fault.” (p. 205) Clark had great concern for the survival of the Indian tribes, although like many, he thought their future lay in adapting to the white man’s way of life. He believed in the philosophy expressed by Bourke that the government’s Indian policy should be one of “justice backed with power.” (p. 47) After Clark’s death, many of his former commanders spoke well of him. In particular, Sheridan wrote, “It is seldom that the same man combines military skill and scholarly attainments, but Clark had both.” (p. 204)

As author Nelson points out, Clark’s two major contributions to American history were his book on Indian sign language and his collection of Plains Indian artifacts, which remained in his family’s possession for generations but now resides in a museum in New Jersey. Nelson has done a good job in reconstructing Clark’s life. Sad to say, Clark’s diary has not survived, or has not yet been found, so Nelson has had to concentrate on military records, as the title suggests. The reader is sometimes confounded by the meaningless minutia thus dredged up, but Nelson has done his best to seek out other sources, such as personal reminiscences and newspaper articles, to flesh out his subject’s life. In a couple of instances, Nelson had to speculate on Clark’s activities, due to a lack of concrete data. Nelson (or his copy editor) may want to look up the difference between “disburining” and “dispersing.” Beyond that, this book is not only the story of one man’s life but is a valuable contribution to the study of Indian policy in the 1870s and 1880s. We are in Mark Nelson’s debt for having written it.

Russell K. Brown


This book offers a concise summary of the many ways in which the Great War affected Texas and Texans. The author, a historian with the U.S. Air Force, also wrote *They Called Them Soldier Boys: A Texas Infantry Regiment in World War I*, which was reviewed in *JAMP* 125.

A year before the United States entered the war that was raging in Europe and the Middle East, Texans had experienced increased military activity on their southern border, as a result of the Mexican Revolution. After a series of bandit raids on border settlements in New Mexico and Texas in the spring of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson activated almost the entire National Guard, and tens of thousands of citizen-soldiers were soon deployed to the Southwest.

No sooner had the situation on the Mexican border cooled down than the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. The federal government soon passed the Selective Service Act to bring millions of men into the armed forces. Draft avoidance remained an issue in Texas throughout the war, but only four other states contributed more men to the U.S. Army than Texas, which was credited with providing the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) with two divisions, the 36th and the 90th (with significant numbers of Oklahomans also serving in both formations). About three-quarters of the 36th Division’s men came from the National Guard, while the 90th Division was primarily manned by draftees. Neither division saw combat until the final months of the war, but they bravely fought in the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. Suspecting that the Germans were listening in on their field telephone conversations, the 36th Division devised a unique solution to this problem. Indians who spoke the Choctaw language were placed in the command posts of each of the division’s four infantry regiments, and these Choctaw code talkers transmitted tactical messages that the Germans were not able to decipher. In addition to serving as “doughboys” in the Army’s divisions, almost 19,000 Texans also volunteered for the Navy and Marine Corps.

Thirty-two new camps were constructed across the United States to train the millions of new men who were entering the Army. Four of these camps were located in Texas — Camp Bowie (Ft. Worth), Camp Logan (Houston), Camp MacArthur (Waco), and Camp Travis (San Antonio). This massive military construction program provided a great boost to the local economies of the cities involved, but there were problems as well. Black soldiers of the 24th U.S. Infantry were assigned to guard the site of Houston’s Camp Logan, but they objected violently to the discriminatory “Jim Crow” policies that they encountered in the “Bayou City.” In August 1917, a group of these soldiers drew their weapons and went on a shooting rampage, killing a number of innocent
Desertion and Military Justice; Facing the Enemy and Confronting Defeat; and The Trophies of Victory and the Relics of Defeat. Each of these chapters is a standalone essay and thus the book’s chapters can be read in any order the reader desires. I found all the chapters to be interesting, but I found myself going back and re-reading the last three chapters. This is because the first four chapters lay the foundation upon which the last three chapters are built.

Desertion has always been a serious crime in the military. In joining the army, however, soldiers on both sides considered they had entered into a contract with their government. In...
the Confederacy was destroyed by the might of the Federal government. Thus, the Confederate soldier could be proud of his service as a defender of Southern honor. Thereafter, individual and regimental heroism against overwhelming odds would become the cornerstone of the Confederate history of the war. From Appomattox onward, it became an article of faith within the Confederate states that if all Southerners had retained faith in God and the justice of their cause, the South would have won against the overwhelming horde of Yankees.

If you are interested in the life of the common Civil War soldier, you will want to read this book. One drawback is that its focus is limited to the Eastern Theater of War. Despite this geographic limitation, the book brings together a number of interesting threads which make the reader contemplate the differences and the similarities between Union and Confederate soldiers.

Charles H. Bogart


This is yet another addition to the “Emerging Civil War” series of books on important battles, campaigns, and other Civil War-related subjects. The author, William Lee White, is a National Park Service ranger at Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, who professes a lifelong interest in the topic at hand due to boyhood trips taken with some of his relatives to various battlefields and historic sites.

As with the other books in this series, this is a relatively short overview of Gen. John B. Hood’s Tennessee Campaign after the fall of Atlanta and the tragic Battle of Franklin, and it’s short on tactical details. That is not to say that it doesn’t have worth, as there is more to this than just a description of how the Army of Tennessee came to find itself in front of Franklin and subsequently destroyed in a bloody battle.

In order to tell that story, White begins at the fall of Atlanta, describing how Hood was determined to draw Sherman away from the city, or barring that, to cut his lines of supply and communication by turning back to northwest Georgia and the fields of the earlier encounters of the Atlanta campaign. To his credit, he recounts the not-always successful engagements at Allatoona Pass, Resaca, and Dalton before moving into north Alabama, where Sherman stopped chasing him and returned to his original objective: “The March to the Sea.”

Chasing Maj. Gen. John Schofield’s army into Tennessee, meanwhile, brought Hood an opportunity to catch and destroy that force and led to one of the more controversial episodes of the war: Schofield’s escape from a trap set by Hood at Spring Hill where the Columbia Pike should have been interdicted yet wasn’t (despite assurances to Hood that it had been). Schofield’s men walked right by the encamped Confederates, leaving Hood “wrathy as a snake” the next morning.

Consequently, Schofield marched to Franklin, where he deployed his army while awaiting the same from Hood’s men, setting the scene for the climactic encounter in which the Confederates made five attacks against the entrenched Federals during the late afternoon, evening, and then a rare nighttime attack. Those five attacks are detailed in chapters which describe the decimation of the famed but unsupported Missouri Brigade, that of Edward Walthall and William Loring’s divisions, those of Patrick Cleburne, John Brown and William Bate’s divisions, and finally the night attack by Edward “Alleghany” Johnson’s division, which only served to lengthen an already long casualty list, including six killed or mortally wounded generals along with many other field and staff officers.

Although the Federals abandoned the field to Hood and continued on to Nashville and the Army of Tennessee’s utter destruction, it was nothing more than a pyrrhic victory in exchange for the losses suffered. Many of those killed ended up in the Confederate cemetery graciously provided by the Carter family, on whose land much of the worst fighting took place, including their own Tod Carter who was mortally wounded just feet from his home.

In addition to the battle narrative, there is also a driving tour of the battlefields referenced in the text, from Allatoona Pass to Franklin — a total of fourteen stops. Appendices include first-hand accounts of the Confederate artillery at Franklin, colors lost by each side during the battle, the preservation or reclamation progress of the battlefield made in recent years, and a short recollection by the author of his lifelong interest in the battle. There is also an order of battle for both armies.

There are many photographs interspersed throughout the book. Unfortunately, many are of relative thumbnail size, lack resolution as a result, or otherwise require the use of a magnifying glass for purposes of discerning details. The maps are large, scaled, and provide considerable information on specific units, their positions, and attack directions.
Virginia, ransacked by Union soldiers who had quasi-official blessing for their acts under the large rubric of military necessity. In addition, while the Army understood how to provide shelter and clothing to its male soldiers and male contraband workers, clothing for women and children was another matter. Into the void stepped freedmen groups who sought donations from Northern households. That proved to be a problem on several levels. Those who feared handouts would condemn ex-slaves to lives of dependency made them pay for both food and clothing, a fact which led to a positive cash flow at some refugee camps. In addition, when volunteers distributing articles of clothing felt that some of the items were too good for the former slaves and might give them the wrong idea about their station in a post-slavery America, they kept those items off the shelves.

Eliza Bogan decided that following her husband by becoming a laundress in a U.S. Colored Troops (USCT) regiment was preferable to the dangers of living in a refugee camp near Helena, Arkansas. She often viewed slave women as little more than temptresses—had difficulty integrating her and others like her into army life.

Gabriel Burdett, an ex-slave minister at Camp Nelson, Kentucky, somewhat links the three family groups together. Sent after the war to Fort Monroe, Virginia, he may have crossed paths with the Whitehursts. After that, he sailed to Brownsville, Texas, where he may have bumped into Eliza Bogan’s 46th USCT. Finding his way back to Kentucky, Burdett eventually gave up trying to create a life for himself and his extended family near Camp Nelson and moved to Kansas.

By this time, the Whitehursts, Bogans, and Burdetts would have experienced some joy but perhaps more pain on their paths toward freedom. Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation, they would have read, gave the former slaves and black soldiers, slave auctions and slavery continued in places like Kentucky and occupied Virginia throughout most the war.

Disheartened after four long years of strife and President Lincoln’s assassination, the nation had no clear consensus and little stomach for a protracted fight about ex-slaves. Former slave masters instituted a program of sharecropping that was little better, and in some ways worse, than slavery.

Taylor, an associate professor of history at the University of Kentucky, has produced a well-written, thoroughly documented,


In the spring of 1861, northern generals, politicians, advocates of emancipation, and others were forced to deal with the practical problems of what to do with the eventual half million men, women, and children who fled their enslavers in an attempt to find freedom behind Union lines. This exodus and how it was handled lies at the heart of Amy Taylor’s _Embattled Freedom: Journeys through the Civil War’s Slave Refugee Camps_. While battlefields, fortifications, and plantations provide physical memorials to the antebellum South and Civil War itself, Taylor argues that few such manifestations exist for the hundreds of refugee camps that sprang up during the war. Her book is just one small attempt to keep the memory of these camps and the ex-slaves who occupied them alive.

Taylor focuses on three groups of refugees to anchor her story: the Whitehursts, Eliza Bogan and her kin, and the Burdetts. In September 1861, Edward and Emma Whitehurst of the Virginia Peninsula were among the very first ex-slaves to be legally married by northern authorities during the war. Their union was made possible in part by Union Maj. Gen. Benjamin Butler’s famous “contraband of war” decision in May 1861. It allowed slaves to pass through Union lines in order to prevent them from helping the Confederate war effort. Although John C. Frémont would be dismissed and his August 1861 order to emancipate slaves in the Department of the West disavowed by President Lincoln, Butler’s approach gained traction. The slaves themselves, according to Taylor, played a large role in making sure Northern authorities recognized that the interests of the Federal military were aligned with the interests of the slaves.

Achieving a semblance of freedom was a difficult, slow process. The Whitehursts themselves had their own store in Hampton,
Crews normally rotated back to the U.S. after completing thirty-five missions. Faulkner and his men never made that mark. On their twenty-eighth mission, to Augsburg, Germany, in late February 1945, their plane was damaged by heavy anti-aircraft fire and was rendered incapable of making it over the Alps Mountains back to Italy. Faulkner hoped to fly west and land behind advancing American ground forces in France. Instead, because of misinformation and disorientation, he flew into Swiss air space and was forced down by Swiss fighter planes. He and his crew were briefly interned under most hospitable conditions before being returned to American control. Despite success in business and family for the rest of his life, Faulkner endured mental torment and physical pain for many years over his decision-making in his damaged airplane. It was not until he was in his eighties that Dan Matthews, a World War II researcher, examined the records of the cause, clarified the events of that fateful day, and informed Faulkner of the results. Writes the author, “His findings lifted a veil that had haunted me for six decades.” (p. vi) Among other things, Faulkner learned that he had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross that he had never received.

Author Faulkner’s memoir contains fascinating details about Fifteen Air Force operations, about life in the Army Air Forces in the States and in Italy, and about the B-24 bomber. … fast-paced, and easy to read. Readers interested in this topic may want to compare Faulkner’s book with Keith Mason’s My War in Italy: On the Ground and in Flight with the 15th Air Force, reviewed in JAMP 132 (Fall 2016).

Guilt can manifest itself in many ways, physical, emotional, and psychological. So it was with Tom Faulkner, who suffered for more than sixty years, during which he tortured himself about a decision while at the controls of a damaged American bomber in Germany during World War II. In the hands of accomplished editor David L. Snead, Faulkner’s previously self-published memoir becomes a work of historical significance.

Born in Arkansas in 1925 and reared in Texas, Faulkner and his family experienced the Great Depression, as did so many others. Faulkner entered the Army Air Force before his eighteenth birthday, completed flight training and was assigned as a pilot of a four-engine B-24 “Liberator” bomber. In August 1944, Faulkner and his crew flew their own airplane to Italy to join the Fifteenth Air Force in the strategic bombing campaign against Germany. Over the next six months, they flew missions against enemy targets in Germany, Austria, Italy, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Their twenty-eighth mission was their last; its outcome was the cause of Faulkner’s self-blame for so many years.

Faulkner must have an encyclopedic memory or have notes of his experiences. The only journal he quotes from was his mission log, which editor Snead has amplified with comprehensive research in Air Force records, identifying missions, personnel, aircraft, and many other details. Faulkner on his own remembers episodes and incidents of his flying training, details about his crewmembers and their idiosyncrasies, facts about his missions, and comments about primitive living conditions at their airbase. “I can remember showering only once during our entire six months at San Giovanni.” (p. 78) Like other Liberator pilots, he recalls, “The B-24 was a demanding beast.” (p. 140) “Lotta Laffs,” the airplane that Faulkner and his crew flew on most of their missions, he refers to as “super-stiff.” (p. 82) Despite being only nineteen years old when he arrived in Italy, and younger than some of his crew, Faulkner served as a command pilot. Over the course of his six months, many newly arrived pilots were assigned to him as co-pilots for their orientation combat flights. On several occasions he flew as lead plane in his squadron.


This book offers readers a fascinating collection of 100 black and
white photographs depicting the many facets of the Great War. The photographs underscore the global nature of the war, which was the first conflict to be so extensively photographed. These striking images are organized into six sections: Nations at War (i.e., home fronts), the Eastern Front, the Western Front, the Southern Fronts, the War Against Turkey, and War Across the Globe.

“Nations at War” generally illustrates what civilians were doing to assist their respective war efforts, as well as how they were targeted by their enemies. In 1915, Belgian civilians are shown being searched by German soldiers. A group of American men train to become officers in 1916, a year before the United States entered the war. In 1917, female munitions workers fill artillery shells for the Austro-Hungarian army at the Skoda Works, and a year later dockers unload frozen meat from the hold of a ship at a British port.

The photos from “The Eastern Front” depict the fighting that occurred between Austro-Hungarian and German forces and their Russian opponents. One photo depicts Austro-Hungarian infantry manning a trench in a snow-covered forest in the Carpathian Mountains in 1915. German and Russian troops dance together during negotiations for the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war.

“The Western Front” concentrates on the Belgian, British (and other Commonwealth), and French forces fighting the Germans in Belgium and northeastern France. Belgian gunners prepare to fire a field gun in late 1914. At about the same time, German infantry is shown on the march, and Gordon Highlanders (a Scottish regiment) are depicted fraternizing with German soldiers during the famous Christmas Truce of 1914. Later in the war, a French infantryman is shown just before being executed for participating in a mutiny.

Activities on “The Southern Fronts” occur in the Balkans and Italy. Romanian infantrymen man trenches in the north of their country in 1917. Austro-Hungarian officers play chess with their pet dog on the Italian Front in 1917, and Italian infantrymen man a forward position on the Piave Dam in 1918.

“The War Against Turkey” looks at the operations that took place in the Caucasus Mountains, on the Gallipoli peninsula (Turkey), and in the Middle East. One image shows mounted Cossacks from the Caucasus serving with the Russian Army in 1917. At about the same time, Turkish infantry is shown embarking at a Black Sea port for service on the Caucasus Front. In 1915, New Zealand soldiers are shown on sentry duty at Gallipoli, and another photo shows British soldiers collecting the dead after a bloody beach landing at Gallipoli. An Australian demolition team quickly moves back after setting demolition charges on a Turkish railway located in Palestine in 1918.

The photos in “War Across the Globe” focus on operations, in Africa, India, and the Pacific. Kenyan soldiers of the King’s African Rifles march to the Nairobi railway station in 1916. In 1917, a column of British infantry moves along the bed of a river during operations against Mahsud tribesmen on the North West frontier of India. In 1914, Japanese troops pose next to a 280mm howitzer during the siege of Tsingtao, a German colonial outpost in China.

Readers who are interested in the Great War will definitely want to add this volume to their military library.

Roger D. Cunningham


The focus of this book is Adm. John S. McCain’s service during World War II. The first fifty pages of the book highlights McCain’s development from being a surface naval warfare officer to being a naval aviation officer. McCain was the second oldest U.S. Navy officer to win his wings. Before the war, he commanded the aircraft carrier USS Ranger and on the eve of the war the patrol aircraft based on the West Coast.

The heart of the book concerns McCain’s leadership skills during the course of the war. The author focuses on McCain as both a combat leader and as a bureaucratic administrator. He judges McCain to be an excellent battlefield leader who was innovative in his use of carrier aviation. He sees McCain as being not a great wartime leader but a totally competent leader, who occasionally got things wrong. An overall evaluation of McCain shows him to be equal to and, in some cases, superior to his contemporary carrier task force commanders. As an administrator in wartime Washington, D.C., the author finds McCain to be superior to many around him. During his wartime tour of duty in Washington, McCain was able to work effectively with Adm. Ernest King, the Navy’s Bureau chiefs, members of the other services, and with Congress to effectively expand the Navy’s carrier and shore-based air assets.

McCain’s first combat assignment came in May 1942, when he was sent to the South Pacific as Commander Air South Pacific. As COMAIRSOPAC he commanded all the Allied land-based aircraft supporting the Guadalcanal Campaign. It was his responsibility to
ensure that Henderson Field had enough planes and pilots to control the air over the island. Following the successful occupation of Guadalcanal, McCain, in October 1942, was ordered to Washington, D.C., to head the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation. In August 1943, he was made a Vice Admiral and became Deputy Chief of Naval Operations.

In August 1944, McCain returned to the Pacific Theater of Operations. There he commanded a carrier task force designated TF 38 when operating with the Third Fleet and TF 58 when operating with the Fifth Fleet. He participated in the Marianas Campaign, Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Philippines Land Campaign, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Battle of Okinawa, and attacks on the Japanese homeland. As Chief of Staff for Admiral Halsey’s Third Fleet, he participated in the decision to remain off Okinawa in the path of Typhoon Cobra. This decision led to the storm sinking three destroyers and inflicting major damage to other Third Fleet ships.

McCain’s time at sea during 1944 and 1945 took a heavy toll on his health, as he could not divorce himself from the anguish of his men dying or being wounded in battle. Although in poor health, he witnessed the surrender of Japan on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay in September. The next day, he departed for California, but shortly after reaching his home in California, he died.

While the previous paragraphs provide an outline of McCain’s World War II service, this summary does not begin to cover his contributions to the Navy’s victory against the Axis powers. During 1943, McCain developed the policies and procedures that made sure the men and equipment the Navy needed to win the naval war in the Pacific were in place. Then during 1944 and 1945, he used these men and their equipment to smash the Japanese Army Air Force and destroy the ships and aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The author does an excellent job in showing the connectivity of McCain’s wartime service as an administrator and as a warrior. The book is both a biographical account of a naval hero but also a look at competent leadership during a time of crisis.

Charles H. Bogart


The passing of the centennial of the Great War does not mean that publications in this series have ceased. On the contrary, they continue to be released for the edification of all. There is, however, just a small difference between this particular booklet and others previously available in terms of the information in the text.

With the end of the German spring and summer offensives and their subsequent manpower exhaustion, it was time for the Allies to go over to the offensive. Indeed, France’s Marshal Ferdinand Foch, overall commander-in-chief of Allied armies, believed that the time was right for a “Grand Allied Offensive,” which would give German armies no respite now that at least some American manpower had obtained combat experience and was able to affect the balance of power along the front lines.

To that end, a series of offensives was planned for late summer and early fall in an effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion before the end of 1918. Although American Expeditionary Forces commander, Gen. John Pershing, had initially resisted amalgamation of American troops within the ranks of French and British armies, as it might dilute or obscure the American contribution to the war effort, he was persuaded to do so to a limited extent. It was done as part of the continued combat “blooding” of American formations, as well as to bulk up the strength of their companion armies for these offensives.

The limited extent of this amalgamation was restricted to placing whole American divisions under the command of French and British corps structures. The result of this international cooperation demonstrated that Americans could and would fight just as well as their foreign comrades, even to the extent of the same heavy casualties, in attaining their objectives. As it turned out, the French were quite impressed by American battlefield prowess.

Following the standard initial account of the strategic setting, American participation in each of the summer-fall offensives is described in sections in the text, from the Battles of Hamel and Juvigny, the Somme, bridging the AISNE River and breaking the Hindenburg Line to Blanc Mont Ridge and the Selle River. All of these accomplished the Allied goal of driving back the Germans, gaining ground and reducing their manpower and combat effectiveness to unsustainable levels prior to the Armistice.

Finally, and creditably, the little-known American participation in Italy is also described although it was limited to just a small regimental task force that fought on the Vittorio-Veneto front against German and Austro-Hungarian armies in October-November. This effort’s mission was to “bolster Italian morale, deceive the Central Powers into believing that a large American force was present in the theater, and assist the Italian Army in combat whenever possible.” (p.79) The Americans were just as successful and impressive on this
In **Bold Venture**, Steven K. Bailey covers the air war over Hong Kong from that first mission aimed at Japanese ships and dockyards in Hong Kong until the last strike on Hong Kong just one day before the Pacific war ended. Strikes were mounted by fighters and bombers from Chennault’s team, as well as planes from U.S. Navy flattops.

Problematically, readers don’t find out until about a quarter through the book that the BAAG initiative to supply medicines to the POWs “fizzled,” according to Bailey, “perhaps due to the long supply line from India, or different American priorities.” (p. 78) One of those priorities, Bailey reported, was tobacco. In just one month in the spring of 1942, C-47s flew two tons of cigarettes over the Hump to nicotine-addicted AVG members.

Bailey tells the stories of the Hong Kong air raids through several different lenses. Downed American pilots struggle through hundreds of miles of terrain to reach the safety of their forward bases, dodging Japanese patrols and never knowing whether the Chinese peasants they encounter will help them or turn them in for rewards. Europeans trapped in Hong Kong wonder if stray bombs will ruin their days or nights, and if false claims by the Allies about damage inflicted on Hong Kong meant that all Allied assertions of victories in the Pacific were shams. And, of course, flight personnel outline air combat, from the perspective of both fighter pilots and bomber crews.

Some of the most interesting facets of the book, however, deal with technical issues. From the beginning, Chennault encouraged his pilots to take advantage of the superior dive capabilities of their P-40s, meaning that the pilots needed to ambush the faster-climbing and more maneuverable Japanese from above. Later in the war, specially modified B-24Js arrived over China from bases in the Philippines. Not only could their radar find ships in the rain and darkness, the AN/APQ-5 system could be linked to the Norden bombsight so it could fly the plane and drop the bombs automatically. That meant Japanese vessels could potentially be attacked any time of day or night in any weather. Although an amazing feat of American ingenuity, the AN/APQ-5 and other systems were prone to error. Bailey is not afraid to tackle the issue of collateral damage and the price paid by the local Chinese. Ironically, sometimes the POWs who were to be the beneficiary of the original raids actually came close to being hit by shrapnel from near misses.

With only limited knowledge of the Chinese front during World War II, I had never heard of Ichigō sakuse (Operation Number One), a massive Japanese offensive involving 800 tanks and armored cars, over 1500 artillery pieces, and ten times as many trucks, plus 100,000

The high point of Union Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s military career came at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on 3 July 1863. There his Army of the Potomac defeated Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the most celebrated battle in American history. Meade’s low point dragged out over the next ten months as he failed to bring Lee to a decisive engagement that would destroy the latter’s army and possibly bring an end to the Civil War. Although Meade’s Gettysburg victory is rightly celebrated as a great achievement, it is the ensuing lackluster campaign for which he is often blamed and remembered. History professor John G. Selby has recreated Meade’s Civil War experiences in this generally objective but oftentimes sympathetic book.

Born in Spain to American parents in 1815, in later life Meade adopted Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, his wife’s birthplace, as his hometown. He graduated from West Point in 1835 and served as an army engineer for most of the next 25 years. He was commissioned as a brigadier general of Pennsylvania volunteers in 1861 and commanded, successively, a brigade, a division and an army corps in Virginia, notably at the battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. According to Selby, Meade was “A fierce division commander [and] an aggressive corps commander.” (p. 300) Suddenly thrust into command of the 90,000-man Army of the Potomac on the eve of the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign, Meade rose to the occasion by fighting a mainly defensive battle against his aggressive opponent. Skillfully employing the reserves of his numerically superior army to shore up threatened points in his lines, and ably supported by some (but not all) of his subordinate commanders, Meade fought Lee to a standstill in the three-day battle at Gettysburg. Writes Selby, “Meade had made all the right decisions and provided that intangible resolve that infused confidence into his officers and men.” (p. 58)

Meade’s leadership at Gettysburg won high praise from President Abraham Lincoln and other civil and military officials, but his failure to immediately follow up on his victory and his less than stellar performance in the fall of 1863 and winter of 1864 drew criticism from the administration, the press, and the public. Meade’s star was further eclipsed in March 1864, when Lincoln promoted U.S. Grant to lieutenant general and commanding general of all armies. When Grant decided to collocate his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac for the rest of the war, Meade predicted that Grant would get credit for any future successes of the army, and he was right. Through the Overland and Petersburg campaigns of 1864-1865 it was Grant who devised the strategy and called the shots, although Meade gave valuable input for many decisions.

Author Selby has done an excellent job of mining all available sources to recreate Meade’s tenure as commander of the Union’s largest field army. In doing so, Selby has drawn an accurate but favorable portrait of his subject; like many biographers he tends to extol Meade’s positive accomplishments, while explaining away the negative. Meade’s infamous hot temper, which caused him headaches with politicians and the press, is described in mellow terms. The investigations by the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which almost cost Meade his job, are laid out in detail. Meade’s interactions with many other officers, some supportive, some critical, some competitive, and some unreliable, including Maj. Gens. Henry W. Halleck, Philip H. Sheridan, Winfield S. Hancock, Gouverneur K. Warren, and Ambrose Burnside, are examined. And most important, Meade’s relationship with Grant is analyzed for a fair assessment of his contributions in the final campaigns of the war. In the end, writes Selby, “What mattered most to Meade was not whether he held the position of commanding general but how his performance affected his military reputation.” (p. xiii) That reputation suffered for years following the Civil War, but in modern times astute historians have given Meade more of the

Throughout military history, armies have had to adjust their organization and tactics to technological breakthroughs that provided temporary advantages to the opposing side that adapted them first and most efficiently. One such example occurred in 1903, when the Wright Brothers greatly shook up the military status quo with their development of the airplane. In this book, Lori A. Henning, an assistant professor of history at St. Bonaventure University, examines how the American and British armies tried to harness airpower to augment the effectiveness of their cavalry forces up to the outbreak of World War II.

The author begins by discussing the differences between the development of American and British cavalry. The United States Army favored light cavalrymen, such as mounted riflemen and dragoons, who could fight while mounted but more often functioned as infantrymen who rode into battle and then dismounted to fight. Even after all of the American mounted regiments were re-designated as cavalry at the start of the Civil War, the light cavalry model was retained. British cavalry, on the other hand, strongly emphasized the shock effect of the mounted charge in battle. The author writes: “British cavalrymen were members of a service that had existed for centuries and had built their identity around the use of the knee-to-knee charge.” (p. 28)

About five years after the Wrights’ successful flight, the military applications of airplanes began to be discussed in the professional journals of both the British and American armies. Some cavalrymen were quite concerned that airplanes would eventually rob their branch of its vital reconnaissance function, while others opined that bad weather and frequent mechanical problems would limit the effectiveness of aerial reconnaissance and ensure that horse-mounted cavalry units would retain an unbeatable edge.

American cavalry units saw very little service with the American Expeditionary Forces during the Great War — their horses remained in the United States — and British cavalry, albeit mounted, also contributed little on the Western Front. British and Commonwealth mounted forces did perform well in the Middle East, but there were few instances of effective air-ground cooperation. Both Great Britain and the United States entered the 1920s still wrestling with how to coordinate airplanes with cavalry. Royal Air Force (RAF) officers tried to argue for the retention of an independent air force by erroneously maintaining that “air policing” of the vast British Empire was a more cost-effective option than using ground forces.

In the post-war United States there were several attempts to coordinate Army Air Service assets and cavalry forces during maneuvers conducted in the Southwest. Such coordination was much more difficult in Great Britain, as all air assets belonged to the RAF that had been created by amalgamating the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service in 1918. American cavalrymen began to see that airplanes could be a useful augmentation to their reconnaissance role, and they looked for ways to improve air-ground coordination. When the autogiro — a precursor to the helicopter — was developed in the late 1920s, there were moves to assign the experimental aircraft to cavalry units, but that concept didn’t work out well.

A much greater threat to the horse-mounted cavalry came from mechanization, as light tanks and armored cars began to replace horses. All British horse cavalry was mechanized by the late 1930s, and the U.S. Army followed suit during World War II. The American 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions were dismounted, and the men of the former formation fought as infantry in the Southwest Pacific.

Harnessing the Airplane began as a doctoral dissertation and is meticulously researched, as is underscored by its 36 pages of endnotes and 21-page bibliography. The book is not light reading, but readers who are interested in the final four decades of both American and British horse-mounted cavalry will find much useful information in its pages.

Roger D. Cunningham


Many books have been written about the Vietnam air war, but as far as I know, few if any have been written by the Guy-in-Back (GIB), a Naval Flight Officer (NFO). The duty of the GIB was to serve as the F-4’s Phantom’s Radar Interceptor Officer. Flying the Phantom was a team effort. The aircraft’s electronic warfare suite required a two-person crew to operate it. This autobiographical account follows the author from his senior year in college, through enlistment in the
Marine Corps, undergoing flight training as an NFO, being assigned to VMFA-232, the “Red Devils,” and taking part in 123 combat air support missions in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The book covers the period from 1966 to 1970.

The author reports that he was not physically, emotionally, or mentally prepared for OCS but was able, due to self-determination, to survive it. Once he began NFO training he found himself plagued by air sickness and fought it throughout his flying time, as he struggled to gain his wings. That he gained his NFO wings is a testimony to his sheer determination to succeed.

Once he gained his NFO wings, he was assigned to VMFA-232, based at MCAS El Toro, California. VMFA-232 was flying the two-seat missile-armed McDonnell Douglas F-4J Phantom II. The F-4J was designed to serve as a long-range interceptor, but the Vietnam War saw it being used as a ground support aircraft with bombs, rockets, and gun pods hung on its wings. The delivery of these weapons on target demanded coordinated team work between the pilot and the GIB. The author’s main duty was to operate the AWG-10 Westinghouse pulse-Doppler radar.

The book follows the author from joining VMFA-232 in March 1968, as a “Nugget,” to becoming a well-seasoned GIB and respected Marine Corps officer. The story covers not only flying duties but routine squadron administration duties. Thus, the book is much more than a series of aerial combat tales. It is a story of VMFA-232 preparing for combat and engaging in combat as seen through the eyes of the author. We are with the author as he learns his GIB duties, carries out various administrative tasks, is almost killed in the air as his aircraft suffers a malfunction, has a fellow GIB killed, and fights to hold his marriage together.

VMFA-232 arrived in Vietnam in March 1969 and was based at Chu Lai, located 50 miles south of Da Nang. We are treated to stories of life and death on the battlefield, in the air, and on the base. Death came from enemy fire, accidents, and the unknown. One F-4J with its crew just disappeared. The author found little solace in using rowdiness and alcohol to stay the fear of death or injury but instead built upon his Christian beliefs to conquer his fears and found inner peace. He flew both daytime and nighttime attack missions. In one 24-hour period, he and his pilot flew five missions, the most flown in a 24-hour period by any member of the squadron. On the home front, his marriage continued a slow decline, as his wife’s wants and needs diverged from his chosen life of being a Marine NFO.

The book is a tour de force of one man’s look back upon his service in the Marine Corps. We are treated to the good, the bad, and the ugly of service life, as experienced by the author. Phantom in the Sky is a worthy addition to the University of North Texas Press’s well-respected Military Biographical and Memoir Series. It adds greatly to one’s knowledge of the Vietnam air war and belongs in any library focusing on the development and use of air power.

Charles H. Bogart


Not only is this publication authored by a current United States Senator, but Tom Cotton is also a U. S. Army veteran and former member of the “Old Guard,” the 3d United States Infantry Regiment. As such, it is the oldest extant unit of the Army, and primary Army ceremonial formation for everything from funerals and presenting military honors at Arlington to marching in parades, guarding the Tomb of the Unknowns, hosting foreign dignitaries and saluting the President, other important officials and retiring generals with gun salutes. All of this is covered within this volume. It is actually more about what goes on behind the scenes, as well as in front of the public, and not nearly so much about Cotton’s service with the Old Guard, although that is included as part of the testing, qualifications, and service necessary to be part of such an elite unit.

Although guarding the Tomb and being present for military honors at the funerals of many of the veterans who choose to be buried at Arlington are mostly what the 3rd is best known for, there is much more to this unit than meets the eye. This is essentially a primer on the many services provided, how one gets to be a member, the rigorous steps necessary to qualify and the perfection necessary to make sure that there is never a “mission failure” when it comes to honoring those who have served and sacrificed for this nation.

Included with the overall description of its more celebrated contemporary functions is a history of the unit’s valor and service to the country, dating from its organization in the early years of the Republic, right up through all of the conflicts in our history until its deactivation. That was not the end of the story, however, as the 3d was ultimately re-activated in 1948, assigned to the Military District of Washington (MDW) and based at Fort Myer, Virginia.

Since then, it has incorporated an Honor Guard, Color Guard, field music, Continental-style fife and drum corps (a throwback to its early days under George Washington), the Tomb Sentinels, drill team, equestrian and caisson team (the only one in the Army), and
other functions into its ranks. Each one of these is covered in the text. Probably unknown to most, as a result of being in the MDW chain of command, the Old Guard members provided security and cleanup for a month at the Pentagon after the 9/11 attack there. They did so on top of maintaining their regular schedule at the Cemetery just as they have done when elements were deployed to the Middle East or have been sent for regular tactical field training, live firing, and “blowing stuff up” at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia.

Along the way, Cotton describes the meticulous, almost obsessive manner in which members ensure that all goes perfectly in uniform, function, and overall appearance, and that the best possible image is presented to the public, especially in funerals where the family in question wants its loved one to receive all of the honors due him or her. That image is also maintained guarding the Tomb 24/7 in foul weather and fair, as solemnly and respectfully as possible.

Whether a general or a private, killed in action or retired veteran, spouse or dependent, all of the honors due are provided so that any service and sacrifice of the deceased may be recognized by a grateful nation.

The one map provided is that of the Cemetery, and it is required to be carried whenever on duty for one’s own familiarization, as well as to answer questions from the public. It has a legend describing all of the hearse-to-caisson transfer points, three volley firing points, and hitching points for the horses, and it shows individual burial sections and other historical points of interest.

Photographs are numerous within the text and many are of contemporary members as they go about their duties, behind the scenes and publicly. There are no endnotes but sections on sources and acknowledgments credit the many Old Guard members and others who provided support, research, and information to the author to augment his own experience twelve years ago.

Sacred Duty is a very interesting and informative account and highly recommended to all.

Stuart McClung


I was never the most circumspect student. Years ago, in an American Studies class, I wrote a term paper that basically called memoir a genre that bilked money out of unsuspecting readers who expected verisimilitude but instead were fed fantasy. I provided examples from concocted 19th-century slave narratives to 2003’s A Million Little Pieces. It turned out the instructor was a memoirist, and she was not amused. For my part, out of the hundreds of papers I wrote through my career as a student, that is the one I continue to dwell on the most. In fact, I still stuff the occasional clipping into a file labeled “fake memoir,” probably because I’m still trying to bolster my case.

Thanks to Civil War Writing: New Perspectives on Iconic Texts, I have another example to add to my pile. In William C. Davis’s contribution to this volume of essays, the emeritus history professor at Virginia Tech illuminates the story of Loreta Velasquez, whose 1876 memoir, The Woman in Battle, detailed her supposed service in the Confederate Army as a woman dressed as a man. The fact I had never heard of it raises two questions. How did I overlook it for my paper on fake memoirs as an example of “concocting fiction for personal gain” (p. 66), as one amateur historian cited by Davis warned? The answer to that is simple: poor research skills. The answer to the second question — how can a book that no one in my Civil War Round Table ever heard of be called iconic? — is a little more complicated. Gallagher and Cushman’s “Introduction” explains that not all the works in the text may be familiar, but that they have “influenced many generations of readers and scholars.” (p. 1) By parading a long line of historical and contemporary criticism, Davis convinced me that The Woman in Battle deserves a place in the volume.

Because full-length accounts of women who fought in the Civil War are so few, book reviewers for 19th-century newspapers and 20th-century academics wanted to believe Velasquez (whose name probably really wasn’t Velasquez) despite the fact that the accepted historical record did not mesh with many of her claims. Even after solid proof arose that her memoir was complete nonsense, Velasquez continued to show up in women warrior books, where her story was presented as real. Some academics admitted the tale was not true but said it didn’t matter as they applied questionable sociological and psychological meanings to the text. Whether or not Davis intended it, his essay in places is quite humorous, as he quotes critics who call Velasquez a “protolesbian” (p. 70), even though she was married several times and never claimed to be a man except in her memoir. Indeed, her husbands and lovers, only one of whom ever saw her in uniform and only one of whom may have favored the South, were proof that Velasquez had brought southern masculinity “to a homoerotic crisis.” (p. 70) That and several other passages made me groan out loud and cringe for my profession. For those reasons, it was
my favorite among the nine essays in the book.

The first essay in the collection discusses Joseph T. Wilson’s *The Black Phalanx*. Another book with which I was not familiar, *The Black Phalanx* was the best-selling volume by an African American in the 1890s. Elizabeth R. Varon’s essay on Wilson is edifying, pointing out that Wilson never touched on the slave rebellions of Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner nor the Haitian revolution, while other contemporaneous books about blacks in the Civil War did. Yet Wilson was not afraid to tackle the subject of “passing,” which allowed some former slaves to serve as officers in Union regiments. These stories, according to Varon, illustrated Wilson’s belief that it was racism and not race holding back black soldiers.

Other essays cover the kinds of texts that I expected, those by well-known figures like Joe Johnston, William T. Sherman, Jubal Early, and Mary Chestnut. While Louisa May Alcott’s *Little Women* is not my idea of a Civil War text. J. Matthew Gallman struggles mightily in his essay on this classic to frame it as such. Perhaps because familiarity breeds contempt, the essays that covered these well-known subjects seemed to be the weakest.

The best essays about what I would have originally considered iconic texts were Keith S. Bohannon’s on John B. Gordon’s *Reminiscences* and co-editor Gary Gallagher’s on Edward Porter Alexander’s history of the war. Both were straightforward, well-crafted accounts about their subjects.

It’s hard to imagine there will be a large audience for this book, so I have to give Louisiana State University Press credit for taking a chance on it. In an ironic twist, it might be the essays on the unfamiliar texts that will attract the most readers, since the discussions of books like *The Woman in Battle* and *The Black Phalanx* are no doubt a good way to become conversant with them.

Dave Page


Union army Lt. James Riley Weaver closed his diary entry for 10 January 1865, with the notation, “Health good. Eating slim. Hope medium.” (p. 191) Such was the life of a man who had been a prisoner of war (POW) in a Confederate pen for fifteen months and who wondered when that miserable status would end for him and his fellows.

Weaver, born in 1839, was a farm boy with two years of college when he enlisted in the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry regiment in 1862. A year later in the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, on the eve of the battle of Gettysburg, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in his regiment and had also earned his college degree by examination while in the army. Weaver fought with his unit through the Gettysburg campaign and through the cavalry engagements in the summer and fall of 1863, frequently as company commander. He, along with some thirty-odd other members of the 18th Pennsylvania, was captured at Brandy Station, Virginia, in October 1863, when they were surrounded and cut off from retreat.

Initially incarcerated at the notorious Libby Prison, in Richmond, Virginia, Weaver passed through a half-dozen other Confederate prison sites before his eventual parole in March 1865. Many times his move and that of other POWs to a new location was predicated on the threat of imminent liberation by Union forces. As an officer prisoner, Weaver fared much better than enlisted POWs, but even he suffered from inadequate food and health care, lack of replacement clothing, and retaliatory treatment by his captors for supposed misconduct by Federal authorities in their handling of Southern POWs. For example, Weaver had to make moccasins from the cape of his overcoat when his shoes wore out, and at Charleston, S.C., in 1864, he was placed in a camp under fire from Union guns shelling that city. Frequently, POWs’ care packages from their families or Northern relief agencies were withheld or sometimes pilfered by prison officials.

The prisoners’ status was exacerbated by the Union’s vacillating policy on parole and exchange. Early in the war, paroles and/or exchanges occurred quickly and often. By 1863, positions had hardened and policy had changed. The Lincoln administration was wary of granting legitimacy to the Confederacy through negotiations, the South threatened extreme punishment for black Union troops and their white officers, and Northern military leaders sought to reduce the Southern manpower pool by preventing captured soldiers from returning to the ranks. As a result, men like Weaver languished for months or years under execrable conditions. Time after time the hopes of Weaver and his mates were raised by rumors of exchange, only to be dashed by the reality of continued confinement. Hope for release rose and fell: “The day comes and goes leaving nothing by which to be remembered, and so we expect to pass many months.” (p. 88) Prison life wore on the officers’ morale as well as their morale. On Christmas Day 1864, Weaver noted, “The most of the officers have
lieutenant. He spent his early years with the 5th U.S. Infantry regiment assigned at several posts in the West and in the South. Army promotion moved at a glacial rate throughout the Gilded Age, and it took Liggett eighteen years to be promoted to captain.

When the Spanish-American War broke out, Liggett was able to secure a major’s billet as an assistant adjutant general in the Volunteer Army that was raised to augment the small Regular Army (RA). In 1899, he was appointed as a major in the 31st U.S. Volunteer Infantry, one of the regiments specially raised to fight in the Philippine War. His Philippine service was on the southern island of Mindanao and involved no combat. After mustering out of the volunteers, he reverted to his RA rank of captain, but he was again promoted to major in 1902.

While at Fort Leavenworth commanding an infantry battalion, Liggett audited the courses of both the School of the Line and the Army Staff School. This decision “separated him from most of his peers and placed him on an upward career track.” (p. 66) In 1909, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and selected to attend the newly established Army War College, in Washington, D.C. He did so well in that course that he was assigned to the Army Staff in 1910, and three years later, he was promoted to brigadier general and appointed as the War College’s president. His time there “was the culmination of his scholarly journey, much of it self-study, and it added value to his standing and burnished his reputation as a US Army officer.” (p. 81)

After commanding brigades in Texas and the Philippines, as well as the Department of the Philippines, Liggett was promoted to major general and given command of the Western Department, with headquarters in San Francisco. In April 1917, as the United States entered World War I, he was sixty and rather portly. Gen. John J. Pershing preferred younger, fitter commanders for his AEF divisions, but Liggett was still given command of the 41st Division and deployed to France. The 41st was designated as a depot division – its men were gradually parceled out to other formations – so he was moved up to command I Corps in 1918. In August, his corps became part of the newly created U.S. First Army, commanded by General Pershing. When the Second Army was created in October, Pershing turned First Army over to Liggett, who was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant general. He commanded that army during the Meuse-Argonne campaign during the final weeks of the war, although Pershing continued to interfere in command decisions that rightfully belonged to Liggett.

The Armistice went into effect in November, and the First Army was inactivated in April 1919, but as his “doughboys” headed for


Although Lt. Gen. Hunter Liggett was one of the top commanders in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during World War I, few Americans have ever heard of him. Michael E. Shay, a judge trial referee in Connecticut who has written several books on Great War topics, now provides us with a biography of this long-forgotten general.

Born in Reading, Pennsylvania, in 1857, Hunter Liggett graduated from West Point in 1879 and was commissioned as an infantry second become degraded in virtue, religion and even decency.” (p. 186) But their confidence in the righteousness of the Union cause never wavered. Wrote Weaver: “The Prisoners to a man don’t want our Government to back down one mite.” (p. 200)

The bulk of the transcribed diaries covers Weaver’s POW years. Perhaps he was lucky that he was allowed to maintain his journal, but he made daily entries. Almost invariably he commented on the weather, the food, his health, and his own activities. Prison life was dull, with Weaver sometimes suffering from bouts of depression, which he called the “horrors.” He usually managed to find reading material to pass the time, engaged in some light physical activity, and interacted with other prisoners. Although he frequently commented on the poor quality of the food, he stayed remarkably healthy and recorded his weight at one point as 170 pounds. He stayed current on news of the day, and on activities in his regiment, from newly arrived inmates (“fresh fish”) and from Northern and Southern newspapers. Where he obtained reading material or how he obtained the papers he never said. Despite his youth, Weaver was a man of better than average intelligence and ambition, as attested by his later career as a diplomat and educator, and his intellect helped him through his ordeal.

Weaver’s diary has been carefully transcribed and nicely edited by a consortium of a college history professor, an archivist, an international graduate student, and an independent scholar who specializes in military studies. There are a few slight errors in transcription but none that mar the overall effect of the narrative. Explanatory endnotes are copious and helpful. The result is a more-interesting-than-average account of Civil War prison life, as documented by an observant inmate with a bright mind and a ready pen.

Russell K. Brown
As it tried to translate the lessons learned from World War I into a cohesive war fighting doctrine, a Navy’s strength was no longer arrived at by counting its battleships. A modern war-fighting Navy had to be built around surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. To tell this story, the Navy developed a public relations program which slowly grew in sophistication to encompass the print, radio, and film industry. This public relations program had various goals which included refuting misinformation spread by others about the Navy, telling the story of the Navy, helping with the recruitment of officers and men, and ensuring progress in the war-fighting capability of the Navy. The struggle to tell the Navy’s story to the general public was controversial within the service. Some naval officers were against contact with the news media, due to various prejudices that had developed over the decades. Other naval officers realized that if the Navy did not provide the desired information, there was someone else willing to provide the information shaped to their own beliefs.

This book shows how the Navy overcame its internal dissent. The Navy’s public relations section, i.e. information section, was buried in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This was a logical location for the Navy’s public relations section, as ONI was tasked with providing information on foreign threats to the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government.

The author admits that others have tackled this subject, but he states that he addresses topics that those studies have not examined in detail. These are: 1) How the Navy responded to the various public threats to the its claim to be the front line of American defense; 2) How the Navy adapted to using the media to present their message to the President, Congress, and the general public; 3) What was the dominant theme of the Navy’s message; and 4) How effective was the message the Navy crafted in achieving what it wanted.

A great sub-story in the book is the 1929 Navy’s creation of the Motion Picture Board. Before this, the Navy’s relationship with the movie industry had been on an ad hoc basis. Hereafter, there was a formal relationship between the Navy and Hollywood, which led to the filming of a score of theatrical films or Movietonews films centered on the Navy. Thus, at little cost to the Navy, the service received a great deal of exposure in the movie houses across the heartland of America. As a result, by the late 1930s, Midwestern teenagers had become the heart and soul of those enlisting in the Navy.

This book should appeal to naval historians, anyone interested in social media as a messenger, movie buffs, or those trying to understand how to influence people and institutions. Hopefully, the

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I have trouble with the title of this book. When writing about the problems of global warming, would an author title the book “Selling Global Warming” or title a book advocating the planting of more trees “Selling Reforestation.” What the U.S. Navy did between 1917 and 1941 was sponsor a public education program on the importance of a strong maritime force. They did nothing different during this period than every other large organization did in presenting themselves to the public in the most favorable way. Harvard, Yale, and Princeton spent these years promoting themselves as the pinnacle of university education.

At the end of World War I, the Navy found itself in the crosshairs of isolationist agitators, anti-war groups, and government spending protestors. The Washington Naval Treaty and other ship limitation treaties of the interwar period were all looked upon favorably by those who insisted that the United States must never again be drawn into a European conflict. The Navy, in 1922, found its most modern capital ships being scrapped on the building ways before they could join the fleet. Millions of dollars in fleet modernization was lost and not recovered till the 1930s.

The interwar period was also a period of turmoil within the Navy, as it tried to translate the lessons learned from World War I into a cohesive war fighting doctrine. A Navy’s strength was no longer arrived at by counting its battleships. A modern war-fighting Navy had to be built around surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. To tell this story, the Navy developed a public relations program which slowly grew in sophistication to encompass the print, radio, and film industry. This public relations program had various goals which included refuting misinformation spread by others about the Navy, telling the story of the Navy, helping with the recruitment of officers and men, and ensuring progress in the war-fighting capability of the Navy. The struggle to tell the Navy’s story to the general public was controversial within the service. Some naval officers were against contact with the news media, due to various prejudices that had developed over the decades. Other naval officers realized that if the Navy did not provide the desired information, there was someone else willing to provide the information shaped to their own beliefs.

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This book should appeal to naval historians, anyone interested in social media as a messenger, movie buffs, or those trying to understand how to influence people and institutions. Hopefully, the
author will write a book that will extend his study to cover the 1940s and 1950s.

Charles H. Bogart


The life of John Benton Hart followed a pattern fairly typical in mid-nineteenth century America, from his birth in Pennsylvania in 1842 to his participation in the relentless westward expansion. In broad strokes, many lives unfolded in this manner while, in detail, each was unique with its own array of accomplishments, failures, and formative experiences.

John Benton Hart’s story was recorded between 1918 and 1923 when he was in his 70s. At the behest of his son, Harry, he wrote about his Civil War experiences and the adventures he had thereafter working in the West. Some of the stories were rewritten in a noticeably different style by Harry, and they were all then put away for about a century, coming to light only recently through the efforts of Hart’s great-grandson, also named John Hart. This volume presents the recollections of John Benton Hart, along with a well-researched historical context provided by John Hart. It is unfortunate that only those writings that had been typed out and bound reached the protective hands of the younger Hart while many handwritten pages from the same corpus were deemed worthless by another family member and burned.

Hart’s stories begin with the Civil War. Several moves across the Midwest landed his family in Grasshopper Falls, Kansas, where he joined the 11th Kansas Volunteer Infantry on 9 September 1862. His Civil War experiences, humorous in places and disturbing in others, concentrate on the climactic battles in northwest Missouri in the autumn of 1864. With the war all but over in this area, the 11th Kansas (which had changed to a cavalry regiment in September 1863) was ordered west to patrol the immigrant trails and telegraph lines along the North Platte River. The region had seen increased raiding on the part of Native Americans, especially since the Sand Creek Massacre at the end of November 1864. With its individual companies strung out among the military stations on the North Platte, the men of the 11th faced a kind of warfare they had not yet experienced and were not well prepared for. Hart took part in the tragic Battle of Platte Bridge on 26 July 1865, being one of the few soldiers to escape injury or death.

The service of the 11th Kansas Cavalry in the West lasted only a few months, and they were sent back to Kansas in September to be mustered out. Hart and his brother Hugh, however, headed west again in the spring of 1867 to work on a mule train transporting goods up the Bozeman Trail. Their employment with Wells Fargo in that capacity was short. Their first trip ended at Fort C. F. Smith, a remote post located on the Bighorn River, where the Hart brothers were offered more attractive employment. They stayed at Fort Smith for a little over a year, hunting to supply the soldiers with meat, cutting hay, and for John running mail to and from Fort Phil Kearny, a dangerous journey of over 100 miles. The mail route provides material for a number of interesting stories, but his most riveting account involves his participation in the Hayfield Fight of 1 August 1867, where a handful of civilian employees and its small military guard fought off an enormous force of Lakota warriors.

Old war stories such as these comprise a genre which tends to be at once illuminating and troublesome. Often recorded many decades after the events described, they are usually flawed when compared to dependable accounts. Actions are frequently exaggerated and purported dialogues often seem hollow and improvised to make the narrator look clever. Hart’s stories follow this pattern. The reader may be tempted to explain this in terms of self-aggrandizement, but so uncharitable an interpretation would miss the point of the narrative. The author’s goal is not so much to record an official history as it is to communicate the experience of a very different time and place. He is aware that his audience is expecting a good story, and if subsuming into his own account some events that he did not directly experience helps in achieving that goal, so be it. In many cases, events may be exaggerated simply to make the story square with the emotional impact of the real events. To be pursued by an enemy who is able and quite determined to end your life is an overwhelming experience, difficult to accurately convey through simple description. Exaggeration of some aspects of the ordeal may better convey the impact it had upon the author’s life.

Frequently, the researcher studying such narratives must conduct an exegesis of sorts, looking for common denominators among different accounts, confirming or refuting timelines and attempting to divine the true motives behind particular statements. In this case, the author’s great-grandson has ably conducted such an analysis, providing an added dimension to the original text. Willing to point out cases where events could not have happened as described, he also discusses instances where Hart’s descriptions match those of other writers, as in the Hayfield Fight, and a few puzzling cases where Hart’s narrative is convincingly detailed and coherent, yet there is no
Stève Sainlaude’s study of France’s diplomatic reaction to the American Civil War is an important addition to this international interpretation of the conflict.

France and the American Civil War is an abridged translation of two of Sainlaude’s previous works, Le gouvernement impérial et la guerre de Sécession (1861-1865): L’action diplomatique and La France et la Confédération sudiste (1861-1865): La question de la reconnaissance diplomatique pendant la guerre de Sécession, both published in 2011 and winners of the Prix Napoléon III in 2013. This English translation draws only from those parts of the earlier books dealing specifically with the French diplomatic response to the American Civil War. The result is a concise, readable, and informative monograph.

Sainlaude’s primary intervention is in demonstrating that the Civil War was a conflict that influenced the decision making of Europe’s great powers generally, and France specifically. By utilizing French sources that have remained unknown, ignored, or mistranslated by American scholars, Sainlaude demonstrates that the Second Empire analyzed and interpreted the American Civil War within an international framework that included Great Britain, Russia, the Netherlands, Mexico, China, and Japan. As a result, we learn that the outcome of the war depended not only upon the contingencies of battlefields in Virginia and Mississippi, but also upon the insightful observations of a French consul in Richmond and the willingness of career diplomats to ignore the orders of Napoleon III. These diplomats, argues Sainlaude, knew best and the survival of the Union was due, at least in part, to their belief that the Confederacy stood no chance of winning the war without European intervention. A belief that British intervention would have swung the tides of war in favor of the South has remained popular for some time. Sainlaude’s use of French diplomatic communications shows, however, that the French government never believed Great Britain was close to formally recognizing the slave South and without British cooperation France would not support the Confederate States either.

While the issue of slavery was significant in British hesitation to come to the aid of the South, according to Sainlaude military and economic factors weighed more heavily in French policy. Napoleon III’s desire to restore a Latin-Catholic empire in Mexico limited his diplomatic options north of the Rio Grande, as did the French need for American assistance in naval operations in the Far East. Furthermore, Sainlaude’s discussion of France’s economic ties to the North demonstrate once again that Confederate leaders overestimated Europe’s dependence upon cotton. In fact, France was more dependent on Northern wheat and markets than it ever was on corresponding mention of the events elsewhere, as would be expected.

The resulting work gives the reader an interesting insight into John Benton Hart. Clearly willing to work hard and take risks, he could also be impulsive at times, pressing pranks beyond the point where they ceased to be funny. He was not immune to the negative attitudes most whites held about Native Americans, yet he openly expressed admiration of some of them. During the 1860s, the Lakota were engaged in a war with the Crow, as they pressed into their traditional territory. This made the Crow de facto allies of the whites, whose incursion into the region brought on their own conflict with the Lakota. Hart developed a close relationship with some of these Crow, who at one point probably saved his life, and made a sincere attempt to understand and convey their customs. He does this with a sensitivity that provides some of the book’s most interesting passages.

Hart’s stories end with the closing of Fort Smith in the summer of 1868, while he is still a young man. We have no written accounts of his later life which included marriage, working as a miner in Colorado, homesteading in a valley on the western slope, still named Harts Basin, and serving in the Colorado House of Representatives.

It is fortunate that John Benton Hart had a son who urged him to write down his experiences and a great-grandson who appreciated their value. It is a very engaging book that leaves the reader sadly wondering about the contents of those pages consigned to a fire.

Steven C. Haack


Nearly a decade ago, as a master’s degree student working on a Civil War-themed thesis, I read a small mountain of books and monographs about the sectional conflict. These works covered themes as varied as the military tactics used on small battlefields in Missouri, to the role women played on the homefront during and after the war, to the efforts of African Americans who seized the opportunity to free themselves. Apart from an occasional discussion of “King Cotton’s” importance in Europe, these books were almost entirely insular; they did little to place the Civil War in a broader global perspective. In the years since, scholars have undertaken to correct the narrowly United States-focused historiography of the Civil War by expanding our understanding of the war’s effect upon Europe, and to a lesser degree, the entire world. French historian
Southern cotton and believed the cotton shortage was more the fault of Confederate policy than the Union blockade. Sainlaude forces his readers to recognize that the outcome of the American Civil War depended on more than simply American factors. His work provides a useful look at the diplomacy that secured the Union victory and began the shaping of a newly modern world.

Michael A. Hill


On 21 April 1944, a group of men, many of them Allied military personnel attempting to escape from Nazi-occupied France by crossing the Pyrenees Mountains into neutral Spain, was detected and attacked by a German border patrol. Most of the members of the group were captured; a few escaped to reach their destination. This incident forms the basis of French-born Jean-Luc Cartron’s examination of Pyrenees escapers, the networks that aided them, and the likely suspects in their presumed betrayal. Cartron, a professor of biology in New Mexico, has previously written on the French Resistance movement and has also published works on the zoology of the American Southwest.

Resistance to German occupation began as early as the spring of 1940. From France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, escapers exfiltrated by sea across to England, or by land into neutral Switzerland or Spain. The flow consisted of Jewish refugees, stranded British and French servicemen, and young men dodging forced labor service in Germany. After 1942, as the air war over Europe intensified, a large number of the escapers were downed American and British airmen. The latter group included men from countries of the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Underground networks composed of people called “helpers” developed to support the escapers by rescuing, housing, feeding, transporting them, and giving them false identities. Cartron makes clear the formal difference between escapers (those who had been in German custody and had escaped) and evaders (those who had never been in custody and were attempting to elude capture). For simplification, this review refers to both categories as escapers.

Cartron focuses his attention on the escape lines leading across the Pyrenees to Spain. It was a route fraught with hazard, from German border patrols to fierce terrain and climate conditions, to double agents working to infiltrate the resistance and intercept the lines. Mountain passes were as much as 9,000 feet high; in winter, snow might be shoulder depth. Some of the escapers were physically unfit for the trek, most did not have appropriate clothing, especially shoes, for the climb. Many were left behind on the trail; often groups had to turn back. In the anecdotes related by Cartron, taken from reminiscences, archives and historical research, the individual experiences are both exciting and entertaining, with a wealth of personal detail about the escapers and their guides, called passeurs. In his foreword, writer Roger Stanton estimates that “more than 3,500 British and colonial Allied servicemen and more than 3,400 Americans returned home from occupied Europe to Great Britain to fight again.” In addition, “Many believe that for every escaper or evader who made it home, four escape line helpers died or suffered in a concentration camp.” (both quotations, p. x)

In the incident that Cartron uses as the centerpiece of his monograph, 21 Allied airmen, including 12 Americans, and a dozen civilian escapers were spirited across western Europe to be collected in southwest France. From there, they were guided into the mountains by experienced passeurs. “With no ropes and no hiking sticks, they all found themselves struggling through knee-deep snow, each of them stepping into the footprints of the man directly in front, lest one sink deeper.” (p. 66) High in the Pyrenees, at a place known as “the black shed,” where they paused to rest for the night, and one day’s march from the Spanish border, they were intercepted by a German patrol, possibly alerted to their presence by an informer who could have been a witness to their passage, an insider in an escape line, or even a member of the escape group. Carton points to several potential suspects, one of whom was later executed as a German collaborator, but his opinions are based largely on conjecture and supposition. Isn’t it possible that the suspicions of German authorities were aroused by a large group of military-aged men traveling on public conveyances to villages in the foothills of the mountains?

At any rate, this slim, enjoyable book on a little-known aspect of World War II is well worth the time it takes to read. The author might have improved it by following a more standard timeline of events rather than his somewhat disjointed presentation of episodes, but this is a minor flaw.

Russell K. Brown
In the summer of 1913, more than 55,000 Civil War veterans, with an average age of 72, descended on the small town of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, to observe the fiftieth anniversary of the great battle that had been fought there. In this book, this historic event is analyzed by Thomas Flagel, an associate professor of history at Tennessee’s Columbia State Community College.

It was not just Union army veterans who were drawn to the reunion of the North’s greatest victory. Thousands of former Confederates also attended, as over the years “Pickett’s Charge had become the centerpiece of the Lost Cause narrative.” One southern newspaper proclaimed, “There was glory for both sides at Gettysburg.” (both quotes, p. 3) Delegations came from every state, and all but sixteen states and territories provided financial support. Although it had no regiments at Gettysburg, the Iowa legislature budgeted $10,000, while South Carolina, a relatively poor state, came up with only $3,000.

Once the veterans arrived in Gettysburg – most of them by train – they proceeded to a massive tent city, nicknamed the “Great Camp,” that occupied an area of almost two square miles on the south side of town. They were then directed — sometimes by helpful Boy Scouts — to their respective state areas (states of residence rather than the states in whose units they had once enlisted), which varied greatly in size. Each tent had cots with two blankets provided by the War Department. The Army also provided stoves to help prepare the massive amount of food that was consumed, and it helped to provide medical coverage, especially for those veterans who had problems adjusting to the great heat. Unfortunately, heat exhaustion killed at least two attendees and required hospitalization for over 300 others.

Most of the Union veterans wore civilian clothes, but the former Confederates generally wore gray coats and hats indicating their membership in the national organization known as the United Confederate Veterans (the Union veterans had a much larger organization called the Grand Army of the Republic, or GAR).

One group of veterans that was poorly represented was African Americans. There had been almost 200,000 black soldiers in the United States Colored Troops, but no black units fought at Gettysburg, and most other black veterans undoubtedly felt that their presence would not be welcome, especially by white southerners. The African American presence was thus pretty much limited to the cooks who helped to prepare reunion meals, and many veterans commented on how much better the food was than what had been provided to them in 1863.

There was a “Great Tent” capable of seating thousands that was used to allow long-winded orators to address those who were interested in hearing patriotic speeches. There was usually much background noise and no public address system, however, so it was often quite difficult for the veterans — many of whom had poor hearing — to understand what was being said. That was certainly the case when President Woodrow Wilson appeared on the Fourth of July and gave a speech that was not especially well received. Wilson spent less than an hour at Gettysburg before hurrying away to begin his summer vacation.

The author has done an excellent job of analyzing the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion, which meant so much to so many Civil War veterans, as well as their loved ones. He differs from many other historians in maintaining that most of the veterans were far less interested in national reconciliation and far more interested in reconnecting with old comrades, mourning dead friends, and revisiting the ground that they had once fought over. Doing these simple things reduced many of them to tears. After his journey to Gettysburg, one old soldier wrote his family: “I am so tired that I can’t see, but I wouldn’t have missed this trip for 20 years of my life.” (p. 44) This book is highly recommended.

Roger D. Cunningham


This is a useful guide to a World War I battlefield that is hallowed ground for U.S. Marines. The author has chosen the format of a staff ride, guiding the reader from stop to stop, and nicely complementing the text with a colorful, detailed set of maps, as well as “then and now” photographs. Additionally, the reader will find a chronology and some reflections on USMC history. A bonus is a sidebar on the Germans on the other side of the battlefield, especially a much-decorated officer named Lt. Col. Josef Bischoff.

Why does Belleau Wood matter so much to Marines? It was an “evolutionary bridge” in the history of the Corps that before World War I had been relatively small and tied closely to the Navy. (p. viii) This was a chance to prove the Corps’s mettle in a major land battle.
by demonstrating Marines’ excellent marksmanship, especially at longer ranges, and their ability to stand, fight, and advance in a protracted battle. It was also important because no less than four future Marine Corps commandants fought at Belleau Wood — Wendell C. Neville, Thomas R. Holcomb, Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., and Clifton B. Cates — as well as a number of other officers who would advance to senior ranks, like the future three-stars Holland M. Smith and Gerald C. Thomas. This was the battle where they proved themselves and developed basic impressions of what combat was about. If Holcomb continued to stress marksmanship, and if Smith was prepared for bitter fighting and heavy casualties in the Pacific in World War II, it might have had something to do with Belleau Wood.

For the Allies, this battle was an important contribution to victory. The author explains how, in the spring of 1918, Germany was in a good position to inflict a decisive blow on the Western Front. Russia’s withdrawal from the war allowed Germany to transfer more than a million experienced soldiers and more than 3,000 guns to the west. Now, for the first time, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s army had numerical superiority. Equally important was the relatively poor state of the Allies — the French being exhausted after four years of fighting on their soil, the British bleeding from their disastrous offensives in Flanders, and the Italians reeling from the Battle of Caporetto. If ever the Allies needed reinforcements, it was the spring of 1918, and that is what the U.S. Army and Marine Corps supplied.

When the Marines first arrived in France, they found themselves performing far too many stevedore and guard duties. The author explains how, according to many accounts, it was a dreary experience for the Marines, who were eager for more challenging duties. The opportunity came with the establishment of American formations, typically a mix of Marine and Army units that would go into battle in March 1918 under the umbrella of the 2d U.S. Infantry Division, which included a Marine brigade comprising the 5th and 6th Regiments. The Battle of Belleau Wood occurred three months later, over some 20 days in June, as the Marines repelled a determined German attack that threatened to break the Allied line, and then pushed the enemy back — though at great cost, with some units suffering 50-60 percent casualties.

The author led numerous battlefield tours while serving at SHAPE in the 1990s and obviously knows whereof he writes. He salutes his working relationship with the mapmaker, Lt. Col. R. L. Cody, explaining how they challenged each other to improve — to make a map fit the text and improve the text after studying a map. Cody based his work on maps published by American, German, and French military historians after the war, in addition to consulting modern satellite imagery. After undertaking this research, the author comments that he was struck by the fact that the terrain had changed very little since 1918.

By the way, the guide’s title comes from the Edgar A. Guest poem, “Battle of Belleau Wood,” published in 1922. Though it seems a little old-fashioned today, it was reportedly the iconic Marine Gen. John A. Lejeune’s favorite poem of all the verses written after the war.

Nick Reynolds


The one hundredth anniversary of the end of the Great War has come and gone from the public eye, but there is still much that can be learned on how this truly wholesale slaughter by countries with innovative new technology occurred. Historian Peter Hart, from the Imperial War Museum in London, writes a vivid and descriptive account of the last year of the Great War titled The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I. The author also devotes much attention to the efforts of each warring side in the early days of the war.

Hart’s work on the Great War is not just a typical long and furious book on the fighting. There are vast amounts of eyewitness documents that give the reader a fresh look at the leadership, battles, peace plans, and the occupation of defeated Germany. The author throughout the book puts a human face on the complex and often times confusing policies and goals of the various combatants.

Through long forgotten documents and interviews, the author clearly demonstrates that the factions waging war during the early days did not understand industrialized warfare, because the Germans were depending on horse and foot power to execute the ambitious Schlieffen Plan to defeat the French. The author describes the euphoria that came over the Germans as they marched from cantonments, railheads, and villages to the border. Within a few months after invading Belgium and France, the Germans ran out of steam and failed to achieve their planned decisive victory. It is this backdrop of failure that starts the true efforts to win the war, as described by the author. Since the author is British, he takes a surprising and critical view of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). He details how the BEF’s small size hindered its effectiveness and almost caused it to become a sideshow. Further criticism of the command relationship...
between then-Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig helped to create at times almost a circus sideshow. Hart details in the book how the Prime Minister tried to limit the actual involvement of the BEF during the last year. By keeping troop numbers down and failing to replace soldiers that became casualties. Understandably, the tremendous British death toll played into the Prime Minister’s thinking and actions.

In the last year of the war, the author portrays the arrival of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) almost like a thousand-pound gorilla in a room. This was in part because the AEF was not ready for modern warfare, much as the other combatants had learned at the start of the 1914 hostilities. The author also appears to be unimpressed with the ranks inside the AEF and their experiences fighting in the Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, and the Mexican Punitive Expedition. Hart shows himself to be a bit of an Anglophile when he writes that these wars were colonial wars. He also questions the soundness of Gen. John J. Pershing’s refusal to break up the AEF and “loan” formations to the other allies, since the AEF needed more time to train in the tactics needed to survive in this new kind of warfare.

Credit must be given to the author’s in-depth research on the AEF once it did hit the ground. Eyewitness documents show that the Allies were astonished at the size of the AEF divisions compared to the French and the British formations, because they were twice as big. The 25,000-man divisions of the AEF fought in several battles that clearly put the Germans on the defensive late in the war.

One of the more intriguing parts of this book is the on again/off again peace efforts made by all the combatants. One chapter toward the end of the book gives a truly intriguing look behind the scenes in Germany. The German leadership appeared to see that the game was over, but nobody wanted to go down in history as being responsible for losing the war. Kaiser Wilhelm II, Gen. Erich Ludendorff, and Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg jostled for power during the peace plans but failed to see the Bolshevik threat appearing in the streets of Germany.

This effort by Peter Hart to chronicle the last year of the Great War definitely brings new topics for discussion and study. The only caution that I might add when reading this book is to be aware of the difference between British and American English phrases. One such potential for misunderstanding is the mention of public schools in England, which were (and still are) comparable to private schools in the United States. Regardless of what version of English you practice, you will be thoroughly intrigued as you read this book.

Vernon Yates


Brig. Gen. George Crook had a solid reputation as an Indian fighter when he arrived on the high plains in 1876, having waged successful campaigns against the Paiutes in the Northwest and the Apaches in the Southwest. Weather, political realities, and the sheer number of enemy combatants would conspire to make the new theatre of operations a daunting challenge.

By the terms of the broad treaty hammered out with the Plains Indians in 1868, reservations would be established and annuities paid, but in the Native Americans also were granted broad rights to hunt throughout the vast territories north and west of their reservations. While some settled on the reservations, others refused to recognize the validity of the 1868 treaty and adhered to their traditional ways in the Powder River region. Others chose to live on reservations during the winter, but left for the hunting grounds in the summer, where they could accumulate dried meat for the next winter and live the traditional life for a few months, attending Sun Dances and socializing. Such a fluid arrangement proved problematic. The treaty stipulated that rail lines could be constructed through the region, but non-reservation warriors attacked the survey expeditions. As upsetting as they found this incursion, the discovery of gold in the Black Hills and the subsequent influx of miners was a greater outrage. The Black Hills lay well within reservation boundaries, a fact acknowledged by the government, which initially brought Crook in to evict the illegal intruders. There followed an attempt to purchase the Black Hills, which failed. Government negotiators blamed that failure in large part upon the intimidation and threats from non-reservation traditionalist Indians. President Grant viewed the purchase and development of the Black Hills as the economic shot needed to lift the nation out of the 1873 depression. It was time to take control of the situation in the West, and this would begin by forcing all the Plains Indians onto reservations.

Pursuant to this, the word went out that all the bands living off reservations had to report to an agency forthwith or be considered hostile and turned over to the military. Crook took to the field in March 1876 to implement this policy, and his first action was an abject failure. Winter weather in the Southwest was difficult, but nothing there could prepare him for the brutality of winter on the Northern Plains. The March expedition lost its beef herd to raiders early on. It culminated in the destruction of a Cheyenne village on the Powder
River, but contrary to orders, foodstuffs and robes were destroyed rather than taken for the soldiers’ use and the Indians’ horse herd was poorly secured and recovered by its owners the next day. Furthermore, a wounded soldier was knowingly left to his fate on the field of battle. The slew of courts martial had barely concluded when Crook left Fort Fetterman at the end of May for his second foray.

On 29 May, fifteen cavalry companies, five infantry companies, and 100 wagons pulled by 600 mules ascended the old Bozeman Trail. Crook had depended heavily on the use of native guides and scouts in the Southwest but had been unable to recruit any from the agencies east of Fort Laramie. He had sent his guide Frank Grouard to the west in hopes of recruiting scouts from among the Crow and was undoubtedly relieved on 13 June when Grouard arrived at the camp on Goose Creek with 175 Crow auxiliaries. The next day, 86 Shoshones arrived as well. The guide also brought news that Sitting Bull was camped 45 miles due north on the banks of the Rosebud, with some 700 lodges.

On 15 June all was ready. The wagons would be left behind under guard. The men were ordered to travel with four days rations and the bare minimum of equipment. Infantrymen mounted mules, a process that went surprisingly well, considering that neither the men nor the mules had any previous experience with such an arrangement. The column pulled out, camping the night of 16 June on the Rosebud and continuing along its banks the next morning. At 8 a.m., Crow scouts galloped in to report the sighting of some Sioux downstream. Crook determined it best to take some time to form his strategy and ordered the men to unsaddle. Most of the soldiers took advantage of the break to relax, picketing their horses to graze or leading them down to the river to drink.

Sioux hunters had already seen the column and had returned to their camp, which was on Reno Creek, not the Rosebud, to raise the alarm. Many elders counseled restraint. They were there to hunt, not fight, but the Cheyenne among them remembered the unprovoked attack of the previous March and knew that a fight was inevitable. The camp was burgeoning with summer hunters who had come from the reservations, sharing the information that the government was no longer preventing miners from invading the Black Hills. Nobody could hold the warriors back. They would not await an attack, they would engage the soldiers where they found them. Shortly after the men on the banks of the Rosebud unsaddled, more Crow scouts came rushing in. They were being chased by Sioux warriors. The battle began.

The battlefield was huge, encompassing some fourteen square miles, and topographically complex, bordered by the Rosebud on the east and a tributary known as Kollmar Creek on the west, with ridges and rock fields between them. The author does an excellent job condensing the myriad of individual accounts into a coherent battle narrative. It must be borne in mind, of course, that such a reconstruction can seemingly impose order where there was, in fact, chaos. It was generally a mess, with cavalry and infantry responding moment to moment to a dynamic array of threats. The distribution of outcroppings and rocks provided safe positions from which the Native Americans could fight, and if the soldiers managed to make a particular position untenable, they could easily fall back to make a stand from another defensible site. Crook located a workable observation post and sent orders out via courier, slowly taking control of parts of the battlefield. He even managed to hold some companies in reserve. Most of the casualties occurred near the mouth of Kollmar Creek, as a group of retreating soldiers were overrun, with nine being killed. Around 4 o’clock, the Native American forces quit the field. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to estimate their strength, with reasonable estimates running between one and two thousand combatants.

Crook now ordered his battered and exhausted troops to the east side of the field where the Rosebud entered a canyon. He was still convinced that a camp lay just a few miles downstream and was determined to strike it, but the Crow and Shoshone balked at the proposition. The canyon appeared to be the perfect place for an ambush, and they would not enter it. Others pointed out that ammunition was probably running low. There was also the matter of the injured men. Crook ordered the command back to Goose Creek to evacuate the injured and await reinforcements. The Crow and Shoshone scouts then announced that they were done. They had fought the good fight and taken scalps, and it was time to go home. In Crook’s mind, their departure crippled the expedition. Couriers rode off with his reports and requests to be telegraphed back to headquarters, and Crook, uncharacteristically reluctant to act, did nothing. He hunted and fished and moved the camp every few days to better pastures. He was still hunting and fishing when word reached him on 10 July about the events on the Little Big Horn on 25 June. How history would have unfolded had Crook, with or without scouts, put his thousand-man force to some use following the fight on the Rosebud will forever be a topic of speculation.

Crook’s ordeal was not over. In the wake of Little Big Horn, he would lead a punitive expedition. It, too, would go poorly and end up being known as the Horsemeat March, as the starving soldiers were forced to subsist on their broken-down mounts. This book provides a detailed and engaging history of this pivotal battle. It is an excellent

You can tell by the quality of his prose that Philip Gerard is a professor of creative writing. His compilation of essays on the Civil War in North Carolina is marked by sharp writing and superlative composition. One might search here in vain for poor grammar, awkward constructions, or misplaced modifiers. Dr. Gerard has produced a masterpiece of anecdotes about the people in or from the Old North State and their experiences during the years 1861-1865. Gerard originally wrote these narratives on North Carolina’s wartime events as monthly installments during the state’s sesquicentennial celebration. Precisely because he was not a historian, he was deliberately selected for the assignment, because he was “not to bring any preconceived notions” (p. ix) to the task.

North Carolina was the next-to-the-last Confederate state to secede from the union (21 May 1861). Gerard’s anecdotes take the reader from those heady early days of 1861 up to the surrender in April 1865 of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s rebel army to the victorious forces of Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman at the “Bennitt Place [sic].” His work encompasses a wide scope, from country boys killed in battle, far from home, to Unionist resisters to the Confederate war effort, from Union soldiers in prisoner of war camps to slaves released from bondage, and from blockade runners to civilians whose lives and property were collateral damage to the military conflict.

Not all North Carolinians were happy with the prospect of secession and war. Pockets of strong pro-Unionists in the western counties and elsewhere were dismayed, even outraged, at the thought of having to fight to protect the plantation owners’ battle to maintain slavery as a right. One group, who styled themselves the “Heroes of America,” openly resisted Confederate conscription and other efforts of the Richmond government to harness the state’s manpower and economy. The goal of the Heroes was “simple and audacious: to bring down the Confederacy.” (p. 45) Some Carolinians who joined the Union army (called “buffaloes” by their detractors) were subject to capital punishment if captured. Gerard tells the story of one such group, hanged by order of Confederate Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett, of Gettysburg notoriety.

But other citizens fought bravely for their new country. At Gettysburg in 1863, the 26th North Carolina Volunteers, the largest regiment in Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, was destroyed. In three days of battle, the regiment’s ranks were reduced from 800 men to three officers and sixty-four privates. On the Union side, men of the United States Colored Troops (USCT), many of them recruited in North Carolina, fought to take Fort Fisher at the mouth of the Cape Fear River in January 1865, winning the praise of Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, “[They] went forward with alacrity in capital form, showing that they were good soldiers.” (p. 294) One of those men captured among the defenders was his own former master. The stories of individuals fill the pages. There is naval officer and blockade runner John Newland Maffitt; notorious female rebel Rose O’Neal Greenhow, who drowned near Wilmington in 1864 while trying to come ashore from a blockade runner; redoubtable Gov. Zebulon Vance, who warred as much with Confederate President Jefferson Davis as he did with the North; and African-American activist Abraham Galloway, who declared that if slaves could not get political equality “at the ballot box, they would have it at the cartridge box!” (p. 115) And last but not least is the chronicle of the Bennett family, who lost two sons and a son-in-law to the war, and whose simple home was the scene of the final surrender in 1865.

Philip Gerard has done a first-class job of relating North Carolina’s rich Civil War history, not only in accurate reporting of events but also in marvelous story-telling. No reader will come away from a perusal of this book without being impressed by its lively style and its immediacy. For this reviewer it provided a pleasurable and informative read.

Russell K. Brown


As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-64), Ambassador to South Vietnam (1964-65), and a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisor Board (1965-70), Maxwell D. Taylor was intimately involved in many of the high level decisions that drew the United States deeper and deeper into the quagmire of the Vietnam War. In this book, Ingo Trauschweizer, director of the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University, examines Taylor’s involvement in these decisions, as well as in several other key Cold War flashpoints.

Steven C. Haack
Born in Missouri in 1901, Maxwell Taylor graduated from West Point in 1922 as a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. He later transferred to the field artillery and was promoted to lieutenant colonel shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During World War II, his linguistic and diplomatic skills caught the eye of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Taylor rose rapidly in rank and was a major general commanding the 101st Airborne Division when the war ended. Gen. George Marshall showed his great confidence in Taylor’s abilities by selecting him to serve as the superintendent at West Point in 1945, and four years later Taylor returned to Europe as the chief of staff for the U.S. European Command and the commander of the American sector in occupied Berlin. This gave him a close look at the Soviet military threat to Western European security that had emerged from the ashes of World War II.

After a tour of duty as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) on the Army Staff and promotion to lieutenant general, Taylor moved to the other side of the world in 1953 and commanded Eighth Army during the closing months of the Korean War. This brought him another star, before he moved to Japan and commanded U.S. Forces Far East. In mid-1955, Taylor was appointed as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. One of his organizational innovations, the pentomic division (1956-61), was an attempt to enable the Army to perform more effectively on the atomic battlefield, but it was ill-conceived and lasted only a short time. General Taylor retired in 1959, and his 1960 book, The Uncertain Trumpet, was a scathing indictment of ... the shortcomings of massive [nuclear] retaliation.” (p. 97) Taylor advocated a Cold War strategy of flexible response — conventional weapons to be used as much as possible, before resorting to nuclear options — and that greatly impressed John F. Kennedy. As president, JFK selected Taylor to be his military representative at the White House, which included the task of investigating what had gone wrong in the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs operation that had failed to unseat Fidel Castro in Cuba. In 1962, the president recalled Taylor to active duty to serve as the JCS Chairman, and two weeks after he took office, the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted. During his time as chairman, Taylor was troubled by the fact that the JCS members were generally unable to rise above their narrow service interests and fulfill their role as strategy advisors to the president. The author maintains, however, that Taylor was too close to Kennedy and “acted more as a presidential aide than as an independent advisor.” (p. 136)

After two years in the Pentagon, Taylor retired from active duty again, and President Lyndon Johnson appointed him to serve as the ambassador to South Vietnam, where the American military presence was gradually increasing. Taylor favored using airpower, rather than a large ground component, so he and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the MACV commander, “parted ways on the need for American soldiers.” (p. 158) After leaving Saigon in 1965, Taylor was appointed to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Board, including serving as its chairman from 1968 until 1970. He died in Washington, D.C., in 1987 and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

This book is not a full-fledged biography of General Taylor, in that it glosses over the first twenty-three years of his military service in about five pages. Serious analysis of his military (and diplomatic) career only begins with his assignment to West Point after World War II. Nevertheless, the book presents a meticulously researched look at Taylor’s impact on many of the most significant flashpoints of the Cold War and underscores the fact that he shares a good deal of the blame for what went wrong in Vietnam. The book is highly recommended to readers who are interested in that period of American history.

Roger D. Cunningham


At the end of Raising the White Flag, David Silkenat implies that the acceptance by President Donald Trump’s political base of his “inanecriticism of John McCain” for being captured (p. 294) can be traced back to “Lost Cause” mythology foisted on the American public for the past 150 years. Besides insisting that the South faced unwinnable odds, Lost Cause proponents eventually claimed that southerners had not surrendered at all (at least their principles), and in fact had won the war (partial support for that last assertion can be found in Silkenat’s own writing about the Civil War Centennial Commission, whose members could not meet at a Charleston, South Carolina, hotel in April 1960 because one was black). The result, both North and South, was “a popular and military culture that views surrender as fundamentally illegitimate” (p. 294), according to Silkenat.

Given America’s current feelings about surrender due in part to Lost Cause rhetoric, it is ironic that the Civil War itself saw numerous surrenders, both individuals and entire armies. In fact, one in every four Civil War soldiers surrendered at some point in the conflict, Silkenat writes, approximately the same as the number who died. As a consequence, Silkenat contends, surrender had a significant impact on the war and its aftermath.
The author starts the book with a brief history of surrender during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War. Despite having surrendered himself at Queenstown Heights during the War of 1812, Winfield Scott did not mention the word surrender, when he wrote the General Regulations for the Army. It was left to Secretary of War John B. Floyd to set what Silkenat calls the “Floyd standard” for surrender during the Civil War. Floyd first ordered Maj. Robert Anderson to fight to the last extremity at Fort Sumter but then later amended that to state that he did not mean for Anderson to needlessly sacrifice his own life or the lives of his men. From that point forward, a “hopelessness” test was applied to surrender to determine whether it was honorable.

A surrender considered dishonorable both at the time it occurred if not in hindsight was that of Brig. Gen. David E. Twiggs at the Alamo in February 1861. Silkenat makes clear that Twiggs got no clear direction from General Scott, who passed the buck to President Buchanan, who also provided no guidance. Twiggs eventually informed Washington of his intention to resign his commission once Georgia seceded. Even so, when Ben McCulloch arrived to force the issue for Texas secessionists, Twiggs refused to surrender unless his men could keep their personal arms. The Texans at first said no, but then relented, and Twiggs surrendered all Federal property in Texas before returning to his family in New Orleans, where he was “received with public honors.” (p. 46) Silkenat speculates that Anderson was celebrated as a hero and Twiggs cast as a pariah not only because Anderson put up a spirited fight — admittedly in a much stronger fort—but also remained with his men as they sailed north, while Twiggs did not fire a shot and immediately abandoned his command after the surrender.

One of the most famous surrenders in Civil War folklore occurred at Fort Donelson in February 1862. Ironies abound. Former U.S. Secretary of War Floyd was one of the Confederate commanders. While he agreed the situation was hopeless, he refused to surrender personally because he feared his ante bellum political shenanigans had marked him for severe punishment. The other Confederate commander, Gideon Pillow, also claimed the garrison’s surrender was the only option, but likewise said he could not surrender personally because of his high political profile in the Confederacy. That left Simon Buckner to negotiate the surrender with U.S. Grant. Jump forward to May 1865. In the Trans-Mississippi, Edmund Kirby Smith was commanding the last significant Confederate army, the one to which Jefferson Davis was trying to flee. While traveling to Texas to establish a new headquarters, Kirby Smith put Buckner in charge of the troops in Louisiana. Realizing most of his command had melted away, Buckner decided to give up before he had nothing left to surrender, making him the man who oversaw both the first and last surrenders of significant Confederate armies.

Silkenat also points out that Civil War surrender sites, other than Vicksburg, were slow to be commemorated. Even at Vicksburg, the actual spot where Grant accepted Pemberton’s surrender was marked in 1864 by an obelisk, which was promptly defaced. A replacement did not include the word surrender. It was not until 1926 that the Appomattox Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy erected a plaque commemorating the surrender there. It proclaimed the “heroic struggle in defense of principles believed fundamental to the existence of our government” by Robert E. Lee, who “surrendered 90,000 men the remnant of an army still unconquered in spirit to 118,000 men under Grant.” (p. 180) As Silkenat makes clear, the marker exaggerates the numbers in line with unwinnable odds, emphasizes the “unconquered ... spirit” of the Rebels, and proclaims the war was for fundamental “principles” of government, not the expansion of slavery.

Raising the White Flag provides a fresh perspective on the Civil War that should keep readers turning its pages. Let’s hope the University of North Carolina Press fixes the many little typos in any subsequent editions.

David Page
little personal familiarity with military terminology, weapons and organization can easily understand what is being discussed in the text. Considerable emphasis is placed on the concept of one’s buddies as military “family,” as well as downplaying any heroic acts on the part of the author as just simply doing his job, notwithstanding the fact that he wounded in hand-to-hand combat with a German soldier in North Africa, thereby earning the award of a Purple Heart. The Silver Star noted on the book’s cover came from his actions treating the wounded on Omaha Beach, in the invasion’s first wave, prior to being wounded himself and subsequently evacuated to England.

As with many World War II veterans, Ray Lambert grew up in Depression-era America in a family which struggled to keep body and soul together. From an early age, he was tasked with responsibilities that ultimately provided a sense of self-reliance and personal independence. It was not much of a reach to become a medic when he entered the Army, as he already had some veterinary experience in civilian life. As it turned out, his brother also was a medic in the 1st Infantry Division, serving in the same campaigns as the author.

As referenced above, Lambert got his baptism of fire in North Africa and anticipated a period of rest and recuperation before being assigned to the invasion of Sicily, and subsequently England. Not only was Lambert’s 16th Infantry Regiment assigned to the first assault wave, but it also came ashore at Omaha Beach, which turned out to be the worst of the five landing sites, as far as the German defenses were concerned. Unable to establish an aid station, Lambert was forced to use a large rock as the only cover for the wounded from the murderous German machine guns, mortars, and artillery. On a postwar visit to Normandy, the location was dedicated as “Ray’s Rock” in honor of his efforts to prevent the wounded from drowning in the surf and assisting them onto the beach. Continually exposing himself to enemy fire, he was eventually wounded himself and evacuated at the same time as his brother, who was even more seriously wounded than he was and in danger of losing an arm and a leg.

Lambert’s postwar life is told as well. His first wife died of lung cancer, and he subsequently re-married. He became a successful businessman, though he is now retired and telling his story to the younger generation and attending reunions, even as his buddies continue to pass away.

Besides a collaborator’s note, three appendices cover the equipment and responsibilities of combat medics, World War II “battle fatigue” and PTSD, and finally suggestions for further reading.

Primary sources are the gold standard in historical writing, and it is gratifying that Lambert’s story has been recorded for posterity, although according to Jim DeFelice, it took a while to convince him to do so. We are all much the better and richer for it. Our World War II veterans are truly members of the Greatest Generation.

As most readers know, the collapse of the British “Southern Strategy” in utter failure at Yorktown led directly to the birth of the United States of America. This major campaign has been examined numerous times. Stanley Carpenter brings a fresh look, analyzing the operation from the perspective of British strategy. He examines the question of how a major power crafts and executes a strategy to prosecute what is in effect an irregular war within the contexts of a regional revolution and a global war. Answers to this question have current pertinence.

The author begins by introducing his analytical framework and defining terms such as strategic coherence, strategic leadership, and the theory of victory. This approach adds precision and leads readers to a better understanding. Carpenter is the Naval War College’s command historian. Thus, his analytical line of attack is somewhat expected, and as it turns out quite successful. This is a graduate course in strategic analysis.

Carpenter hypothesizes that the Southern Strategy was theoretically sound, yet the operational execution was deeply flawed. The British attempted to implement a strategy of “clear and hold.” Regulars would eliminate the enemy in a region, and then Loyalists would secure that region from rebel resurgence while the regulars moved on. Based upon erroneous assumptions, a deep misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South, inadequate resourcing, and ineffective command and control, the prosecution of the war resulted in cascading failures at various levels.

Carpenter examines the organization and lines of authority of the British ministry, the Royal Navy, and the army, and finds numerous points of friction and blurred responsibility. He then examines
various engagements through the lens of his analytical framework. Time and again, he determines that a critical British assumption, that Loyalists would flock to the colors to regain and maintain Crown rule, was unfounded. The dependence upon active Loyalist support was crucial. With the entry of France and Spain into the global contest, Britain was forced to divert military and naval forces to its other colonies, particularly those in the West Indies. Manpower was limited and Britain could hardly replace losses in America. Worse still from the British standpoint was the evolution of American tactics to encompass widespread irregular warfare. American raids and ambushes conducted by particularly skillful leaders and a few carefully planned battles bled the British and demoralized their Loyalist adherents.

The British strategy opened with the capture of Charleston, South Carolina, arguably the worst American defeat. With a loss of fewer than 400 casualties, the British took 5,500 prisoners, four frigates, and large amounts of weapons and ammunition, but this was the highpoint of the Southern Strategy. Sir Henry Clinton issued a proclamation demanding that people sign an oath of allegiance or be considered in rebellion. Those signing would be pardoned and restored to their rights as Englishmen. Crown authorities hoped to regain the citizens lost to the Patriot cause, but the proclamation had the opposite effect. Loyalists were stunned that these traitors, who had made their lives miserable, would not be punished. Neutrals were forced to choose sides, and many came to see that their best interests would be served by a Patriot victory. Paroled militiamen by the hundreds refused to sign, thus returning them to traitor status. It was just a short step for these men to take up arms once again. The drift of the populace toward the Patriot cause was accelerated following the “Waxhaws Massacre.” Troops led by Banastre Tarleton allegedly slew over one hundred American Continentals as they attempted to surrender. Despite battlefield successes, the British had surrendered any hope of gaining the “hearts and minds” of the citizenry. Clinton returned to New York City, and Lord Charles Cornwallis inherited the fatally flawed Southern Strategy.

Almost immediately, partisan bands arose to intimidate Loyalists and degrade British logistics. Cornwallis was forced to allocate regulars to deal with groups led by Francis Marion and Thomas Sumter, a task that British strategy had assigned to Loyalists. Battles such as King’s Mountain cost Cornwallis valuable troops. Even the British victory at Camden was equivocal in strategic terms. The apparent magnitude of the victory persuaded Cornwallis to move into North Carolina, further exposing his supply lines. With Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates disgraced by the loss at Camden, Washington was able to send a most gifted strategist, Nathanael Greene, to this critical theater. Greene implemented a Fabian strategy yielding battles such as Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse. Cornwallis believed that tactical brilliance could rescue a flawed strategy, but even American defeats degraded Cornwallis’s ability to pursue his strategy, leading him into Virginia and eventual defeat at Yorktown.

Carpenter’s writing is clear and to the point. His analysis is comprehensive and convincing. This study is a notable addition to the University of Oklahoma Press’s Campaigns and Commanders Series. I highly recommend *Southern Gambit* to those with an interest in the American Revolution and to general readers of military history.

Richard V. Barbuto
Cruiser Olympia

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paired small arms, primarily muskets and rifles. Springfield Armory had been an ordnance depot for the Army since the Revolutionary War. In 1794, Congress authorized the acquisition of Springfield as an armory, and simultaneously authorized the acquisition of Harpers Ferry. Although both armories pioneered the use of standardized parts in the manufacture of rifles, yet most people consider Springfield as the pioneer in the standardization of industrial techniques.

In addition to these large facilities, the U.S. Army also constructed smaller ordnance installations called arsenals, beginning with the Schuylkill Arsenal at Philadelphia in 1799. In 1849, there were 28 arsenals, which were divided into arsenals of construction; arsenals of deposit and repair; and depots. The arsenals of construction were located at West Troy, New York (Watervliet); Pittsburgh (Allegheny), Pennsylvania; Washington, D.C., and Hampton, Virginia (Ft. Monroe). The arsenals of construction fabricated the varied types of military equipment other than weapons, such as gun carriages, caissons, armorer’s tools, ammunition, and gunner’s haversacks. The arsenals of deposit and repair fixed ordnance stores, including small arms; they also stored and maintained ordnance supplies for future issue. The ordnance depots could only perform minor maintenance; they were primarily storage facilities.

The ordnance facility at Charleston, South Carolina, began life as an ordnance depot. Generally, arsenals were composed of nineteenth-century industrial buildings characterized by brick or stone two-story masonry buildings, with large window openings to allow light into the works. Like factories of the time period, little exterior differentiation was needed for buildings housing different manufacturing processes, except for some specialized processes such as the manufacture and storage of gunpowder. Nineteenth-century industrial buildings were surprisingly generic, no matter what was produced inside them.

In the early days of its existence, the arsenal at Charleston was small in scale and technically a depot. The only building was a storehouse constructed by the government at the site during the War of 1812 to store supplies for the military. The facility remained small in size after the war and an Army report from 1828 shows that the Charleston Arsenal only received $200 during the first three quarters of the year. The small scale of the operation at Charleston was even more evident in 1832, when the Army showed that only one storekeeper manned the depot, and that Charleston was the only depot or arsenal with only one person on-site. The report went on to say that Charleston was one of the “minor depots, and [is] used...
After receiving the appropriation, Army architects began work on the plans. The 1838 plans showed that the Charleston Arsenal was a U-shaped complex. Figure 1 provides an 1838 plat of the arsenal, showing the warehouse building, three small buildings that are probably housing, and a guard house. (From Historic Charleston Foundation Archives)

Arsenals of construction are expensive, it is not thought expedient unnecessarily to increase them, and doubts are entertained whether, under existing circumstances, the city of Charleston is a proper location for such an establishment. There is a depot for arms in Charleston, belonging to the United States, which, however, is on too limited a scale. I would therefore respectfully recommend that an appropriation be asked for, either to add to this depot, or to provide such other site in the vicinity of the city as may be found, on examination, most expedient. An arsenal on a moderate scale ought to be provided there, and such workshops could be attached to it as might be necessary to repair and keep in order the arms and to construct gun-carriages for some of the southern stations.

Based on the Army’s opinion, Congressman Richard M. Johnson, chair of the House Committee on Military Affairs, proposed an appropriation of $20,000 to repair and extend the United States Arsenal at Charleston, South Carolina, on 21 March 1836. On 17 May 1836, the House of Representatives passed the bill, and the Senate concurred in July of the same year. One might view Pinckney’s attempt to get money for the arsenal as a way to gain votes in the tradition of “pork-barrel” politics. His political position might also explain why the Army did not want to invest money in South Carolina, the political base for President Andrew Jackson’s chief rival.

Figure 1. An 1838 plat of the arsenal, showing the warehouse building, three small buildings that are probably housing, and a guard house. (From Historic Charleston Foundation Archives)

After receiving the appropriation, Army architects began work on the plans. The 1838 plans showed that the Charleston Arsenal was a U-shaped complex. Figure 1 provides an 1838 plat of the arsenal, showing the warehouse building, three small buildings that are probably housing, and a guard house. The designed expansion called for: “Enlarging the U.S. Arsenal, Charleston ... and rendering it a Citadel of great convenience .... The Plan represents a simple extension of the old Arsenal, by adding a Building to the rear, corresponding with that so as to embrace a structure 280 x 200 feet.”

The plans make provisions for the new buildings to be placed “100 feet on [the] Potter’s Field” and opposite the “residence of [the] Superintendent of [the] Burial Ground.”

To facilitate the expansion of the arsenal, on 6 February 1839, the House of Representatives Committee on Military Affairs authorized an appropriation of $1,585 for the purchase of land adjoining the arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina, offered for sale by the city council. Figure 2 provides a drawing of the 1838 plan for the arsenal.

Records of the Office of the Chief of Engineers entitled “Proposed Arsenal for Charleston, SC” present an 1842 plan for enlarging the arsenal. The new plan called for the buildings:
The beginning of the Civil War in Charleston bred several myths, including one about the capture of the Charleston Arsenal. Newspaper accounts produced years after the event credit the capture of the arsenal to 20 members of the Washington Light Infantry who marched into the arsenal on 7 November 1860. However, the Official Records of the War of Rebellion tells a different story. Based on the accounts of the time, Col. John Cunningham and the Seventeenth Regiment of Infantry, South Carolina Militia, captured the U.S. Arsenal on 30 December 1860, after surrounding it and making a formal protest and asked that his men remain quartered at the arsenal and that he could salute the flag.

After its capture, the Confederate government used the facility for the manufacture and storage of munitions throughout the Civil War. The Southern forces constructed Colcock Hall, a Greek Revival-style building, in 1862 to develop heavy artillery. They also continued to use the remaining buildings to support their war effort. Figure 4 provides two views of the arsenal from the Civil War period.

After the fall of Charleston in 1865, the federal government regained control of the arsenal. Francis H. Parker served as...
commander of the site from 1865 to 1868. He commented in his autobiography that one of his responsibilities was to repair the facility. He described the arsenal in a letter as a collection of brick buildings, “simple rectangular, two-story structures with low-pitched hip roofs, [and] tall windows ... recessed in arches in the outside walls.”25 After the war, the government had little use for the facilities and all but abandoned them. In 1872, Congress authorized $1,300 for a new slate roof on the Foundry Building, $1,200 for re-laying the floors in the storehouses, and $200 for general repairs of the public buildings and grounds.26

In 1879, Rev. A. Toomer Porter began to take steps to acquire the old arsenal for use as a school. In a letter seeking the endorsement of the government for the property, Porter wrote, “I am encouraged to hope that the Government may help me by contracting with me for a lease of the vacant property, which is admirably adapted to the purposes of a school such as mine ... I desire to impress upon you that I am not making application for speculative purposes.”27

Maj. Gen. Henry J. Hunt, commanding the post of Charleston at the time, seemed eager to dispose of what he viewed as marginal property. In a response to Porter’s request, Hunt stated:

I have examined Rev. Dr. A. Toomer Porter’s paper with respect to the acquisition of the arsenal grounds, Charleston, for the school of which he has charge, and believe that all the statements found in it are correct. In all excavations made in these grounds human remains are found, a boggy creek originally ran through the Square, diagonally, and it is difficult to get good foundations for new buildings. The locality is entirely outside the business part of the town, and the existing quarters, barracks, storehouses, and hospital are unfitted for any private use.28

Porter received a lease for the old arsenal for 99 years at a cost of one dollar per year. Ten years later, by act of Congress, the property was deeded fee-simple to the school under the condition that the property always be used for educational purposes.29 Porter quickly and tirelessly began converting and using the arsenal for the Holy Communion Institute. “I had to use the old schoolhouse for some months until I could convert the foundry, which the Confederate Government had built during the war, into a schoolhouse, changing its use from molding bullets into molding brains and hearts and characters.”30

Rev. Porter hired local African-American contractor Holten Bell to remodel the artillery shed into St. Timothy’s Chapel as well as to work on several other buildings. In addition to Holten Bell’s work, his teenage son, Hiram L. Bell, built the entire brick fence around Porter Academy. Hiram Bell was the grandson of Joseph DeReef, who lived at 42 Amherst Street and owned a woodyard and wharf at the east end of Ann Street. Hiram Bell later organized the Bricklayers Union, Local 1 of South Carolina and served as a foreman at the U.S. Navy Yard in North Charleston.31

The 1902 Sanborn Fire Insurance Map of Charleston shows that there were six large brick buildings and one brick church at Porter Academy.

The Works Progress Administration Guide to South Carolina described the Porter Military Acad-
The Federal Arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina

By 1963, the Medical College of South Carolina (now the Medical University of South Carolina) acquired the Porter Military Academy and it has been part of its campus since then. The Porter Military Academy was listed on the National Register of Historic Places in 1996.

ENDNOTES

1. This project grew out of research conducted for a study of the wall that surrounds the former Charleston Arsenal conducted by the author while he was employed in Charleston, South Carolina.


5. George B. Eckhard, A Digest of the Ordinances of the City Council of Charleston, from the Year 1783 to October 1844: To Which Are Annexed the Acts of the Legislature Which Relate Exclusively to the City of Charleston. (Charleston: Walker and Burke, 1844), p. 126.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 41.

10. Ibid., p. 62.


24. W. Curtis Worthington, St. Lukes Chapel: Birth and Rebirth (Charleston: Medical University of South Carolina, 1996).


29. Ibid., p. 358.

30. Ibid., p. 366.

31. Historic Charleston Foundation Archives record related to the Porter School, n.d.

Sacramento Capital Park’s Civil War Memorial Grove Then and Now

By Brendan Harris

The winter months in northern California bring the majority of the region’s rain for the year. The storm systems that come through the region bring wind and rain that can be violent. The system that came through northern California the week of 15 January 2017 was no different than storms of winters’ past. The saturation of the ground, however, combined with the wind to fell hundreds of trees and cause property damage all through the state capital of Sacramento. Some of the damage that occurred in the immediate area was concentrated in the park surrounding the capitol building. One area in particular contained three large trees located in Capitol Park’s Civil War Memorial Grove. Two trees that originally hailed from the battlefields of Five Forks, Virginia, and Missionary Ridge near Chattanooga, Tennessee; while the third tree was planted in memory of President William McKinley, who was assassinated in office and the last Civil War veteran to serve as President of the United States.1 The grove was created during a time of remembrance about the Civil War in the United States and has seen several different iterations since its creation.

The idea of a Civil War memorial grove did not originate from a government entity or from the military looking to honor its past, but from Eliza Waggoner, the leader of the Ladies of the Grand Army of the Republic (LGAR) in Sacramento during the late 1890s.2 Mrs. Waggoner’s goal was quite simple; she wanted to create a living memorial of trees from various Civil War battlefields that were significant to the Union during the war. The idea of memorial groves was not new to cities around the United States in the late Nineteenth Century. One of the recent groves that had been planted in the region was in San Francisco. To commemorate the American Revolution, thirteen trees were planted in Golden Gate Park to signify the original colonies. The reason for the living monument was to signify, “the historic arch along to the Atlantic and linking the colonial history to the west.”

In the eyes of Mrs. Waggoner, if San Francisco had a memorial to America’s past, then why shouldn’t the state capital. The idea of creating monuments to the past was not just a Californian idea — memorializing and remembrance in the United States gained popularity in the last decade of the Nineteenth Century. The idea of a “sacred groves” is an ancient pagan device that invoked the image of a classical memorial. This was in part to the increase of national pride in the expansion of the United States overseas. This increase led in turn to reflection on the historic past of the United States to show the country’s current strength. Up to the 1890s, two main events impacting the nation’s history were the American Revolution and the Civil War. The Sons and Daughters of the American Revolution were created by people who had family members who fought during the war or aided the cause. The Civil War saw the creation of the Grand...
Sacramento Capital Park’s Civil War Memorial Grove Then and Now

The location of the grove would be on the northeast corner of Capital Park (now between M and L Streets). The Memorial Grove would be the first monument to be placed in Capital Park. With the grounds secured, the Memorial Committee set out to secure funding and trees for the grove.

The largest expense for the grove was securing the trees from the various battlefields and important sites from the Civil War. This required a large amount of fundraising and advertisements in the local newspapers, which were generally supportive of the initiative to build the memorial. The idea of creating a monument to show the importance of the Civil War struck a chord with most people living in the United States, especially in Union states. By 1896, the war had occurred barely a generation previously, with many veterans still living to tell tales about their experiences. To this end, other local GAR and LGAR groups gave money to support the cause. By the start of 1897, the Committee was ready to receive trees and begin placing them.

By March 1897, several trees had been received from various Civil War battlefields. Trees from major engagements in the Eastern theatre and Western theatre arrived with notes of support. A tree from Appomattox Courthouse arrived with a note stating that the tree came from a spot “two hundred yards from where General Robert E. Lee surrendered.” Plans were made by the Committee to have an opening ceremony on 1 May 1897. Veterans of the Civil War, politicians, and the general public were invited to see the monument.

With the grove planted, it was time to let the memorial grow and flourish under the California sun. The history of the grove did not end on that spring afternoon in 1897. The shape of the grove and how it occupied space in Capital Park would change over the next century.

As the grove began the twentieth century, it started to shape the landscape of Capital Park. By 1902, the original grove of trees had lost some of its original members, and some others were added, consisted of trees from the following battlefields:
Some of the trees were lost to vandals, others to old age. Some of the trees were not meant to reside in the climate and soil of northern California and could not survive out of their natural habitat. Capital Park began to sprout other monuments, as California and the nation moved on through history. Located throughout the park are monuments to Californians who have fought in the conflicts that involved the United States after the Civil War. All of these monuments were just as important to Californians, but the Civil War Memorial Grove still remains the first and oldest in the park. In order to preserve the memorial grove, the historical society and concerned groups continue to refresh and maintain the existing trees and monuments within it. The number of trees has shrunk to a handful in recent times, due to the age of the trees themselves. The storms of January 2017 nearly wiped out the original trees from 1897-1902.

These were not the only additions to the grove during the early twentieth century. In 1926, a stone monument was added to the grove. The stone marker was placed in the center of the trees that remained standing in Capital Park. Around that same time, a statue of Gov. Starr King was added to the Memorial Grove. Governor King was one of the state’s fiercest abolitionists during the antebellum period and the Civil War. As the decades progressed, some trees grew larger and survived, and others died. As the grove approached its centennial, efforts were discussed to restore the grove that had been ignored and fallen into disrepair.

There were many reasons for the poor state of the monument. Capital Park is a public park with thousands of visitors every week.
different. Each tree is a part of the ground that saw battle. Each of the original trees had been pulled from blood-soaked fields and had been cultivated around tragedy, triumph, and death. As time went on in the grove, like in battle, there were casualties, with some tress lost for good; be it from nature or man-made influences. The remaining trees and the ones planted to replace the fallen continue to grow and live on as a reminder of the war that was fought from 1861-1865. The crowds moving through Capital Park are heavy during most workdays, filled with state workers and children on field trips vising the State Capitol.

**Battlefields with Trees Remaining in the Memorial Grove**
(As of February 2019)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Andersonville, GA</th>
<th>Gettysburg, PA</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Appomattox, VA</td>
<td>Savannah, GA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arlington, VA</td>
<td>Shiloh, TN</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chattanooga, TN</td>
<td>Wilson’s Creek, MO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fredericksburg, VA</td>
<td>Yellow Tavern, VA</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ENDNOTES


6. Ibid., pp. 848-853.

7. Josephine Todman, “Letter to Eliza Waggoner, November 14, 1896,” Memorial Grove Committee Collection, Box 880, California State Library.


12. Information Compiled by the author.
Mission Command & Joint Strategic Planning During Operation Husky

By Dr. Paul F. Messina

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Paul F. Messina is currently an Associate Professor of Mathematics at the University of the Incarnate Word in San Antonio, Texas. In addition, Dr. Messina currently serves as a colonel in the United States Army Reserve. He has commanded at every echelon from company through brigade. His extensive experience in the operations arena and his formal education at the U.S. Army War College serve as catalysts for his cross disciplinary writing. Dr. Messina’s research interests include mathematics education, military history, and military strategy.

Soon after the entrance of the United States into the Second World War, American air, ground, and naval forces were engaged in a joint coalition campaign involving both U.S. and British forces, code named Operation Husky, tasked to liberate Sicily from its Axis occupation forces. In terms of operational level execution, Operation Husky suffered from appalling command and control, as well as the inadequate integration of the joint functions of communication synchronization, and fire control. Fortunately for the Allies, as a direct result of the Casablanca Conference, a compromise was reached, which included the decision to implement Operation Husky rather than proceed with a cross-channel invasion into France. This well-timed and favorable decision provided Allied forces the opportunity to evaluate countless lessons learned that would serve them well and eventually lead to the success of Operation Overlord in June 1944. Although the upcoming campaign in Sicily had limited objectives, Operation Husky intended to secure Allied lines of communication across the Mediterranean, divert German military strength from the Eastern front, and pressure Italy to surrender. An overarching military objective for this campaign was the capture and eventual control of Sicily in order to conduct future operations.

With the war in North Africa approaching a favorable conclusion for the Allies, appropriate attention, both strategic and operational, was given to the island of Sicily. The island represented not only a natural bridge between Africa and Europe, but also offered the opportunity to reopen vital sea lanes and give the Allies a base for launching future operations in the region. Despite the clear strategic location of Sicily, the Allies were deeply divided regarding the decision to invade the island, though ultimately the invasion plan was approved and was then influenced by three main factors, the island’s topography, the location of Axis air bases, and the amount of anticipated resistance from the island’s defenders. Regrettably, even with a clearly defined chain of command, throughout the Sicily campaign the commander’s intention was not clearly defined, there was a lack of mutual trust, and a widespread lack of understanding among the involved Allied forces, resulting in poor command and control throughout the campaign.

“Mission command is the conduct of military operations through decentralized execution based upon mission-type orders. Successful mission command demands that subordinate leaders at all echelons exercise disciplined initiative and act aggressively and independently to accomplish the mission.” Thus, mission command allows the commander a greater deal of flexibility compared to the traditional command and control process, but the commander must be able to carefully balance the art of command and the science of control, as he or she deftly integrates all the joint fighting functions. The commander’s intent speaks to the end state of a military operation or campaign while simultaneously ensuring that subordinates are clearly synchronized with the assigned mission.

Understanding the mission affords decision-makers at different levels the direction to make effective operational decisions, manage risk, and estimate the potential second and third order effects of their decisions. Finally, trust allows subordinate commanders to make time-sensitive decisions, which allows for the execution of the commander’s intent.
Despite several weeks of continued refinements to the plan, there was still no definitive guidance provided by either Eisenhower or his Executive Officer and Fifteenth Army Group Commander, Gen. Sir Harold Alexander. Thus, there was no clear understanding of the operation by the Allied forces tasked to carry out the mission. This would continue to be an issue throughout the campaign and hinder the Allied forces at nearly every step of the way, including but not limited to a lack of operational coordination between air, ground, and naval assets.

To make matters worse, the British had a clear and explicit lack of mutual trust, even to the point of disdain, for their American counterparts. It is generally thought that this lack of trust and respect for American forces was the direct result of the beating American forces endured at the Kasserine Pass by the German Africa Korps. Despite an overall American success throughout the Sicily campaign the lack of trust by the British would play a key part in American forces taking supporting and secondary roles throughout the duration of Operation Husky.

The British themselves suffered an equally humiliating defeat at Dunkirk in 1940 in addition to major setbacks during the campaign in North Africa. A prime example of the British feeling of superiority occurred when General Montgomery persuaded General Alexander...
62,000 Italian soldiers escaping to the Italian mainland to fight another day.

Although inadequately integrated by today’s criteria, the fire support integration was not a comprehensive failure. One notable success was the timely mortar fire from the 83d Chemical Battalion combined with supporting naval gunfire which effectively repulsed an attack at Gela during the invasion’s initial phase. General Alexander’s refusal to forward plan past the initial landings, would continue the erosion of mutual trust, as well as be the proximate cause for the widespread lack of understanding, disagreement, and contention amongst the two primary army commanders throughout the campaign.

Contributing to the challenges experienced by Allied forces during Operation Husky was the lack of proper communication across forces and fire missions. According to Joint Publication 1, integration is “the arrangement of military forces and their actions to create a force that operates by engaging as a whole.” Fire missions are one of the functions necessary to successful operations in support of offensive and defensive tasks as well as empower commanders to seize and retain the initiative. When employed in a campaign such as Operation Husky, fire support was necessary to integrate and coordinate attacks, preclude friendly fire incidents, diminish duplication of effort, and shape the operational environment. It was this absence of coordination that caused a number of notable issues in the course of the Sicily campaign. One example of which was the Allies failure to adequately plan their operational fires to prevent the withdrawal of Axis forces across the Straights of Messina. In fact, an Axis withdrawal was not even considered in any of the planning phases of the campaign, resulting in over 52,000 German and over 10,000 Italian soldiers escaping to the Italian mainland to fight another day.
submission upon Benito Mussolini’s removal from power on 25 July 1943. General Eisenhower clearly recognized the significance of negotiating with Italy before German forces could reinforce the country, but Prime Minister Winston Churchill and President Franklin Roosevelt refused to allow hostility termination negotiations with the new Italian government.25

In the end, Operation Husky achieved several important results including, but not limited to (1) the downfall of Benito Mussolini and the eventual surrender of Italian forces, which compelled the Germans to commit additional manpower to the Mediterranean theater of operations, (2) a relief in pressure from German forces on the Russian front, and (3) the weakening of German forces across all combatant commanders, George E. Little, former Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, stated that every staff product must clearly reflect a leader’s intent and all portions of a command must be thoroughly synchronized.22 When clear communications do not exist within the joint force, mission success can be negatively impacted due to the confusion it causes, subsequently leading to a potential mis-alignment of operations, actions, words, and images.23 This clearly played a part in the inefficient use of forces during Operation Husky.

On 11 July 1943, German aircraft were operating within the American sector near Gela. Notwithstanding this activity, U.S. reinforcement forces were programmed for airdrop that evening. Despite all efforts by senior Allied officers to advise friendly ground units of the forthcoming airdrop, Allied antiaircraft guns shot down 23 and damaged an additional 37 of the 144 transport planes, causing a 10 percent casualty rate among the paratroopers. In a subsequent investigation of the incident, evidence surfaced that all units were not notified of the operation.24 Another Allied gaffe with respect to communication synchronization was the failure to procure Italy’s
theaters of operation in preparation for the D-Day landings nine months later. In spite of the numerous achievements of the Sicily campaign, Allied immaturity in terms of command and control, as well as coalition politics gave rise to a campaign rife with joint operations challenges, specifically the inadequate integration of the joint functions of fires and communication synchronization. Although Operation Husky was a significant Allied victory it was not a decisive victory and this would eventually affect the resulting follow-on campaign in Italy. The greatest future value of Operation Husky would come on 6 June 1944, when the Allied forces, having learned countless lessons from the Sicily campaign, successfully executed Operation Overlord, marking the beginning of the end for the Third Reich.

ENDNOTES

3. Ibid., 4.
5. Ibid., p. 4.
6. Ibid., p. 5.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid., p. 6.
13. Ibid., p. 8.
15. Ibid., p. 6.
21. Ibid., p. 27.
25. Swenson, Operation Husky, p. 43.
27. Swenson, Operation Husky, p. 57.
Minutes from Board Meeting
April 3, 2019
Tucson, Arizona

Present: Directors Mark Magnussen, Bridget Hart, Marylou Gjernes, Nick Reynolds, Ann Todd
Present by phone: Directors Vance Nelson, Danny Johnson, Ron Plante, Gordon Bliss, JAMP Editor Vince Rospond,
Unable to attend: Emil Dankser, Dale Floyd, Mark Morgan, Terry McGovern
Visitors: Neil Dukas, Nick Faller

Minutes from the Lexington, Kentucky Board Meeting were unanimously accepted as written. Motion made by Mark Magnussen. Seconded by Marylou Gjernes.

Report from Nominating Committee: 60 ballots were cast. 56 voted for the complete slate, one ballot was blank, one write-in for a cartoon character. Reelected to the Board were Gordon Bliss, Dale Floyd and Mark Magnussen. Newly elected to the Board was Ann Todd.

A motion was made and seconded with applause to thank Ron Plante for his many years of service on the Board and as Vice President of CAMP.

The Meeting was adjourned to immediately reconvene with the new Board of Directors.

Major Business Areas: Vance Nelson Treasurer reported that we have $15,259.36 in the treasury as of March 31, 2019. The USAA investment was reinvested for $5,663.15. We received over $300 as contributions to CAMP. As income, Membership contributed $21,153.50, publication sales totaled $143.26 and a royalty check for $69.73 added up to a total income of $21,366.49. Expenses totaled $10,804.75, leaving a balance of $10, 561.74 for the fiscal year.

With the recent death of John Lynch, we need to identify a new corporate agent who lives in Arizona, where we are incorporated. President Reynolds and Treasurer Nelson have identified John Langellier to be that person. Nelson needs to file appropriate documents with the state and needs permission to use the names and addresses of the Board Members. This was agreed to. Reynolds and Nelson arranged for electronic filing of the Non-Profit IRS Form 990 just before this meeting. We are current with our report to the state. The next one is due in June.

Membership Secretary Report. Bridget Hart reported that we have 299 members, 66 of whom are life Members. She is reviewing the list of life memberships to determine who is still active. We gained about a dozen new members this year. Members can now join on-line, but they must pay by check, or credit card as a separate step. This presents a delay in reporting, as Bridget can’t immediately tell if dues have been sent to the Treasurer. In addition, many people are renewing on-line.

Heliogram – The editor has started the next issue that will include the Tucson Conference. He is holding to three publications a year.

JAMP – Three issues were published in 2018. The first issue for 2019 will be out in about two weeks. Everything has been converted to PDF format. Hardcopy printing is holding at 200 copies. Eight or nine of the articles in JAMP were from first-time authors. The editor would like to encourage members to write articles for the publication. He is still using Sheridan Press for the hard copies but is sending the e-mail and PDFs himself.

Question for JAMP Editor Rospond: How are we archiving the copies of the Journal? All PDF copies are archived. Vincent has started to scan older journals. Tina, the typesetter for the Journal, also keeps a copy of everything she does. The Heliogram is on Mark’s hard drive.

Question for CAMP Webmaster Gordon Bliss: Can we put copies on the website? Do we want part of the website to be for members only. This discussion was tabled to take up after this meeting.

Gordon Bliss has retrieved a complete JAMP collection from Tom Vaughn. He asked if we also want the Heliogram.

Hal Youmans has created and writes The Persistent Preservationist, a new CAMP publication. A motion was made, seconded, and voted with applause to thank Hal for his great work.

Webmaster Report. Gordon Bliss reports that he has 3 to 4 months of JAMP on the Website. He has plans to increase this to 6 months. Would like to link to the PDFs not on the active page but this will take some time. He has not yet done a Google analysis. He needs to sign up for the program and check with Greg Kurtz who has been working with Mark Magnussen on marketing ideas for CAMP. Question for Gordon. Can we put copies on the website? Do we want part of the website to be for members only. This discussion was tabled to take up after this meeting.

This discussion was followed by a discussion of CAMP getting into Facebook. The sense of the Board was mixed. Most did not want to be part of Facebook because of the many security issues, but all acknowledged that it could be helpful in reaching young people.

A motion was made and seconded to thank Bret Hart and Julie Hirst for the work they have done refreshing the website and arranging for online payment processes.

Marketing: Mark Magnussen had three proposals. 1. Advertising on Facebook as a three-month test at no cost to CAMP. We would provide the mailing list. He will provide a plan. 2. He also proposed that CAMP reproduce a Military Map of the US, 1944 showing all the airfields and military posts at that time. This could be sold. 3. CAMP could put together a directory of small military museums around the country that are frequently overlooked. It would be a service to CAMP and a publicity boost to the small museums.
Election of Officers for 2019 – CAMP’s officers for the next year as elected are President – Nick Reynolds; Vice President – Marylou Gjernes; Secretary – Ann Todd; Treasurer – Vance Nelson. Continuing in their current roles are Bridget Hart, Membership; Vincent Rospond, JAMP Editor; Roger Cunningham, JAMP Book Review Editor, and Mark Magnussen, Heliogram Editor.

A motion was made that CAMP take a position on recent changes proposed for Historical Preservation. The proposed change would give the federal government the ability to block the listing of historic resources on federal lands. Marylou will work in coordination with Gordon Bliss who is the Historic Preservation Office for the Coastal Defense Study Group (CDSG).

Location for 2020 meeting and after: After much discussion, it was proposed that the 2020 meeting be held in either Lincoln, Nebraska, or Baltimore, Maryland. The decision to be presented to the membership. The 2021 meeting would be a joint meeting with CDSG in the Charleston, Savannah, North Florida Area. If the Joint meeting does not work out, the CAMP meeting would be in the Jacksonville/St. Augustine area. Hawaii was proposed for 2022 and Galveston, Texas, for 2023.

The meeting was adjourned at 4:40.

Respectfully Submitted,

Marylou Gjernes
Secretary Pro Tem

Post Library

Any CAMP member who would like to review a book for this journal is encouraged to consult the list of books that can be found in the publications section of our website: campjamp.org. That book list is updated every week or two.


Two of the U.S. Army’s most noted soldier-ethnologists of the late nineteenth century were John Gregory Bourke and William Philo Clark. Both became students of and friends with Native Americans. In life they were associates; both had their books on aspects of their subjects’ culture published, some posthumously. Bourke is the better known because his diaries have survived, ably edited in part by the late Charles M. Robinson III. Author Mark J. Nelson, professional preservationist of the American West, fills in some of the gaps in Clark’s legacy with this book.

Clark was a New York native and a graduate of West Point, Class of 1868. Called Philo by his brother officers and “White Hat” by his Indian associates, as a lieutenant and captain in the 2d U.S. Cavalry, Clark was in the thick of events occurring on the northern plains over a 15-year period. He suffered through Maj. Gen. George Crook’s “Starvation March,” and participated in the Sioux War of 1876-1877. Clark was frequently employed in Army dealings with native tribes. He recruited and led Indian scouts on numerous expeditions; at one time Chief Crazy Horse was a sergeant under his command. Clark was present when Crazy Horse was killed while in Army custody in 1877. He is reported to have cried when given the news, but some blamed him for Crazy Horse’s death. Lt. Jesse M. Lee, the Indian agent, wrote that the chief’s death was “the result of mismanagement by Philo Clark.” (p. 95) Author Nelson does not pass judgment. Clark was successful in “talking in” then-chief Little Wolf and his Northern Cheyenne band after they jumped the reservation in 1879, thus averting another crisis. He also had dealings with chiefs Red Cloud and Spotted Tail and had one meeting with Sitting Bull.

Clark had frequent interface with high-ranking U.S. military and civil officials, as well. In connection with his Indian duties, Clark met with Presidents U.S. Grant and James A. Garfield. When President Chester A. Arthur visited Yellowstone National Park in 1883, Clark was a member of the party. He served on the staffs of Crook and Lt.
Gen. Philip H. Sheridan in Chicago and Washington, D.C., and under Sheridan’s auspices was working on his magnum opus, The Indian Sign Language, when he died. Clark was an acknowledged expert in sign language. His book was published posthumously, receiving both praise and criticism. Maj. Gen. John Gibbon thought it a useful contribution to inter-racial relations but an anonymous reviewer panned it. Previously, J.G. Bourke once commented in his diary that Clark was “proficient” in sign language.

As a person Clark was described as “a brave, generous, and noble man and officer.” (p. 61) Former newspaper reporter John F. Finerty, wrote, “I have always found him a perfect gentleman, generous to a fault.” (p. 205) Clark had great concern for the survival of the Indian tribes, although like many, he thought their future lay in adapting to the white man’s way of life. He believed in the philosophy expressed by Bourke that the government’s Indian policy should be one of “justice backed with power.” (p. 47) After Clark’s death, many of his former commanders spoke well of him. In particular, Sheridan wrote, “It is seldom that the same man combines military skill and scholarly attainments, but Clark had both.” (p. 204)

As author Nelson points out, Clark’s two major contributions to American history were his book on Indian sign language and his collection of Plains Indian artifacts, which remained in his family’s possession for generations but now resides in a museum in New Jersey. Nelson has done a good job in reconstructing Clark’s life. Sad to say, Clark’s diary has not survived, or has not yet been found, so Nelson has had to concentrate on military records, as the title suggests. The reader is sometimes confounded by the meaningless minutia thus dredged up, but Nelson has done his best to seek out other sources, such as personal reminiscences and newspaper articles, to flesh out his subject’s life. In a couple of instances, Nelson had to speculate on Clark’s activities, due to a lack of concrete data. Nelson (or his copy editor) may want to look up the difference between “disbursing” and “dispersing.” Beyond that, this book is not only the story of one man’s life but is a valuable contribution to the study of Indian policy in the 1870s and 1880s. We are in Mark Nelson’s debt for having written it.

Russell K. Brown

Texas and World War I, by Gregory W. Ball. Austin: Texas State Historical Association, 2019. 156 pp., $20 softcover.

This book offers a concise summary of the many ways in which the Great War affected Texas and Texans. The author, a historian with the U.S. Air Force, also wrote They Called Them Soldier Boys: A Texas Infantry Regiment in World War I, which was reviewed in JAMP 125.

A year before the United States entered the war that was raging in Europe and the Middle East, Texans had experienced increased military activity on their southern border, as a result of the Mexican Revolution. After a series of bandit raids on border settlements in New Mexico and Texas in the spring of 1916, President Woodrow Wilson activated almost the entire National Guard, and tens of thousands of citizen-soldiers were soon deployed to the Southwest.

No sooner had the situation on the Mexican border cooled down than the United States declared war on Germany in April 1917. The federal government soon passed the Selective Service Act to bring millions of men into the armed forces. Draft avoidance remained an issue in Texas throughout the war, but only four other states contributed more men to the U.S. Army than Texas, which was credited with providing the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) with two divisions, the 36th and the 90th (with significant numbers of Oklahomans also serving in both formations). About three-quarters of the 36th Division’s men came from the National Guard, while the 90th Division was primarily manned by draftees. Neither division saw combat until the final months of the war, but they bravely fought in the Saint-Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne campaigns. Suspecting that the Germans were listening in on their field telephone conversations, the 36th Division devised a unique solution to this problem. Indians who spoke the Choctaw language were placed in the command posts of each of the division’s four infantry regiments, and these Choctaw code talkers transmitted tactical messages that the Germans were not able to decipher. In addition to serving as “doughboys” in the Army’s divisions, almost 19,000 Texans also volunteered for the Navy and Marine Corps.

Thirty-two new camps were constructed across the United States to train the millions of new men who were entering the Army. Four of these camps were located in Texas — Camp Bowie (Ft. Worth), Camp Logan (Houston), Camp MacArthur (Waco), and Camp Travis (San Antonio). This massive military construction program provided a great boost to the local economies of the cities involved, but there were problems as well. Black soldiers of the 24th U.S. Infantry were assigned to guard the site of Houston’s Camp Logan, but they objected violently to the discriminatory “Jim Crow” policies that they encountered in the “Bayou City.” In August 1917, a group of these soldiers drew their weapons and went on a shooting rampage, killing a number of innocent
Desertion has always been a serious crime in the military. In joining the army, however, soldiers on both sides considered they had entered into a contract with their government. In the preface, the author cites in notes a passage from personal experience, “For soldiers, the contract was a serious matter. In joining the army, they entered into a kind of quasi-judicial arrangement with the government. They promised to serve for a certain period of time, and the government promised to provide them with food, shelter, and pay. The breach of this contract by desertion was considered a serious offense. In both armies, desertion led to courts-martial and, in some cases, to execution. Unfortunately, we have little written documentation from those shot for deserting, but we do have the thoughts of those who witnessed these executions. They make poignant reading, and one wonders what the overall effect of these executions had on the soldiers. Did these executions discourage men leaving the Army to go home to help their families, or did they discourage men from returning to the Army after taking “French leave” to help their family?

The maintenance of morale has always been an important part of generalship. The author of this book, however, has seen fit to observe maintaining morale from the bottom up. We are frequently reminded that it is the men at the bottom of the hierarchy who live in the foxholes and trenches, and it is they who must keep the Army fighting. The author sets out to show that both armies, in their own way, were concerned with the men who were most likely to lose their lives in battle. The author’s goal is to show that both armies maintained morale from the bottom up. During the war, the Union and Confederate armies were concerned with the welfare of their soldiers. The Union Army was concerned with the welfare of its soldiers, both on and off the battlefield. The Confederate Army was concerned with the welfare of its soldiers, both on and off the battlefield. In both armies, the welfare of the soldier was important to the success of the army.

The last chapter is not concerned with the war years but the years after the war. The author looks at how each side sought to glorify its victories and explain away its defeats. This chapter is a discussion of the post-war years and the attempts to glorify the war. The author’s goal is to show that both armies attempted to glorify the war and explain away their defeats. The author quotes from various sources to show that both armies attempted to glorify the war and explain away their defeats. The author’s goal is to show that both armies attempted to glorify the war and explain away their defeats.
the Confederacy was destroyed by the might of the Federal government. Thus, the Confederate soldier could be proud of his service as a defender of Southern honor. Thereafter, individual and regimental heroism against overwhelming odds would become the cornerstone of the Confederate history of the war. From Appomattox onward, it became an article of faith within the Confederate states that if all Southerners had retained faith in God and the justice of their cause, the South would have won against the overwhelming horde of Yankees.

If you are interested in the life of the common Civil War soldier, you will want to read this book. One drawback is that its focus is limited to the Eastern Theater of War. Despite this geographic limitation, the book brings together a number of interesting threads which make the reader contemplate the differences and the similarities between Union and Confederate soldiers.

Charles H. Bogart


This is yet another addition to the “Emerging Civil War” series of books on important battles, campaigns, and other Civil War-related subjects. The author, William Lee White, is a National Park Service ranger at Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park, who professes a lifelong interest in the topic at hand due to boyhood trips taken with some of his relatives to various battlefields and historic sites.

As with the other books in this series, this is a relatively short overview of Gen. John B. Hood’s Tennessee Campaign after the fall of Atlanta and the tragic Battle of Franklin, and it’s short on tactical details. That is not to say that it doesn’t have worth, as there is more to this than just a description of how the Army of Tennessee came to find itself in front of Franklin and subsequently destroyed in a bloody battle.

In order to tell that story, White begins at the fall of Atlanta, describing how Hood was determined to draw Sherman away from the city, or barring that, to cut his lines of supply and communication by turning back to northwest Georgia and the fields of the earlier encounters of the Atlanta campaign. To his credit, he recounts the not-always successful engagements at Allatoona Pass, Resaca, and Dalton before moving into north Alabama, where Sherman stopped chasing him and returned to his original objective: “The March to the Sea.”

Chasing Maj. Gen. John Schofield’s army into Tennessee, meanwhile, brought Hood an opportunity to catch and destroy that force and led to one of the more controversial episodes of the war: Schofield’s escape from a trap set by Hood at Spring Hill where the Columbia Pike should have been interdicted yet wasn’t (despite assurances to Hood that it had been). Schofield’s men walked right by the encamped Confederates, leaving Hood “wrathy as a snake” the next morning.

Consequently, Schofield marched to Franklin, where he deployed his army while awaiting the same from Hood’s men, setting the scene for the climactic encounter in which the Confederates made five attacks against the entrenched Federals during the late afternoon, evening, and then a rare nighttime attack. Those five attacks are detailed in chapters which describe the decimation of the famed but unsupported Missouri Brigade, that of Edward Walthall and William Loring’s divisions, those of Patrick Cleburne, John Brown and William Bate’s divisions, and finally the night attack by Edward “Alleghany” Johnson’s division, which only served to lengthen an already long casualty list, including six killed or mortally wounded generals along with many other field and staff officers.

Although the Federals abandoned the field to Hood and continued on to Nashville and the Army of Tennessee’s utter destruction, it was nothing more than a pyrrhic victory in exchange for the losses suffered. Many of those killed ended up in the Confederate cemetery graciously provided by the Carter family, on whose land much of the worst fighting took place, including their own Tod Carter who was mortally wounded just feet from his home.

In addition to the battle narrative, there is also a driving tour of the battlefields referenced in the text, from Allatoona Pass to Franklin — a total of fourteen stops. Appendices include first-hand accounts of the Confederate artillery at Franklin, colors lost by each side during the battle, the preservation or reclamation progress of the battlefield made in recent years, and a short recollection by the author of his lifelong interest in the battle. There is also an order of battle for both armies.

There are many photographs interspersed throughout the book. Unfortunately, many are of relative thumbnail size, lack resolution as a result, or otherwise require the use of a magnifying glass for purposes of discerning details. The maps are large, scaled, and provide considerable information on specific units, their positions, and attack directions.
Virginia, ransacked by Union soldiers who had quasi-official blessing for their acts under the large rubric of military necessity. In addition, while the Army understood how to provide shelter and clothing to its male soldiers and male contraband workers, clothing for women and children was another matter. Into the void stepped freedmen groups who sought donations from Northern households. That proved to be a problem on several levels. Those who feared handouts would condemn ex-slaves to lives of dependency made them pay for both food and clothing, a fact which led to a positive cash flow at some refugee camps. In addition, when volunteers distributing articles of clothing felt that some of the items were too good for the former slaves and might give them the wrong idea about their station in a post-slavery America, they kept those items off the shelves.

Eliza Bogan decided that following her husband by becoming a laundress in a U.S. Colored Troops (USCT) regiment was preferable to the dangers of living in a refugee camp near Helena, Arkansas. Taylor explains that Union authorities—who often viewed slave women as little more than temptresses—had difficulty integrating her and others like her into army life.

Gabriel Burdett, an ex-slave minister at Camp Nelson, Kentucky, somewhat links the three family groups together. Sent after the war to Fort Monroe, Virginia, he may have crossed paths with the Whitehursts. After that, he sailed to Brownsville, Texas, where he may have bumped into Eliza Bogan’s 46th USCT. Finding his way back to Kentucky, Burdett eventually gave up trying to create a life for himself and his extended family near Camp Nelson and moved to Kansas.

By this time, the Whitehursts, Bogans, and Burdetts would have experienced some joy but perhaps more pain on their paths toward freedom. Lincoln’s emancipation proclamation, they would have read, said nothing more than “all persons held as slaves within any State... and in the District of Columbia” were to be free. The former slave masters instituted a program of sharecropping that was little better, and in some ways worse, than slavery.

Taylor, an associate professor of history at the University of Kentucky, has produced a well-written, thoroughly documented,
Crews normally rotated back to the U.S. after completing thirty-five missions. Faulkner and his men never made that mark. On their twenty-eighth mission, to Augsburg, Germany, in late February 1945, their plane was damaged by heavy anti-aircraft fire and was rendered incapable of making it over the Alps Mountains back to Italy. Faulkner hoped to fly west and land behind advancing American ground forces in France. Instead, because of misinformation and disorientation, he flew into Swiss air space and was forced down by Swiss fighter planes. He and his crew were briefly interned under most hospitable conditions before being returned to American control. Despite success in business and family for the rest of his life, Faulkner endured mental torment and physical pain for many years over his decision-making in his damaged airplane. It was not until he was in his eighties that Dan Matthews, a World War II researcher, examined the records of the case, clarified the events of that fateful day, and informed Faulkner of the results. Writes the author, “His findings lifted a veil that had haunted me for six decades.” (p. vi) Among other things, Faulkner learned that he had been awarded a Distinguished Flying Cross that he had never received.

Author Faulkner’s memoir contains fascinating details about Fifteen Air Force operations, about life in the Army Air Forces in the States and in Italy, and about the B-24 bomber. ... fast-paced, and easy to read. Readers interested in this topic may want to compare Faulkner’s book with Keith Mason’s My War in Italy: On the Ground and in Flight with the 15th Air Force, reviewed in JAMP 132 (Fall 2016).

Russell K. Brown


This book offers readers a fascinating collection of 100 black and
white photographs depicting the many facets of the Great War. The photographs underscore the global nature of the war, which was the first conflict to be so extensively photographed. These striking images are organized into six sections: Nations at War (i.e., home fronts), the Eastern Front, the Western Front, the Southern Fronts, the War Against Turkey, and War Across the Globe.

“Nations at War” generally illustrates what civilians were doing to assist their respective war efforts, as well as how they were targeted by their enemies. In 1915, Belgian civilians are shown being searched by German soldiers. A group of American men train to become officers in 1916, a year before the United States entered the war. In 1917, female munitions workers fill artillery shells for the Austro-Hungarian army at the Skoda Works, and a year later dockers unload frozen meat from the hold of a ship at a British port.

The photos from “The Eastern Front” depict the fighting that occurred between Austro-Hungarian and German forces and their Russian opponents. One photo depicts Austro-Hungarian infantry manning a trench in a snow-covered forest in the Carpathian Mountains in 1915. German and Russian troops dance together during negotiations for the 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which took Russia out of the war.

“The Western Front” concentrates on the Belgian, British (and other Commonwealth), and French forces fighting the Germans in Belgium and northeastern France. Belgian gunners prepare to fire a field gun in late 1914. At about the same time, German infantry is shown on the march, and Gordon Highlanders (a Scottish regiment) are depicted fraternizing with German soldiers during the famous Christmas Truce of 1914. Later in the war, a French infantryman is shown just before being executed for participating in a mutiny.

Activities on “The Southern Fronts” occur in the Balkans and Italy. Romanian infantrymen man trenches in the north of their country in 1917. Austro-Hungarian officers play chess with their pet dog on the Italian Front in 1917, and Italian infantrymen man a forward position on the Piave Dam in 1918.

“The War Against Turkey” looks at the operations that took place in the Caucasus Mountains, on the Gallipoli peninsula (Turkey), and in the Middle East. One image shows mounted Cossacks from the Caucasus serving with the Russian Army in 1917. At about the same time, Turkish infantry is shown embarking at a Black Sea port for service on the Caucasus Front. In 1915, New Zealand soldiers are shown on sentry duty at Gallipoli, and another photo shows British soldiers collecting the dead after a bloody beach landing at Gallipoli. An Australian demolition team quickly moves back after setting demolition charges on a Turkish railway located in Palestine in 1918.

The photos in “War Across the Globe” focus on operations, in Africa, India, and the Pacific. Kenyan soldiers of the King’s African Rifles march to the Nairobi railway station in 1916. In 1917, a column of British infantry moves along the bed of a river during operations against Mahsud tribesmen on the North West frontier of India. In 1914, Japanese troops pose next to a 280mm howitzer during the siege of Tsingtao, a German colonial outpost in China.

Readers who are interested in the Great War will definitely want to add this volume to their military library.

Roger D. Cunningham


The focus of this book is Adm. John S. McCain’s service during World War II. The first fifty pages of the book highlights McCain’s development from being a surface naval warfare officer to being a naval aviation officer. McCain was the second oldest U.S. Navy officer to win his wings. Before the war, he commanded the aircraft carrier USS Ranger and on the eve of the war the patrol aircraft based on the West Coast.

The heart of the book concerns McCain’s leadership skills during the course of the war. The author focuses on McCain as both a combat leader and as a bureaucratic administrator. He judges McCain to be an excellent battlefield leader who was innovative in his use of carrier aviation. He sees McCain as being not a great wartime leader but a totally competent leader, who occasionally got things wrong. An overall evaluation of McCain shows him to be equal to and, in some cases, superior to his contemporary carrier task force commanders. As an administrator in wartime Washington, D.C., the author finds McCain to be superior to many around him. During his wartime tour of duty in Washington, McCain was able to work effectively with Adm. Ernest King, the Navy’s Bureau chiefs, members of the other services, and with Congress to effectively expand the Navy’s carrier and shore-based air assets.

McCain’s first combat assignment came in May 1942, when he was sent to the South Pacific as Commander Air South Pacific. As COMAIRSOPAC he commanded all the Allied land-based aircraft supporting the Guadalcanal Campaign. It was his responsibility to
ensure that Henderson Field had enough planes and pilots to control
the air over the island. Following the successful occupation of
Guadalcanal, McCain, in October 1942, was ordered to Washington,
D.C., to head the Navy’s Bureau of Navigation. In August 1943, he
was made a Vice Admiral and became Deputy Chief of Naval
Operations.
In August 1944, McCain returned to the Pacific Theater of
Operations. There he commanded a carrier task force designated
TF 38 when operating with the Third Fleet and TF 58 when
operating with the Fifth Fleet. He participated in the Marianas
Campaign, Battle of the Philippine Sea, the Philippines Land
Campaign, the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the Battle of Okinawa, and
attacks on the Japanese homeland. As Chief of Staff for Admiral
Haley’s Third Fleet, he participated in the decision to remain off
Okinawa in the path of Typhoon Cobra. This decision led to the
storm sinking three destroyers and inflicting major damage to
other Third Fleet ships.
McCain’s time at sea during 1944 and 1945 took a heavy toll on his
health, as he could not divorce himself from the anguish of his men
dying or being wounded in battle. Although in poor health, he
witnessed the surrender of Japan on the USS Missouri in Tokyo Bay in
September. The next day, he departed for California, but shortly after
reaching his home in California, he died.
While the previous paragraphs provide an outline of McCain’s
World War II service, this summary does not begin to cover his
contributions to the Navy’s victory against the Axis powers. During
1943, McCain developed the policies and procedures that made sure
the men and equipment the Navy needed to win the naval war in the
Pacific were in place. Then during 1944 and 1945, he used these men
and their equipment to smash the Japanese Army Air Force and
destroy the ships and aircraft of the Imperial Japanese Navy. The
author does an excellent job in showing the connectivity of McCain’s
wartime service as an administrator and as a warrior. The book is
both a biographical account of a naval hero but also a look at
competent leadership during a time of crisis.

Charles H. Bogart

Supporting Allied Offensives: 8 August-11 November 1918, by
Army Center of Military History, 2018. 87 pp., $11.

The passing of the centennial of the Great War does not mean that
publications in this series have ceased. On the contrary, they continue
to be released for the edification of all. There is, however, just a small
difference between this particular booklet and others previously
available in terms of the information in the text.
With the end of the German spring and summer offensives and
their subsequent manpower exhaustion, it was time for the Allies to
go over to the offensive. Indeed, France’s Marshal Ferdinand Foch,
overall commander-in-chief of Allied armies, believed that the time
was right for a “Grand Allied Offensive,” which would give German
armies no respite now that at least some American manpower had
obtained combat experience and was able to affect the balance of
power along the front lines.
To that end, a series of offensives was planned for late summer and
early fall in an effort to bring the war to a successful conclusion before
the end of 1918. Although American Expeditionary Forces com-
mander, Gen. John Pershing, had initially resisted amalgamation of
American troops within the ranks of French and British armies, as it
might dilute or obscure the American contribution to the war effort, he
was persuaded to do so to a limited extent. It was done as part of the
continued combat “blooding” of American formations, as well as to
bulk up the strength of their companion armies for these offensives.
The limited extent of this amalgamation was restricted to placing
whole American divisions under the command of French and British
corps structures. The result of this international cooperation
demonstrated that Americans could and would fight just as well as
their foreign comrades, even to the extent of the same heavy
casualties, in attaining their objectives. As it turned out, the French
were quite impressed by American battlefield prowess.
Following the standard initial account of the strategic setting,
American participation in each of the summer-fall offensives is
described in sections in the text, from the Battles of Hamel and
Juvigny, the Somme, bridging the Aisne River and breaking the
Hindenburg Line to Blanc Mont Ridge and the Selle River. All of
these accomplished the Allied goal of driving back the Germans,
gaining ground and reducing their manpower and combat
effectiveness to unsustainable levels prior to the Armistice.
Finally, and creditably, the little-known American participation in
Italy is also described although it was limited to just a small
regimental task force that fought on the Vittorio-Veneto front against
German and Austro-Hungarian armies in October-November. This
effort’s mission was to “bolster Italian morale, deceive the Central
Powers into believing that a large American force was present in the
theater, and assist the Italian Army in combat whenever possible.”
(p.79) The Americans were just as successful and impressive on this
In **Bold Venture**, Steven K. Bailey covers the air war over Hong Kong from that first mission aimed at Japanese ships and dockyards in Hong Kong until the last strike on Hong Kong just one day before the Pacific war ended. Strikes were mounted by fighters and bombers from Chennault’s team, as well as planes from U.S. Navy flattops.

Problematically, readers don’t find out until about a quarter through the book that the BAAG initiative to supply medicines to the POWs “fizzled,” according to Bailey, “perhaps due to the long supply line from India, or different American priorities.” (p. 78) One of those priorities, Bailey reported, was tobacco. In just one month in the spring of 1942, C-47s flew two tons of cigarettes over the Hump to nicotine-addicted AVG members.

Bailey tells the stories of the Hong Kong air raids through several different lenses. Downed American pilots struggle through hundreds of miles of terrain to reach the safety of their forward bases, dodging Japanese patrols and never knowing whether the Chinese peasants they encounter will help them or turn them in for rewards. Europeans trapped in Hong Kong wonder if stray bombs will ruin their days or nights, and if false claims by the Allies about damage inflicted on Hong Kong meant that all Allied assertions of victories in the Pacific were shams. And, of course, flight personnel outline air combat, from the perspective of both fighter pilots and bomber crews.

Some of the most interesting facets of the book, however, deal with technical issues. From the beginning, Chennault encouraged his pilots to take advantage of the superior dive capabilities of their P-40s, meaning that the pilots needed to ambush the faster-climbing and more maneuverable Japanese from above. Later in the war, specially modified B-24Js arrived over China from bases in the Philippines. Not only could their radar find ships in the rain and darkness, the AN/APQ-5 system could be linked to the Norden bombsight so it could fly the plane and drop the bombs automatically. That meant Japanese vessels could potentially be attacked any time of day or night in any weather. Although an amazing feat of American ingenuity, the AN/APQ-5 and other systems were prone to error. Bailey is not afraid to tackle the issue of collateral damage and the price paid by the local Chinese. Ironically, sometimes the POWs who were to be the beneficiary of the original raids actually came close to being hit by shrapnel from near misses.

With only limited knowledge of the Chinese front during World War II, I had never heard of Ichigō sakuse (Operation Number One), a massive Japanese offensive involving 800 tanks and armored cars, over 1500 artillery pieces, and ten times as many trucks, plus 100,000...

The high point of Union Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s military career came at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on 3 July 1863. There his Army of the Potomac defeated Confederate Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia in the most celebrated battle in American history. Meade’s low point dragged out over the next ten months as he failed to bring Lee to a decisive engagement that would destroy the latter’s army and possibly bring an end to the Civil War. Although Meade’s Gettysburg victory is rightly celebrated as a great achievement, it is the ensuing lackluster campaign for which he is often blamed and remembered. History professor John G. Selby has recreated Meade’s Civil War experiences in this generally objective but oftentimes sympathetic book.

Born in Spain to American parents in 1815, in later life Meade adopted Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, his wife’s birthplace, as his hometown. He graduated from West Point in 1835 and served as an army engineer for most of the next 25 years. He was commissioned as a brigadier general of Pennsylvania volunteers in 1861 and commanded, successively, a brigade, a division and an army corps in Virginia, notably at the battles of Antietam, Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. According to Selby, Meade was “A fierce division commander [and] an aggressive corps commander.” (p. 300) Suddenly thrust into command of the 90,000-man Army of the Potomac on the eve of the 1863 Pennsylvania campaign, Meade rose to the occasion by fighting a mainly defensive battle against his aggressive opponent. Skillfully employing the reserves of his numerically superior army to shore up threatened points in his lines, and ably supported by some (but not all) of his subordinate commanders, Meade fought Lee to a standoff in the three-day battle at Gettysburg. Writes Selby, “Meade had made all the right decisions and provided that intangible resolve that infused confidence into his officers and men.” (p. 58)

Meade’s leadership at Gettysburg won high praise from President Abraham Lincoln and other civil and military officials, but his failure to immediately follow up on his victory and his less than stellar performance in the fall of 1863 and winter of 1864 drew criticism from the administration, the press, and the public. Meade’s star was further eclipsed in March 1864, when Lincoln promoted U.S. Grant to lieutenant general and commanding general of all armies. When Grant decided to collocate his headquarters with the Army of the Potomac for the rest of the war, Meade predicted that Grant would get credit for any future successes of the army, and he was right. Through the Overland and Petersburg campaigns of 1864-1865 it was Grant who devised the strategy and called the shots, although Meade gave valuable input for many decisions.

Author Selby has done an excellent job of mining all available sources to recreate Meade’s tenure as commander of the Union’s largest field army. In doing so, Selby has drawn an accurate but favorable portrait of his subject; like many biographers he tends to extol Meade’s positive accomplishments, while explaining away the negative. Meade’s infamous hot temper, which caused him headaches with politicians and the press, is described in mellow terms. The investigations by the Congressional Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War, which almost cost Meade his job, are laid out in detail. Meade’s interactions with many other officers, some supportive, some critical, some competitive, and some unreliable, including Maj. Gens. Henry W. Halleck, Philip H. Sheridan, Winfield S. Hancock, Gouverneur K. Warren, and Ambrose Burnside, are examined. And most important, Meade’s relationship with Grant is analyzed for a fair assessment of his contributions in the final campaigns of the war. In the end, writes Selby, “What mattered most to Meade was not whether he held the position [of commanding general] but how his performance affected his military reputation.” (p. xiii) That reputation suffered for years following the Civil War, but in modern times astute historians have given Meade more of the
few instances of effective air-ground cooperation. Both Great Britain and the United States entered the 1920s still wrestling with how to coordinate airplanes with cavalry. Royal Air Force (RAF) officers tried to argue for the retention of an independent air force by erroneously maintaining that “air policing” of the vast British Empire was a more cost-effective option than using ground forces.

In the post-war United States there were several attempts to coordinate Army Air Service assets and cavalry forces during maneuvers conducted in the Southwest. Such coordination was much more difficult in Great Britain, as all air assets belonged to the RAF that had been created by amalgamating the Royal Flying Corps and the Royal Naval Air Service in 1918. American cavalrymen began to see that airplanes could be a useful augmentation to their reconnaissance role, and they looked for ways to improve air-ground coordination. When the autogiro — a precursor to the helicopter — was developed in the late 1920s, there were moves to assign the experimental aircraft to cavalry units, but that concept didn’t work out well.

A much greater threat to the horse-mounted cavalry came from mechanization, as light tanks and armored cars began to replace horses. All British horse cavalry was mechanized by the late 1930s, and the U.S. Army followed suit during World War II. The American 1st and 2d Cavalry Divisions were dismounted, and the men of the former formation fought as infantry in the Southwest Pacific.

Harnessing the Airplane began as a doctoral dissertation and is meticulously researched, as is underscored by its 36 pages of endnotes and 21-page bibliography. The book is not light reading, but readers who are interested in the final four decades of both American and British horse-mounted cavalry will find much useful information in its pages.

Roger D. Cunningham


Many books have been written about the Vietnam air war, but as far as I know, few if any have been written by the Guy-in-Back (GIB), a Naval Flight Officer (NFO). The duty of the GIB was to serve as the F-4’s Phantom’s Radar Interceptor Officer. Flying the Phantom was a team effort. The aircraft’s electronic warfare suite required a two-person crew to operate it. This autobiographical account follows the author from his senior year in college, through enlistment in the
Marine Corps, undergoing flight training as an NFO, being assigned to VMFA-232, the “Red Devils,” and taking part in 123 combat air support missions in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The book covers the period from 1966 to 1970.

The author reports that he was not physically, emotionally, or mentally prepared for OCS but was able, due to self-determination, to survive it. Once he began NFO training he found himself plagued by air sickness and fought it throughout his flying time, as he struggled to gain his wings. That he gained his NFO wings is a testimony to his sheer determination to succeed.

Once he gained his NFO wings, he was assigned to VMFA-232, based at MCAS El Toro, California. VMFA-232 was flying the two-seater missile-armed McDonnell Douglas F-4J Phantom II. The F-4J was designed to serve as a long-range interceptor, but the Vietnam War saw it being used as a ground support aircraft with bombs, rockets, and gun pods hung on its wings. The delivery of these weapons on target demanded coordinated team work between the pilot and the GIB. The author’s main duty was to operate the AWG-10 Westinghouse pulse-Doppler radar.

The book follows the author from joining VMFA-232 in March 1968, as a “Nugget,” to becoming a well-seasoned GIB and respected Marine Corps officer. The story covers not only flying duties but routine squadron administration duties. Thus, the book is much more than a series of aerial combat tales. It is a story of VMFA-232 preparing for combat and engaging in combat as seen through the eyes of the author. We are with the author as he learns his GIB duties, carries out various administrative tasks, is almost killed in the air as his aircraft suffers a malfunction, has a fellow GIB killed, and fights to hold his marriage together.

VMFA-232 arrived in Vietnam in March 1969 and was based at Chu Lai, located 50 miles south of Da Nang. We are treated to stories of life and death on the battlefield, in the air, and on the base. Death came from enemy fire, accidents, and the unknown. One F-4J with its crew just disappeared. The author found little solace in using rowdiness and alcohol to stay the fear of death or injury but instead built upon his Christian beliefs to conquer his fears and found inner peace. He flew both daytime and nighttime attack missions. In one 24-hour period, he and his pilot flew five missions, the most flown in a 24-hour period by any member of the squadron. On the home front, his marriage continued a slow decline, as his wife’s wants and needs diverged from his chosen life of being a Marine NFO.

The book is a tour de force of one man’s look back upon his service in the Marine Corps. We are treated to the good, the bad, and the ugly of service life, as experienced by the author. Phantom in the Sky is a worthy addition to the University of North Texas Press’s well-respected Military Biographical and Memoir Series. It adds greatly to one’s knowledge of the Vietnam air war and belongs in any library focusing on the development and use of air power.

Charles H. Bogart


Not only is this publication authored by a current United States Senator, but Tom Cotton is also a U. S. Army veteran and former member of the “Old Guard,” the 3d United States Infantry Regiment. As such, it is the oldest extant unit of the Army, and primary Army ceremonial formation for everything from funerals and presenting military honors at Arlington to marching in parades, guarding the Tomb of the Unknowns, hosting foreign dignitaries and saluting the President, other important officials and retiring generals with gun salutes. All of this is covered within this volume. It is actually more about what goes on behind the scenes, as well as in front of the public, and not nearly so much about Cotton’s service with the Old Guard, although that is included as part of the testing, qualifications, and service necessary to be part of such an elite unit.

Although guarding the Tomb and being present for military honors at the funerals of many of the veterans who choose to be buried at Arlington are mostly what the 3rd is best known for, there is much more to this unit than meets the eye. This is essentially a primer on the many services provided, how one gets to be a member, the rigorous steps necessary to qualify and the perfection necessary to make sure that there is never a “mission failure” when it comes to honoring those who have served and sacrificed for this nation.

Included with the overall description of its more celebrated contemporary functions is a history of the unit’s valor and service to the country, dating from its organization in the early years of the Republic, right up through all of the conflicts in our history until its deactivation. That was not the end of the story, however, as the 3d was ultimately re-activated in 1948, assigned to the Military District of Washington (MDW) and based at Fort Myer, Virginia.

Since then, it has incorporated an Honor Guard, Color Guard, field music, Continental-style fife and drum corps (a throwback to its early days under George Washington), the Tomb Sentinels, drill team, equestrian and caisson team (the only one in the Army), and
other functions into its ranks. Each one of these is covered in the text. Probably unknown to most, as a result of being in the MDW chain of command, the Old Guard members provided security and cleanup for a month at the Pentagon after the 9/11 attack there. They did so on top of maintaining their regular schedule at the Cemetery just as they have done when elements were deployed to the Middle East or have been sent for regular tactical field training, live firing, and “blowing stuff up” at Fort A.P. Hill, Virginia.

Along the way, Cotton describes the meticulous, almost obsessive manner in which members ensure that all goes perfectly in uniform, function, and overall appearance, and that the best possible image is presented to the public, especially in funerals where the family in question wants its loved one to receive all of the honors due him or her. That image is also maintained guarding the Tomb 24/7 in foul weather and fair, as solemnly and respectfully as possible.

Whether a general or a private, killed in action or retired veteran, spouse or dependent, all of the honors due are provided so that any service and sacrifice of the deceased may be recognized by a grateful nation.

The one map provided is that of the Cemetery, and it is required to be carried whenever on duty for one’s own familiarization, as well as to answer questions from the public. It has a legend describing all of the hearse-to-caisson transfer points, three volley firing points, and hitching points for the horses, and it shows individual burial sections and other historical points of interest.

Photographs are numerous within the text and many are of contemporary members as they go about their duties, behind the scenes and publicly. There are no endnotes but sections on sources and acknowledgments credit the many Old Guard members and others who provided support, research, and information to the author to augment his own experience twelve years ago.

Sacred Duty is a very interesting and informative account and highly recommended to all.

Stuart McClung


I was never the most circumspect student. Years ago, in an American Studies class, I wrote a term paper that basically called memoir a genre that bilked money out of unsuspecting readers who expected verisimilitude but instead were fed fantasy. I provided examples from concocted 19th-century slave narratives to 2003’s A Million Little Pieces. It turned out the instructor was a memoirist, and she was not amused. For my part, out of the hundreds of papers I wrote through my career as a student, that is the one I continue to dwell on the most. In fact, I still stuff the occasional clipping into a file labeled “fake memoir,” probably because I’m still trying to bolster my case.

Thanks to Civil War Writing: New Perspectives on Iconic Texts, I have another example to add to my pile. In William C. Davis’s contribution to this volume of essays, the emeritus history professor at Virginia Tech illuminates the story of Loreta Velasquez, whose 1876 memoir, The Woman in Battle, detailed her supposed service in the Confederate Army as a woman dressed as a man. The fact I had never heard of it raises two questions. How did I overlook it for my paper on fake memoirs as an example of “concocting fiction for personal gain” (p. 66), as one amateur historian cited by Davis warned? The answer to that is simple: poor research skills. The answer to the second question — how can a book that no one in my Civil War Round Table ever heard of be called iconic? — is a little more complicated. Gallagher and Cushman’s “Introduction” explains that not all the works in the text may be familiar, but that they have “influenced many generations of readers and scholars.” (p. 1) By parading a long line of historical and contemporary criticism, Davis convinced me that The Woman in Battle deserves a place in the volume.

Because full-length accounts of women who fought in the Civil War are so few, book reviewers for 19th-century newspapers and 20th-century academics wanted to believe Velasquez (whose name probably really wasn’t Velasquez) despite the fact that the accepted historical record did not mesh with many of her claims. Even after solid proof arose that her memoir was complete nonsense, Velasquez continued to show up in women warrior books, where her story was presented as real. Some academics admitted the tale was not true but said it didn’t matter as they applied questionable sociological and psychological meanings to the text. Whether or not Davis intended it, his essay in places is quite humorous, as he quotes critics who call Velasquez a “protolesbian” (p. 70), even though she was married several times and never claimed to be a man except in her memoir. Indeed, her husbands and lovers, only one of whom ever saw her in uniform and only one of whom may have favored the South, were proof that Velasquez had brought southern masculinity “to a homoerotic crisis.” (p. 70) That and several other passages made me groan out loud and cringe for my profession. For those reasons, it was
my favorite among the nine essays in the book.

The first essay in the collection discusses Joseph T. Wilson’s *The Black Phalanx*. Another book with which I was not familiar, *The Black Phalanx* was the best-selling volume by an African American in the 1890s. Elizabeth R. Varon’s essay on Wilson is edifying, pointing out that Wilson never touched on the slave rebellions of Denmark Vesey and Nat Turner nor the Haitian revolution, while other contemporaneous books about blacks in the Civil War did. Yet Wilson was not afraid to tackle the subject of “passing,” which allowed some former slaves to serve as officers in Union regiments. These stories, according to Varon, illustrated Wilson’s belief that it was racism and not race holding back black soldiers.

Other essays cover the kinds of texts that I expected, those by well-known figures like Joe Johnston, William T. Sherman, Jubal Early, and Mary Chestnut. While Louisa May Alcott’s *Little Women* is not my idea of a Civil War text, J. Matthew Gallman struggles mightily in his essay on this classic to frame it as such. Perhaps because familiarity breeds contempt, the essays that covered these well-known subjects seemed to be the weakest.

The best essays about what I would have originally considered iconic texts were Keith S. Bohnannon’s on John B. Gordon’s *Reminiscences* and co-editor Gary Gallagher’s on Edward Porter Alexander’s history of the war. Both were straightforward, well-crafted accounts about their subjects.

It’s hard to imagine there will be a large audience for this book, so I have to give Louisiana State University Press credit for taking a chance on it. In an ironic twist, it might be the essays on the unfamiliar texts that will attract the most readers, since the discussions of books like *The Woman in Battle* and *The Black Phalanx* are no doubt a good way to become conversant with them.

Dave Page


Union army Lt. James Riley Weaver closed his diary entry for 10 January 1865, with the notation, “Health good. Eating slim. Hope medium.” (p. 191) Such was the life of a man who had been a prisoner of war (POW) in a Confederate pen for fifteen months and who wondered when that miserable status would end for him and his fellows.

Weaver, born in 1839, was a farm boy with two years of college when he enlisted in the 18th Pennsylvania Cavalry regiment in 1862. A year later in the Army of the Potomac in Virginia, he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in his regiment and had also earned his college degree by examination while in the army. Weaver fought with his unit through the Gettysburg campaign and through the cavalry engagements in the summer and fall of 1863, frequently as company commander. He, along with some thirty-odd other members of the 18th Pennsylvania, was captured at Brandy Station, Virginia, in October 1863, when they were surrounded and cut off from retreat.

Initially incarcerated at the notorious Libby Prison, in Richmond, Virginia, Weaver passed through a half-dozen other Confederate prison sites before his eventual parole in March 1865. Many times his move and that of other POWs to a new location was predicated on the threat of imminent liberation by Union forces. As an officer prisoner, Weaver fared much better than enlisted POWs, but even he suffered from inadequate food and health care, lack of replacement clothing, and retaliatory treatment by his captors for supposed misconduct by Federal authorities in their handling of Southern POWs. For example, Weaver had to make moccasins from the cape of his overcoat when his shoes wore out, and at Charleston, S.C., in 1864, he was placed in a camp under fire from Union guns shelling that city. Frequently, POWs’ care packages from their families or Northern relief agencies were withheld or sometimes pilfered by prison officials.

The prisoners’ status was exacerbated by the Union’s vacillating policy on parole and exchange. Early in the war, paroles and/or exchanges occurred quickly and often. By 1863, positions had hardened and policy had changed. The Lincoln administration was wary of granting legitimacy to the Confederacy through negotiations, the South threatened extreme punishment for black Union troops and their white officers, and Northern military leaders sought to reduce the Southern manpower pool by preventing captured soldiers from returning to the ranks. As a result, men like Weaver languished for months or years under execrable conditions. Time after time the hopes of Weaver and his mates were raised by rumors of exchange, only to be dashed by the reality of continued confinement. Hope for release rose and fell: “The day comes and goes leaving nothing by which to be remembered, and so we expect to pass away many months.” (p. 88) Prison life wore on the officers’ morality as well as their morale. On Christmas Day 1864, Weaver noted, “The most of the officers have
lieutenant. He spent his early years with the 5th U.S. Infantry regiment assigned at several posts in the West and in the South. Army promotion moved at a glacial rate throughout the Gilded Age, and it took Liggett eighteen years to be promoted to captain.

When the Spanish-American War broke out, Liggett was able to secure a major’s billet as an assistant adjutant general in the Volunteer Army that was raised to augment the small Regular Army (RA). In 1899, he was appointed as a major in the 31st U.S. Volunteer Infantry, one of the regiments specially raised to fight in the Philippine War. His Philippine service was on the southern island of Mindanao and involved no combat. After mustering out of the volunteers, he reverted to his RA rank of captain, but he was again promoted to major in 1902.

While at Fort Leavenworth commanding an infantry battalion, Liggett audited the courses of both the School of the Line and the Army Staff School. This decision “separated him from most of his peers and placed him on an upward career track.” (p. 66) In 1909, he was promoted to lieutenant colonel and selected to attend the newly established Army War College, in Washington, D.C. He did so well in that course that he was assigned to the Army Staff in 1910, and three years later, he was promoted to brigadier general and appointed as the War College’s president. His time there “was the culmination of his scholarly journey, much of it self-study, and it added value to his standing and burnished his reputation as a US Army officer.” (p. 81)

After commanding brigades in Texas and the Philippines, as well as the Department of the Philippines, Liggett was promoted to major general and given command of the Western Department, with headquarters in San Francisco. In April 1917, as the United States entered World War I, he was sixty and rather portly. Gen. John J. Pershing preferred younger, fitter commanders for his AEF divisions, but Liggett was still given command of the 41st Division and deployed to France. The 41st was designated as a depot division – its men were gradually parceled out to other formations – so he was moved up to command I Corps in 1918. In August, his corps became part of the newly created U.S. First Army, commanded by General Pershing. When the Second Army was created in October, Pershing turned First Army over to Liggett, who was promoted to the temporary rank of lieutenant general. He commanded that army during the Meuse-Argonne campaign during the final weeks of the war, although Pershing continued to interfere in command decisions that rightfully belonged to Liggett.

The Armistice went into effect in November, and the First Army was inactivated in April 1919, but as his “doughboys” headed for
home, Liggett remained in France. To occupy the Rhineland in western Germany, the Third Army (later the Army of Occupation) was established, and Liggett commanded that army until mid-1920. After Liggett returned to the U.S., he lost one star as the Army downsized. At his request, he was again given command of the Western Department. Finally, in early 1921, Liggett retired, as he reached the mandatory retirement age of 64. In 1930, Congress returned him to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list, and he died in San Francisco in 1935.

Michael Shay faced several problems in writing this book. Liggett’s compiled military service record was hard to locate in the National Archives, and because the Liggetts had no children, they seemed to have no incentive to save important family papers. Still, the author persevered and was able to craft a well-researched look at the general’s impressive military career. Those who are interested in World War I will definitely want to read this book.

Roger D. Cunningham


I have trouble with the title of this book. When writing about the problems of global warming, would an author title the book “Selling Global Warming” or title a book advocating the planting of more trees “Selling Reforestation.” What the U.S. Navy did between 1917 and 1941 was sponsor a public education program on the importance of a strong maritime force. They did nothing different during this period than every other large organization did in presenting themselves to the public in the most favorable way. Harvard, Yale, and Princeton spent these years promoting themselves as the pinnacle of university education.

At the end of World War I, the Navy found itself in the crosshairs of isolationist agitators, anti-war groups, and government spending protestors. The Washington Naval Treaty and other ship limitation treaties of the interwar period were all looked upon favorably by those who insisted that the United States must never again be drawn into a European conflict. The Navy, in 1922, found its most modern capital ships being scrapped on the building ways before they could join the fleet. Millions of dollars in fleet modernization was lost and not recovered till the 1930s.

The interwar period was also a period of turmoil within the Navy, as it tried to translate the lessons learned from World War I into a cohesive war fighting doctrine. A Navy’s strength was no longer arrived at by counting its battleships. A modern war-fighting Navy had to be built around surface ships, submarines, and aircraft. To tell this story, the Navy developed a public relations program which slowly grew in sophistication to encompass the print, radio, and film industry. This public relations program had various goals which included refuting misinformation spread by others about the Navy, telling the story of the Navy, helping with the recruitment of officers and men, and insuring progress in the war-fighting capability of the Navy. The struggle to tell the Navy’s story to the general public was controversial within the service. Some naval officers were against contact with the news media, due to various prejudices that had developed over the decades. Other naval officers realized that if the Navy did not provide the desired information, there was someone else willing to provide the information shaped to their own beliefs.

This book shows how the Navy overcame its internal dissent. The Navy’s public relation section, i.e. information section, was buried in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). This was a logical location for the Navy’s public relations section, as ONI was tasked with providing information on foreign threats to the Executive and Legislative branches of the U.S. government.

The author admits that others have tackled this subject, but he states that he addresses topics that those studies have not examined in detail. These are: 1) How the Navy responded to the various public threats to the its claim to be the front line of American defense; 2) How the Navy adapted to using the media to present their message to the President, Congress, and the general public; 3) What was the dominant theme of the Navy’s message; and 4) How effective was the message the Navy crafted in achieving what it wanted.

A great sub-story in the book is the 1929 Navy’s creation of the Motion Picture Board. Before this, the Navy’s relationship with the movie industry had been on an ad hoc basis. Hereafter, there was a formal relationship between the Navy and Hollywood, which led to the filming of a score of theatrical films or Movietonews films centered on the Navy. Thus, at little cost to the Navy, the service received a great deal of exposure in the movie houses across the heartland of America. As a result, by the late 1930s, Midwestern teenagers had become the heart and soul of those enlisting in the Navy.

This book should appeal to naval historians, anyone interested in social media as a messenger, movie buffs, or those trying to understand how to influence people and institutions. Hopefully, the
The life of John Benton Hart followed a pattern fairly typical in mid-nineteenth century America, from his birth in Pennsylvania in 1842 to his participation in the relentless westward expansion. In broad strokes, many lives unfolded in this manner while, in detail, each was unique with its own array of accomplishments, failures, and formative experiences.

John Benton Hart’s story was recorded between 1918 and 1923 when he was in his 70s. At the behest of his son, Harry, he wrote about his Civil War experiences and the adventures he had thereafter working in the West. Some of the stories were rewritten in a noticeably different style by Harry, and they were all then put away for about a century, coming to light only recently through the efforts of Hart’s great-grandson, also named John Hart. This volume presents the recollections of John Benton Hart, along with a well-researched historical context provided by John Hart. It is unfortunate that only those writings that had been typed out and bound reached the protective hands of the younger Hart while many handwritten pages from the same corpus were deemed worthless by another family member and burned.

Hart’s stories begin with the Civil War. Several moves across the Midwest landed his family in Grasshopper Falls, Kansas, where he joined the 11th Kansas Volunteer Infantry on 9 September 1862. His Civil War experiences, humorous in places and disturbing in others, concentrate on the climactic battles in northwest Missouri in the autumn of 1864. With the war all but over in this area, the 11th Kansas (which had changed to a cavalry regiment in September 1863) was ordered west to patrol the immigrant trails and telegraph lines along the North Platte River. The region had seen increased raiding on the part of Native Americans, especially since the Sand Creek Massacre at the end of November 1864. With its individual companies strung out among the military stations on the North Platte, the men of the 11th faced a kind of warfare they had not yet experienced and were not well prepared for. Hart took part in the tragic Battle of Platte Bridge on 26 July 1865, being one of the few soldiers to escape injury or death.

The service of the 11th Kansas Cavalry in the West lasted only a few months, and they were sent back to Kansas in September to be mustered out. Hart and his brother Hugh, however, headed west again in the spring of 1867 to work on a mule train transporting goods up the Bozeman Trail. Their employment with Wells Fargo in that capacity was short. Their first trip ended at Fort C. F. Smith, a remote post located on the Big Horn River, where the Hart brothers were offered more attractive employment. They stayed at Fort Smith for a little over a year, hunting to supply the soldiers with meat, cutting hay, and for John running mail to and from Fort Phil Kearny, a dangerous journey of over 100 miles. The mail route provides material for a number of interesting stories, but his most riveting account involves his participation in the Hayfield Fight of 1 August 1867, where a handful of civilian employees and its small military guard fought off an enormous force of Lakota warriors.

Old war stories such as these comprise a genre which tends to be at once illuminating and troublesome. Often recorded many decades after the events described, they are usually flawed when compared to dependable accounts. Actions are frequently exaggerated and purported dialogues often seem hollow and improvised to make the narrator look clever. Hart’s stories follow this pattern. The reader may be tempted to explain this in terms of self-aggrandizement, but so uncharitable an interpretation would miss the point of the narrative. The author’s goal is not so much to record an official history as it is to communicate the experience of a very different time and place. He is aware that his audience is expecting a good story, and if subsuming into his own account some events that he did not directly experience helps in achieving that goal, so be it. In many cases, events may be exaggerated simply to make the story square with the emotional impact of the real events. To be pursued by an enemy who is able and quite determined to end your life is an overwhelming experience, difficult to accurately convey through simple description. Exaggeration of some aspects of the ordeal may better convey the impact it had upon the author’s life.

Frequently, the researcher studying such narratives must conduct an exegesis of sorts, looking for common denominators among different accounts, confirming or refuting timelines and attempting to divine the true motives behind particular statements. In this case, the author’s great-grandson has ably conducted such an analysis, providing an added dimension to the original text. Willing to point out cases where events could not have happened as described, he also discusses instances where Hart’s descriptions match those of other writers, as in the Hayfield Fight, and a few puzzling cases where Hart’s narrative is convincingly detailed and coherent, yet there is no
Sainlaude’s study of France’s diplomatic reaction to the American Civil War is an important addition to this international interpretation of the conflict. France and the American Civil War is an abridged translation of two of Sainlaude’s previous works, Le gouvernement impérial et la guerre de Sécession (1861-1865): L’action diplomatique and La France et la Confédération sudiste (1861-1865): La question de la reconnaissance diplomatique pendant la guerre de Sécession, both published in 2011 and winners of the Prix Napoléon III in 2013. This English translation draws only from those parts of the earlier books dealing specifically with the French diplomatic response to the American Civil War. The result is a concise, readable, and informative monograph.

Sainlaude’s primary intervention is in demonstrating that the Civil War was a conflict that influenced the decision making of Europe’s great powers generally, and France specifically. By utilizing French sources that have remained unknown, ignored, or mistranslated by American scholars, Sainlaude demonstrates that the Second Empire analyzed and interpreted the American Civil War within an international framework that included Great Britain, Russia, the Netherlands, Mexico, China, and Japan. As a result, we learn that the outcome of the war depended not only upon the contingencies of battlefields in Virginia and Mississippi, but also upon the insightful observations of a French consul in Richmond and the willingness of career diplomats to ignore the orders of Napoleon III. These diplomats, argues Sainlaude, knew best and the survival of the Union was due, at least in part, to their belief that the Confederacy stood no chance of winning the war without European intervention. A belief that British intervention would have swung the tides of war in favor of the South has remained popular for some time. Sainlaude’s use of French diplomatic communications shows, however, that the French government never believed Great Britain was close to formally recognizing the slave South and without British cooperation France would not support the Confederate States either.

While the issue of slavery was significant in British hesitance to come to the aid of the South, according to Sainlaude military and economic factors weighed more heavily in French policy. Napoleon III’s desire to restore a Latin-Catholic empire in Mexico limited his diplomatic options north of the Rio Grande, as did the French need for American assistance in naval operations in the Far East. Furthermore, Sainlaude’s discussion of France’s economic ties to the North demonstrate once again that Confederate leaders overestimated Europe’s dependence upon cotton. In fact, France was more dependent on Northern wheat and markets than it ever was on...
Southern cotton and believed the cotton shortage was more the fault of Confederate policy than the Union blockade.

Sainlaude forces his readers to recognize that the outcome of the American Civil War depended on more than simply American factors. His work provides a useful look at the diplomacy that secured the Union victory and began the shaping of a newly modern world.

Michael A. Hill


On 21 April 1944, a group of men, many of them Allied military personnel attempting to escape from Nazi-occupied France by crossing the Pyrenees Mountains into neutral Spain, was detected and attacked by a German border patrol. Most of the members of the group were captured; a few escaped to reach their destination. This incident forms the basis of French-born Jean-Luc Cartron’s examination of Pyrenees escapers, the networks that aided them, and the likely suspects in their presumed betrayal. Cartron, a professor of biology in New Mexico, has previously written on the French Resistance movement and has also published works on the zoology of the American Southwest.

Resistance to German occupation began as early as the spring of 1940. From France, Belgium, and the Netherlands, escapers infiltrated by sea across to England, or by land into neutral Switzerland or Spain. The flow consisted of Jewish refugees, stranded British and French servicemen, and young men dodging forced labor service in Germany. After 1942, as the air war over Europe intensified, a large number of the escapers were downed American and British airmen. The latter group included men from countries of the British Empire, such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. Underground networks composed of people called “helpers” developed to support the escapers by rescuing, housing, feeding, transporting them, and giving them false identities. Cartron makes clear the formal difference between escapers (those who had been in German custody and had escaped) and evaders (those who had never been in custody and were attempting to elude capture). For simplification, this review refers to both categories as escapers.

Cartron focuses his attention on the escape lines leading across the Pyrenees to Spain. It was a route fraught with hazard, from German border patrols to fierce terrain and climate conditions, to double agents working to infiltrate the resistance and intercept the lines. Mountain passes were as much as 9,000 feet high; in winter, snow might be shoulder depth. Some of the escapers were physically unfit for the trek, most did not have appropriate clothing, especially shoes, for the climb. Many were left behind on the trail; often groups had to turn back. In the anecdotes related by Cartron, taken from reminiscences, archives and historical research, the individual experiences are both exciting and entertaining, with a wealth of personal detail about the escapers and their guides, called passeurs. In his foreword, writer Roger Stanton estimates that “more than 3,500 British and colonial Allied servicemen and more than 3,400 Americans returned home from occupied Europe to Great Britain to fight again.” In addition, “Many believe that for every escaper or evader who made it home, four escape line helpers died or suffered in a concentration camp.” (both quotations, p. x)

In the incident that Cartron uses as the centerpiece of his monograph, 21 Allied airmen, including 12 Americans, and a dozen civilian escapers were spirited across western Europe to be collected in southwest France. From there, they were guided into the mountains by experienced passeurs. “With no ropes and no hiking sticks, they all found themselves struggling through knee-deep snow, each of them stepping into the footprints of the man directly in front, lest one sink deeper.” (p. 66) High in the Pyrenees, at a place known as “the black shed,” where they paused to rest for the night, and one day’s march from the Spanish border, they were intercepted by a German patrol, possibly alerted to their presence by an informer who could have been a witness to their passage, an insider in an escape line, or even a member of the escape group. Carter points to several potential suspects, one of whom was later executed as a German collaborator, but his opinions are based largely on conjecture and supposition. Isn’t it possible that the suspicions of German authorities were aroused by a large group of military-aged men traveling on public conveyances to villages in the foothills of the mountains?

At any rate, this slim, enjoyable book on a little-known aspect of World War II is well worth the time it takes to read. The author might have improved it by following a more standard timeline of events rather than his somewhat disjointed presentation of episodes, but this is a minor flaw.

Russell K. Brown
commented on how much better the food was than what had been provided to them in 1863.

There was a “Great Tent” capable of seating thousands that was used to allow long-winded orators to address those who were interested in hearing patriotic speeches. There was usually much background noise and no public address system, however, so it was often quite difficult for the veterans — many of whom had poor hearing — to understand what was being said. That was certainly the case when President Woodrow Wilson appeared on the Fourth of July and gave a speech that was not especially well received. Wilson spent less than an hour at Gettysburg before hurrying away to begin his summer vacation.

The author has done an excellent job of analyzing the 1913 Gettysburg Reunion, which meant so much to so many Civil War veterans, as well as their loved ones. He differs from many other historians in maintaining that most of the veterans were far less interested in national reconciliation and far more interested in reconnecting with old comrades, mourning dead friends, and revisiting the ground that they had once fought over. Doing these simple things reduced many of them to tears. After his journey to Gettysburg, one old soldier wrote his family: “I am so tired that I can’t see, but I wouldn’t have missed this trip for 20 years of my life.” (p. 44) This book is highly recommended.
by demonstrating Marines’ excellent marksmanship, especially at longer ranges, and their ability to stand, fight, and advance in a protracted battle. It was also important because no less than four future Marine Corps commandants fought at Belleau Wood — Wendell C. Neville, Thomas R. Holcomb, Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., and Clifton B. Cates — as well as a number of other officers who would advance to senior ranks, like the future three-stars Holland M. Smith and Gerald C. Thomas. This was the battle where they proved themselves and developed basic impressions of what combat was about. If Holcomb continued to stress marksmanship, and if Smith was prepared for bitter fighting and heavy casualties in the Pacific in World War II, it might have had something to do with Belleau Wood.

For the Allies, this battle was an important contribution to victory. The author explains how, in the spring of 1918, Germany was in a good position to inflict a decisive blow on the Western Front. Russia’s withdrawal from the war allowed Germany to transfer more than a million experienced soldiers and more than 3,000 guns to the west. Now, for the first time, Kaiser Wilhelm II’s army had numerical superiority. Equally important was the relatively poor state of the Allies — the French being exhausted after four years of fighting on their soil, the British bleeding from their disastrous offensives in Flanders, and the Italians reeling from the Battle of Caporetto. If ever the Allies needed reinforcements, it was the spring of 1918, and that is what the U.S. Army and Marine Corps supplied.

When the Marines first arrived in France, they found themselves performing far too many stevedore and guard duties. The author explains how, according to many accounts, it was a dreary experience for the Marines, who were eager for more challenging duties. The opportunity came with the establishment of American formations, typically a mix of Marine and Army units that would go into battle in March 1918 under the umbrella of the 2d U.S. Infantry Division, which included a Marine brigade comprising the 5th and 6th Regiments. The Battle of Belleau Wood occurred three months later, over some 20 days in June, as the Marines repelled a determined German attack that threatened to break the Allied line, and then pushed the enemy back — though at great cost, with some units suffering 50-60 percent casualties.

The author led numerous battlefield tours while serving at SHAPE in the 1990s and obviously knows whereof he writes. He salutes his working relationship with the mapmaker, Lt. Col. R. L. Cody, explaining how they challenged each other to improve — to make a map fit the text and improve the text after studying a map. Cody based his work on maps published by American, German, and French military historians after the war, in addition to consulting modern satellite imagery. After undertaking this research, the author comments that he was struck by the fact that the terrain had changed very little since 1918.

By the way, the guide’s title comes from the Edgar A. Guest poem, “Battle of Belleau Wood,” published in 1922. Though it seems a little old-fashioned today, it was reportedly the iconic Marine Gen. John A. Lejeune’s favorite poem of all the verses written after the war.

Nick Reynolds


The one hundredth anniversary of the end of the Great War has come and gone from the public eye, but there is still much that can be learned on how this truly wholesale slaughter by countries with innovative new technology occurred. Historian Peter Hart, from the Imperial War Museum in London, writes a vivid and descriptive account of the last year of the Great War titled The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I. The author also devotes much attention to the efforts of each warring side in the early days of the war.

Hart’s work on the Great War is not just a typical long and furious book on the fighting. There are vast amounts of eyewitness documents that give the reader a fresh look at the leadership, battles, peace plans, and the occupation of defeated Germany. The author throughout the book puts a human face on the complex and often times confusing policies and goals of the various combatants.

Through long forgotten documents and interviews, the author clearly demonstrates that the factions waging war during the early days did not understand industrialized warfare, because the Germans were depending on horse and foot power to execute the ambitious Schlieffen Plan to defeat the French. The author describes the euphoria that came over the Germans as they marched from cantonments, railheads, and villages to the border. Within a few months after invading Belgium and France, the Germans ran out of steam and failed to achieve their planned decisive victory. It is this backdrop of failure that starts the true efforts to win the war, as described by the author. Since the author is British, he takes a surprising and critical view of the British Expeditionary Force (BEF). He details how the BEF’s small size hindered its effectiveness and almost caused it to become a sideshow. Further criticism of the command relationship
between then-Prime Minister David Lloyd George and Field Marshall Sir Douglas Haig helped to create at times almost a circus sideshow. Hart details in the book how the Prime Minister tried to limit the actual involvement of the BEF during the last year. By keeping troop numbers down and failing to replace soldiers that became casualties. Understandably, the tremendous British death toll played into the Prime Minister’s thinking and actions.

In the last year of the war, the author portrays the arrival of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) almost like a thousand-pound gorilla in a room. This was in part because the AEF was not ready for modern warfare, much as the other combatants had learned at the start of the 1914 hostilities. The author also appears to be unimpressed with the ranks inside the AEF and their experiences fighting in the Indian Wars, Spanish-American War, and the Mexican Punitive Expedition. Hart shows himself to be a bit of an Anglophile when he writes that these wars were colonial wars. He also questions the soundness of Gen. John J. Pershing’s refusal to break up the AEF and “loan” formations to the other allies, since the AEF needed more time to train in the tactics needed to survive in this new kind of warfare.

Credit must be given to the author’s in-depth research on the AEF once it did hit the ground. Eyewitness documents show that the Allies were astonished at the size of the AEF divisions compared to the French and the British formations, because they were twice as big. The 25,000-man divisions of the AEF fought in several battles that clearly put the Germans on the defensive late in the war.

One of the more intriguing parts of this book is the on again/off again peace efforts made by all the combatants. One chapter toward the end of the book gives a truly intriguing look behind the scenes in Germany. The German leadership appeared to see that the game was over, but nobody wanted to go down in history as being responsible for losing the war. Kaiser Wilhelm II, Gen. Erich Ludendorff, and Field Marshall Paul von Hindenburg josted for power during the peace plans but failed to see the Bolshevik threat appearing in the streets of Germany.

This effort by Peter Hart to chronicle the last year of the Great War definitely brings new topics for discussion and study. The only caution that I might add when reading this book is to be aware of the difference between British and American English phrases. One such potential for misunderstanding is the mention of public schools in England, which were (and still are) comparable to private schools in the United States. Regardless of what version of English you practice, you will be thoroughly intrigued as you read this book.

Vernon Yates
River, but contrary to orders, foodstuffs and robes were destroyed rather than taken for the soldiers’ use and the Indians’ horse herd was poorly secured and recovered by its owners the next day. Furthermore, a wounded soldier was knowingly left to his fate on the field of battle. The slew of courts martial had barely concluded when Crook left Fort Fetterman at the end of May for his second foray.

On 29 May, fifteen cavalry companies, five infantry companies, and 100 wagons pulled by 600 mules ascended the old Bozeman Trail. Crook had depended heavily on the use of native guides and scouts in the Southwest but had been unable to recruit any from the agencies east of Fort Laramie. He had sent his guide Frank Grouard to the west in hopes of recruiting scouts from among the Crow and was undoubtedly relieved on 13 June when Grouard arrived at the camp on Goose Creek with 175 Crow auxiliaries.

The next day, 86 Shoshones arrived as well. The guide also brought news that Sitting Bull was camped 45 miles due north on the banks of the Rosebud, with some 700 lodges.

On 15 June all was ready. The wagons would be left behind under guard. The men were ordered to travel with four days rations and the bare minimum of equipment. Infantrymen mounted mules, a process that went surprisingly well, considering that neither the men nor the mules had any previous experience with such an arrangement. The column pulled out, camping the night of 16 June on the Rosebud and continuing along its banks next morning. At 8 a.m., Crow scouts galloped in to report the sighting of some Sioux downstream. Crook determined it best to take some time to form his strategy and ordered the men to unsaddle. Most of the soldiers took advantage of the break to relax, picketing their horses to graze or leading them down to the river to drink.

Sioux hunters had already seen the column and had returned to their camp, which was on Reno Creek, not the Rosebud, to raise the alarm. Many elders counseled restraint. They were there to hunt, not fight, but the Cheyenne among them remembered the unprovoked attack of the previous March and knew that a fight was inevitable. The camp was burgeoning with summer hunters who had come from the reservations, sharing the information that the government was no longer preventing miners from invading the Black Hills. Nobody could hold the warriors back. They would not await an attack; they would engage the soldiers where they found them. Shortly after the men on the banks of the Rosebud unsaddled, more Crow scouts came rushing in. They were being chased by Sioux warriors. The battle began.

The battlefield was huge, encompassing some fourteen square miles, and topographically complex, bordered by the Rosebud on the east and a tributary known as Kollmar Creek on the west, with ridges and rock fields between them. The author does an excellent job condensing the myriad of individual accounts into a coherent battle narrative. It must be borne in mind, of course, that such a reconstruction can seemingly impose order where there was, in fact, chaos. It was generally a mess, with cavalry and infantry responding moment to moment to a dynamic array of threats. The distribution of outcroppings and rocks provided safe positions from which the Native Americans could fight, and if the soldiers managed to make a particular position untenable, they could easily fall back to make a stand from another defensible site. Crook located a workable observation post and sent orders out via courier, slowly taking control of parts of the battlefield. He even managed to hold some companies in reserve. Most of the casualties occurred near the mouth of Kollmar Creek, as a group of retreating soldiers were overrun, with nine being killed. Around 4 o’clock, the Native American forces quit the field. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to estimate their strength, with reasonable estimates running between one and two thousand combatants.

Crook now ordered his battered and exhausted troops to the east side of the field where the Rosebud entered a canyon. He was still convinced that a camp lay just a few miles downstream and was determined to strike it, but the Crow and Shoshone balked at the proposition. The canyon appeared to be the perfect place for an ambush, and they would not enter it. Others pointed out that ammunition was probably running low. There was also the matter of the injured men. Crook ordered the command back to Goose Creek to evacuate the injured and await reinforcements. The Crow and Shoshone scouts then announced that they were done. They had fought the good fight and taken scalps, and it was time to go home. In Crook’s mind, their departure crippled the expedition. Couriers rode off with his reports and requests to be telegraphed back to headquarters, and Crook, uncharacteristically reluctant to act, did nothing. He hunted and fished and moved the camp every few days to better pastures. He was still hunting and fishing when word reached him on 10 July about the events on the Little Big Horn on 25 June. How history would have unfolded had Crook, with or without scouts, put his thousand-man force to some use following the fight on the Rosebud will forever be a topic of speculation.

Crook’s ordeal was not over. In the wake of Little Big Horn, he would lead a punitive expedition. It, too, would go poorly and end up being known as the Horsemeat March, as the starving soldiers were forced to subsist on their broken-down mounts. This book provides a detailed and engaging history of this pivotal battle. It is an excellent

Steven C. Haack


You can tell by the quality of his prose that Philip Gerard is a professor of creative writing. His compilation of essays on the Civil War in North Carolina is marked by sharp writing and superlative composition. One might search here in vain for poor grammar, awkward constructions, or misplaced modifiers. Dr. Gerard has produced a masterpiece of anecdotes about the people in or from the Old North State and their experiences during the years 1861-1865. Gerard originally wrote these narratives on North Carolina’s wartime events as monthly installments during the state’s sesquicentennial celebration. Precisely because he was not a historian, he was deliberately selected for the assignment, because he was “not to bring any preconceived notions” (p. ix) to the task.

North Carolina was the next-to-the-last Confederate state to secede from the union (21 May 1861). Gerard’s anecdotes take the reader from those heady early days of 1861 up to the surrender in April 1865 of Gen. Joseph E. Johnston’s rebel army to the victorious forces of Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman at the “Bennitt Place [sic].” His work encompasses a wide scope, from country boys killed in battle, far from home, to Unionist resisters to the Confederate war effort, from Union soldiers in prisoner of war camps to slaves released from bondage, and from blockade runners to civilians whose lives and property were collateral damage to the military conflict.

Not all North Carolinians were happy with the prospect of secession and war. Pockets of strong pro-Unionists in the western counties and elsewhere were dismayed, even outraged, at the thought of having to fight to protect the plantation owners’ battle to maintain slavery as a right. One group, who styled themselves the “Heroes of America,” openly resisted Confederate conscription and other efforts of the Richmond government to harness the state’s manpower and economy. The goal of the Heroes “was simple and audacious: to bring down the Confederacy.” (p. 45) Some Carolinians who joined the Union army (called “buffaloes” by their detractors) were subject to capital punishment if captured. Gerard tells the story of one such group, hanged by order of Confederate Maj. Gen. George E. Pickett, of Gettysburg notoriety.

But other citizens fought bravely for their new country. At Gettysburg in 1863, the 26th North Carolina Volunteers, the largest regiment in Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia, was destroyed. In three days of battle, the regiment’s ranks were reduced from 800 men to three officers and sixty-four privates. On the Union side, men of the United States Colored Troops (USCT), many of them recruited in North Carolina, fought to take Fort Fisher at the mouth of the Cape Fear River in January 1865, winning the praise of Maj. Gen. Jacob D. Cox, “[They] went forward with alacrity in capital form, showing that they were good soldiers.” (p. 294) One of those men captured among the defenders was his own former master. The stories of individuals fill the pages. There is naval officer and blockade runner John Newland Maffitt; notorious female rebel Rose O’Neal Greenhow, who drowned near Wilmington in 1864 while trying to come ashore from a blockade runner; redoubtable Gov. Zebulon Vance, who warred as much with Confederate President Jefferson Davis as he did with the North; and African-American activist Abraham Galloway, who declared that if slaves could not get political equality “at the ballot box, they would have it at the cartridge box!” (p. 115) And last but not least is the chronicle of the Bennett family, who lost two sons and a son-in-law to the war, and whose simple home was the scene of the final surrender in 1865.

Philip Gerard has done a first-class job of relating North Carolina’s rich Civil War history, not only in accurate reporting of events but also in marvelous story-telling. No reader will come away from a perusal of this book without being impressed by its lively style and its immediacy. For this reviewer it provided a pleasurable and informative read.

Russell K. Brown


As Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1962-64), Ambassador to South Vietnam (1964-65), and a member of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisor Board (1965-70), Maxwell D. Taylor was intimately involved in many of the high level decisions that drew the United States deeper and deeper into the quagmire of the Vietnam War. In this book, Ingo Trauschweizer, director of the Contemporary History Institute at Ohio University, examines Taylor’s involvement in these decisions, as well as in several other key Cold War flashpoints.
Born in Missouri in 1901, Maxwell Taylor graduated from West Point in 1922 as a lieutenant in the Corps of Engineers. He later transferred to the field artillery and was promoted to lieutenant colonel shortly after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. During World War II, his linguistic and diplomatic skills caught the eye of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower. Taylor rose rapidly in rank and was a major general commanding the 101st Airborne Division when the war ended. Gen. George Marshall showed his great confidence in Taylor’s abilities by selecting him to serve as the superintendent at West Point in 1945, and four years later Taylor returned to Europe as the chief of staff for the U.S. European Command and the commander of the American sector in occupied Berlin. This gave him a close look at the Soviet military threat to Western European security that had emerged from the ashes of World War II.

After a tour of duty as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (G-3) on the Army Staff and promotion to lieutenant general, Taylor moved to the other side of the world in 1953 and commanded Eighth Army during the closing months of the Korean War. This brought him another star, before he moved to Japan and commanded U.S. Forces Far East. In mid-1955, Taylor was appointed as the Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army. One of his organizational innovations, the pentomic division (1956-61), was an attempt to enable the Army to perform more effectively on the atomic battlefield, but it was ill-conceived and lasted only a short time. General Taylor retired in 1959, and his 1960 book, The Uncertain Trumpet, was “a scathing indictment of ... the shortcomings of massive [nuclear] retaliation.” (p. 97) Taylor advocated a Cold War strategy of flexible response — conventional weapons to be used as much as possible, before resorting to nuclear options — and that greatly impressed John F. Kennedy. As president, JFK selected Taylor to be his military representative at the White House, which included the task of investigating what had gone wrong in the disastrous 1961 Bay of Pigs operation that had failed to unseat Fidel Castro in Cuba. In 1962, the president recalled Taylor to active duty to serve as the JCS Chairman, and two weeks after he took office, the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted. During his time as chairman, Taylor was troubled by the fact that the JCS members were generally unable to rise above their narrow service interests and fulfill their role as strategy advisors to the president. The author maintains, however, that Taylor was too close to Kennedy and “acted more as a presidential aide than as an independent advisor.” (p. 136)

After two years in the Pentagon, Taylor retired from active duty again, and President Lyndon Johnson appointed him to serve as the ambassador to South Vietnam, where the American military presence was gradually increasing. Taylor favored using airpower, rather than a large ground component, so he and Gen. William C. Westmoreland, the MACV commander, “parted ways on the need for American soldiers.” (p. 158) After leaving Saigon in 1965, Taylor was appointed to the President’s Foreign Intelligence Board, including serving as its chairman from 1968 until 1970. He died in Washington, D.C., in 1987 and was buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

This book is not a full-fledged biography of General Taylor, in that it glosses over the first twenty-three years of his military service in about five pages. Serious analysis of his military (and diplomatic) career only begins with his assignment to West Point after World War II. Nevertheless, the book presents a meticulously researched look at Taylor’s impact on many of the most significant flashpoints of the Cold War and underscores the fact that he shares a good deal of the blame for what went wrong in Vietnam. The book is highly recommended to readers who are interested in that period of American history.

Roger D. Cunningham


At the end of Raising the White Flag, David Silkenat implies that the acceptance by President Donald Trump’s political base of his “inane criticism of John McCain” for being captured (p. 294) can be traced back to “Lost Cause mythology foisted on the American public for the past 150 years. Besides insisting that the South faced unwinnable odds, Lost Cause proponents eventually claimed that southerners had not surrendered at all (at least their principles), and in fact had won the war (partial support for that last assertion can be found in Silkenat’s own writing about the Civil War Centennial Commission, whose members could not meet at a Charleston, South Carolina, hotel in April 1960 because one was black). The result, both North and South, was “a popular and military culture that views surrender as fundamentally illegitimate” (p. 294), according to Silkenat.

Given America’s current feelings about surrender due in part to Lost Cause rhetoric, it is ironic that the Civil War itself saw numerous surrenders, both individuals and entire armies. In fact, one in every four Civil War soldiers surrendered at some point in the conflict, Silkenat writes, approximately the same as the number who died. As a consequence, Silkenat contends, surrender had a significant impact on the war and its aftermath.
The author starts the book with a brief history of surrender during the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, and the Mexican-American War. Despite having surrendered himself at Queenstown Heights during the War of 1812, Winfield Scott did not mention the word surrender, when he wrote the General Regulations for the Army. It was left to Secretary of War John B. Floyd to set what Silkenat calls the “Floyd standard” for surrender during the Civil War. Floyd first ordered Maj. Robert Anderson to fight to the last extremity at Fort Sumter but then later amended that to state that he did not mean for Anderson to needlessly sacrifice his own life or the lives of his men. From that point forward, a “hopelessness” test was applied to surrender to determine whether it was honorable.

A surrender considered dishonorable both at the time it occurred if not in hindsight was that of Brig. Gen. David E. Twiggs at the Alamo in February 1861. Silkenat makes clear that Twiggs got no clear direction from General Scott, who passed the buck to President Buchanan, who also provided no guidance. Twiggs eventually informed Washington of his intention to resign his commission once Georgia seceded. Even so, when Ben McCulloch arrived to force the issue for Texas secessionists, Twiggs refused to surrender unless his men could keep their personal arms. The Texans at first said no, but then relented, and Twiggs surrendered all Federal property in Texas before returning to his family in New Orleans, where he was “received with public honors.” (p. 46) Silkenat speculates that Anderson was celebrated as a hero and Twiggs cast as a pariah not only because Anderson put up a spirited fight — admittedly in a much stronger fort—but also remained with his men as they sailed north, while Twiggs did not fire a shot and immediately abandoned his command after the surrender.

One of the most famous surrenders in Civil War folklore occurred at Fort Donelson in February 1862. Ironies abound. Former U.S. Secretary of War Floyd was one of the Confederate commanders. While he agreed the situation was hopeless, he refused to surrender personally because he feared his antebellum political shenanigans had marked him for severe punishment. The other Confeder ate commander, Gideon Pillow, also claimed the garrison’s surrender was the only option, but likewise said he could not surrender personally because of his high political profile in the Confederacy. That left Simon Buckner to negotiate the surrender with U.S. Grant. Jump forward to May 1865. In the Trans-Mississippi, Edmund Kirby Smith was commanding the last significant Confederate army, the one to which Jefferson Davis was trying to flee. While traveling to Texas to establish a new headquarters, Kirby Smith put Buckner in charge of the troops in Louisiana. Realizing most of his command had melted away, Buckner decided to give up before he had nothing left to surrender, making him the man who oversaw both the first and last surrenders of significant Confederate armies.

Silkenat also points out that Civil War surrender sites, other than Vicksburg, were slow to be commemorated. Even at Vicksburg, the actual spot where Grant accepted Pemberton’s surrender was marked in 1864 by an obelisk, which was promptly defaced. A replacement did not include the word surrender. It was not until 1926 that the Appomattox Chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy erected a plaque commemorating the surrender there. It proclaimed the “heroic struggle in defense of principles believed fundamental to the existence of our government” by Robert E. Lee, who “surrendered 9,000 men the remnant of an army still unconquered in spirit to 118,000 men under Grant.” (p. 180) As Silkenat makes clear, the marker exaggerates the numbers in line with unwinnable odds, emphasizes the “unconquered … spirit” of the Rebels, and proclaims the war was for fundamental “principles” of government, not the expansion of slavery.

Raising the White Flag provides a fresh perspective on the Civil War that should keep readers turning its pages. Let’s hope the University of North Carolina Press fixes the many little typos in any subsequent editions.

David Page


With the rapid passing of the so-called “Greatest Generation,” it is more imperative than ever to obtain the stories behind the experiences of those who truly saved the world from the evils of militarism, fascism, and National Socialism. This is especially important in the case of the approaching 75th anniversary of D-Day, despite the general reluctance of many veterans to revisit their memories.

What is even more significant about this book, over and above its author’s presence at Normandy as part of the 1st Infantry Division (“The Big Red One”) is the fact that he was a medic, providing a rather unique and unusual perspective over and above that of a combat infantryman. Additionally, his experiences in two previous campaigns, North Africa and Sicily/Italy, are included as well.

The style is that of a first-person storyteller, very modest and self-effacing, yet straightforward and told so that even a lay person with
little personal familiarity with military terminology, weapons and organization can easily understand what is being discussed in the text. Considerable emphasis is placed on the concept of one’s buddies as military “family,” as well as downplaying any heroic acts on the part of the author as just simply doing his job, notwithstanding the fact that he wounded in hand-to-hand combat with a German soldier in North Africa, thereby earning the award of a Purple Heart. The Silver Star noted on the book’s cover came from his actions treating the wounded on Omaha Beach, in the invasion’s first wave, prior to being wounded himself and subsequently evacuated to England.

As with many World War II veterans, Ray Lambert grew up in Depression-era America in a family which struggled to keep body and soul together. From an early age, he was tasked with responsibilities that ultimately provided a sense of self-reliance and personal independence. It was not much of a reach to become a medic when he entered the Army, as he already had some veterinary experience in civilian life. As it turned out, his brother also was a medic in the 1st Infantry Division, serving in the same campaigns as the author.

As referenced above, Lambert got his baptism of fire in North Africa and anticipated a period of rest and recuperation before being assigned to the invasion of Sicily, and subsequently... not to be, and the 1st Infantry Division was shipped to England toward the end of 1943 to be part of Operation Overlord.

Not only was Lambert’s 16th Infantry Regiment assigned to the first assault wave, but it also came ashore at Omaha Beach, which turned out to be the worst of the five landing sites, as far as the German defenses were concerned. Unable to establish an aid station, Lambert was forced to use a large rock as the only cover for the wounded from the murderous German machine guns, mortars, and artillery. On a postwar visit to Normandy, the location was dedicated as “Ray’s Rock” in honor of his efforts to prevent the wounded from drowning in the surf and assisting them onto the beach. Continually exposing himself to enemy fire, he was eventually wounded himself and evacuated at the same time as his brother, who was even more seriously wounded than he was and in danger of losing an arm and a leg.

Lambert’s postwar life is told as well. His first wife died of lung cancer, and he subsequently re-married. He became a successful businessman, though he is now retired and telling his story to the younger generation and attending reunions, even as his buddies continue to pass away.

Besides a collaborator’s note, three appendices cover the equipment and responsibilities of combat medics, World War II “battle fatigue” and PTSD, and finally suggestions for further reading.

Primary sources are the gold standard in historical writing, and it is gratifying that Lambert’s story has been recorded for posterity, although according to Jim DeFelice, it took a while to convince him to do so. We are all much the better and richer for it. Our World War II veterans are truly members of the Greatest Generation.

Stuart McClung


As most readers know, the collapse of the British “Southern Strategy” in utter failure at Yorktown led directly to the birth of the United States of America. This major campaign has been examined numerous times. Stanley Carpenter brings a fresh look, analyzing the operation from the perspective of British strategy. He examines the question of how a major power crafts and executes a strategy to prosecute what is in effect an irregular war within the contexts of a regional revolution and a global war. Answers to this question have current pertinence.

The author begins by introducing his analytical framework and defining terms such as strategic coherence, strategic leadership, and the theory of victory. This approach adds precision and leads readers to a better understanding. Carpenter is the Naval War College’s command historian. Thus, his analytical line of attack is somewhat expected, and as it turns out quite successful. This is a graduate course in strategic analysis.

Carpenter hypothesizes that the Southern Strategy was theoretically sound, yet the operational execution was deeply flawed. The British attempted to implement a strategy of “clear and hold.” Regulars would eliminate the enemy in a region, and then Loyalists would secure that region from rebel resurgence while the regulars moved on. Based upon erroneous assumptions, a deep misunderstanding of the nature of the war in the South, inadequate resourcing, and ineffective command and control, the prosecution of the war resulted in cascading failures at various levels.

Carpenter examines the organization and lines of authority of the British ministry, the Royal Navy, and the army, and finds numerous points of friction and blurred responsibility. He then examines
Gen. Horatio Gates disgraced by the loss at Camden, Washington was able to send a most gifted strategist, Nathanael Greene, to this critical theater. Greene implemented a Fabian strategy yielding battles such as Cowpens and Guilford Courthouse. Cornwallis believed that tactical brilliance could rescue a flawed strategy, but even American defeats degraded Cornwallis’s ability to pursue his strategy, leading him into Virginia and eventual defeat at Yorktown.

Carpenter’s writing is clear and to the point. His analysis is comprehensive and convincing. This study is a notable addition to the University of Oklahoma Press’s Campaigns and Commanders Series. I highly recommend *Southern Gambit* to those with an interest in the American Revolution and to general readers of military history.

Richard V. Barbuto
Cruiser Olympia

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The grounds of the U.S. Arsenal in Charleston, South Carolina, guarded by a detachment of the Washington Light Infantry. (Frank Leslie’s Illustrated Newspaper, Dec. 1, 1860)